A WORKING DEFINITION OF ANTI-MUSLIM HATRED

WITH A FOCUS ON HATE-CRIME WORK

PROFESSOR MATTHEW FELDMAN & DR WILLIAM ALLCHORN
THE CENTRE FOR ANALYSIS OF THE RADICAL RIGHT
IN COLLABORATION WITH ACADEMIC CONSULTING SERVICES LTD.
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Professor Matthew Feldman & Dr William Allchorn

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Section 1: Introduction

This report intends to offer a working definition of anti-Muslim hatred. Methodologically, its findings are grounded in recent datasets of empirical evidence largely drawn from reports of attacks both online and offline (understood here as physical or verbal assaults that, in some cases, may prove to be a non-crime incident), compiled by Tell MAMA (Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks; reports were verified annually between 2013 and 2017). Immediately following this Introduction the longest portion of this report, Section 2, also employs accounts drawn from the British press, as well as works from recent academic literature, in reviewing previous descriptions of what is most often termed Islamophobia. Anti-Muslim attacks are more often born of prejudice or hostility toward Islam and Muslims, not ‘fear’. These and other points derive from a dozen qualitative interviews undertaken for this report. Qualitative findings are highlighted in Section 3, conducted with key stakeholders from the Muslim community in Britain; government officials from various agencies, in addition to knowledgeable individuals and activists who monitor the nature and scope of these hate crimes and incidents. These interviews help to isolate key themes relating to anti-Muslim attacks in Britain – including stereotyping and scapegoating; the nature of ‘intersectionality’; the intent of perpetrators; intercommunal attacks and areas for caution – and were undertaken by the authors in the opening months of 2018.

Stressing the date of this study’s compilation is more important than usual with respect to this quickly evolving form of religious, (and often accompanying racial), hatred. During the week of 6 March 2018, just as this report was being completed, letters were sent around the UK announcing that the 3 April 2018 would be ‘Punish a Muslim Day’. ‘Do not be a sheep!’ this vile text declares, warning that the ‘white majority’ is being ‘overrun by those who would like nothing more than to do us harm’. Through a demented ‘points system’, the letter incites attacks against Muslim individuals and institutions. For example, 10 points would be earned for verbal abuse; 25 points for pulling a Muslim woman’s head scarf; 250 points for murder; and 1,000 points for physically attacking a Mosque. Perhaps
understandably, this threat caused alarm amongst Muslim communities in Britain. In addition to inciting terroristic violence, the letter traffics in several stereotypes applied to Islam and its more than one billion adherents around the world. The letter intimates that demographic change and British multiculturalism is down to a hidden plot or conspiracy. Secondly, it assumes that all Muslims are non-white; yet Islam is a faith, not a race – meaning that some believers are white. Likewise, many Muslim men and women choose not to wear the hijab or any outwardly visible signs of their religion; by contrast, some Catholic women wear a mantilla head-covering during the holy season of Lent. Also, dangerously, the letter’s call to violence places defining who a Muslim ‘is’ with the perpetrator. This could lead to attacks on individuals that ‘look’ Muslim (or whose name ‘sounds’ Muslim), which could wrongly mean persons of colour or non-Muslim believers (such as Hindus or Sikhs), being attacked for wearing visibly religious clothing. In reality, like other global religions, Muslims come in all shapes and sizes, including from a range of cultural and religious practices as well as differing sects (such as Sunni, Shia, Ahmadi and Ibadi).

While the ‘Punish a Muslim Day’ is particularly extreme in its anti-Muslim hatred, it draws in turn upon exclusionary themes too often fed by the ‘red top’ press in Britain. While legally defensible under Britain’s freedom of speech laws, these narratives have the effect of stereotyping the more than three million Muslims living in the United Kingdom – advancing a sense of difference and suspicion that remains the hallmark of bigotry. The ‘interconnectivity’ between discriminatory ideas and mainstream, if watered-down, expressions of prejudice targeting Muslim preconceptions, has doubtless helped to stoke the baleful fires of anti-Muslim attacks in Britain.
Stereotypes of Muslims as potential terrorists, paedophiles or somehow culturally ‘alien’, (including Sharia courts and halal diets), remained largely confined to the fringes of British politics at the opening of the 21st century. Broadly, this began to change in the wake of the 7 July 2005 terrorist attacks, which killed 52 innocent people in London and was carried out by four ‘home-grown’ suicide bombers. Anti-Muslim prejudice in Britain was further ‘mainstreamed’ in several high-profile child abuse scandals in the UK involving criminal acts by predominately South Asian men over the last decade. These were abhorrent instances of child sexual abuse, deserving of lengthy prison sentences and nothing less than unequivocal condemnation – from everyone. But to tar just over 5% of Britain’s total population, for the crimes of individuals, is the very essence of discriminatory bias.

In 2011, Baroness Warsi declared that ‘prejudice towards Muslims had “passed the dinner table test” and become socially acceptable.’ Addressing the canard of the Muslim as ‘other’ in Britain must be met head on. A central tenet of British justice is administrative equality; and a central tenet of contemporary British life is the right of individuals to live and associate freely, protected from persecution on the basis of skin colour or faith. Guilt by association is not a democratic value. The noticeable spread of
anti-Muslim sentiment in Britain, Europe, and the US is one reason for the compilation of this study. It is very clear that prejudice can lead to forms of anti-Muslim hatred, which motivate anti-Muslim attacks.

While this report is not attempting a legal definition of anti-Muslim attacks, it bears noting that faith is a protected characteristic in British law with respect to hate crimes (which also extends to ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation, and transgender rights; see also Section 3 below). Expressions of anti-Muslim attacks are explicitly covered by the following Crown Prosecution Service and National Police Chiefs’ Council definition of hate crime, enshrined in August 2017:

any criminal offence which is perceived by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by hostility or prejudice, based on a person’s disability or perceived disability; race or perceived race; or religion or perceived religion; or sexual orientation or perceived sexual orientation or a person who is transgender or perceived to be transgender.6

How a victim, or another person, perceives an attack is, therefore, essential in hate crime and its reporting. Establishing criteria for anti-Muslim attacks can, therefore, clarify the nature and types of incident, while publicly setting out the motives and actions of perpetrators. Reassuring a minority-faith community targeted by prejudice and stereotyping – in making clear the importance and scale of this problem – is, therefore, another important aim of this report.

Relatedly, it bears noting that this report will attempt a working definition of anti-Muslim hatred rather than ‘Islamophobia’. As will be detailed below, while some have suggested that Islamophobia refers to a hatred of Islam and Muslims, crucially, hatred towards a religion does not necessarily have to impact on how that person sees, engages, and communicates with Muslims. People can hate Islam (or any other faith), and be respectful, kind, and courteous to Muslims. Inversely ‘phobia’ or fear of Islam is no defence for discrimination, abuse, or attacks on Muslim people – or on those perceived to be Muslim. As will be taken up directly in the final Section of this report, moreover, the ridicule and questioning of faith and religion are protected under free speech laws in Britain and Europe. Problematically, the term Islamophobia can imply, to some, that the
Muslim faith cannot be questioned, mocked, or ridiculed. This raises a crucial distinction for this report: it is emphatically not seeking to ‘defend’ a particular faith’s merits or otherwise. Instead, it sets out what anti-Muslim hatred ‘looks’ and ‘feels’ like, and the ways in which this is principally manifested in public and online.

This report, therefore, looks at anti-Muslim attacks, as motivated by prejudice against Islam and its adherents. Accordingly, this report suggests against use of the broader, less delimited term Islamophobia, which can be vulnerable to the charge of stifling free speech and expression. Nonetheless, we acknowledge its use by some within academic and social circles.

Being attacked for your identity can take many forms – online or offline, physical, or verbal – but there are some important consistencies. Being the victim of a hate crime is painful; it typically makes victims feel vulnerable and anxious, and by its very nature undercuts levels of community cohesion. Listening to and caring for victims, lowering barriers to reporting, and taking attacks upon Muslims seriously are also advocated by this report. Tackling under-reporting, on one hand, and registering the severity and impact of hate attacks upon individuals by those receiving reports of anti-Muslim incidents on the other, is another of this report’s goals. Finally, creating a working definition and description of tropes relating to manifestations of anti-Muslim hatred in the context of hate crime work, it is hoped, will help raise awareness of this bigoted phenomena, both amongst potential targets of anti-Muslim attacks as well as the wider community of multicultural Britain, of which they are a part. In short, this report seeks to set out a working definition of anti-Muslim attacks as a form of hate incident and/or crime, with examples and manifestations that can be drawn upon by victims, faith-based organisations, and key stakeholders in politics, industry, and activism.
Section 2 – Literature review: from Islamophobia to anti-Muslim Hatred

For much of the concept’s history, Islamophobia and ‘anti-Muslim hatred’ have been used interchangeably, as this section will demonstrate. Yet, this review of existing definitions and approaches will also make clear why these are not synonymous terms and will advocate that the newer phrase ‘anti-Muslim hatred’ should be used for greater accuracy in hate crime work than the more familiar Islamophobia. With respect to the latter, perhaps surprisingly, the term only entered the English lexicon relatively recently. Yet over a generation since its coinage, the term has become a source of controversy in both the scholarly and non-academic world. The importance of a measurable definition for Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred, however, remains a pressing policy issue. In the aftermath of the London Bridge terror attacks on 3 June 2017, for example, anti-Muslim attacks increased five-fold in London alone. Moreover, in the wake of the Finsbury Park terror attack later in that same month, Britain’s Prime Minister, Theresa May, marked out Islamophobia as a distinct form of extremism – suggesting that ‘there has been far too much tolerance of [this type of] extremism in our country over many years’. Indeed, with respect to extremism, a worrying trend amongst the radical right in Britain during recent years has been a perceptible shift from overt anti-Semitism to fanning the flames of popular anti-Muslim hatred. Hate attacks against Muslims are therefore an issue of increasing public concern; moreover, it is one that goes to the heart of British self-understandings of tolerance and individual liberty.

To date, the most widely-used definition of Islamophobia can be found in the Runnymede Trust’s (1997) influential report, ‘Islamophobia: A Challenge for us All’. There, Islamophobia is understood as either a 'dread or hatred of Islam - and therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims' or as an 'unfounded hostility towards Islam'. The Runnymede definition classifies Islamophobic and non-Islamophobic viewpoints, contrasting ‘closed’ and ‘open’ views of Islam. The former includes reducing Islam to 1) ‘monolithic and static, or as diverse and dynamic’; 2) ‘other and separate, or as similar and interdependent’; 3) ‘inferior, or as different but equal’; or 4) ‘an aggressive enemy or as a cooperative partner’. In terms of looking at adherents of the Islamic faith, in
particular, the report’s authors further divided closed and open views into those viewing Muslims as 1) ‘manipulative or as sincere’; 2) whose ‘criticisms of the West are rejected or debated’; 3) where ‘discriminatory behaviour against Muslims is defended or opposed’; and 4) where ‘anti-Muslim discourse is seen as natural or problematic’ (1997: 5). Finally, and in a rejoinder to the 1997 report 20 years on, the Runnymede Trust issued a new definition of Islamophobia as ‘anti-Muslim racism’ (2017: 1); that is, ‘any distinction, exclusion, or restriction towards, or preference against, Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life’.

The newer definition does help to broaden out the nature of anti-Muslim prejudice, allowing the intersectionality of anti-Muslim incidents to be better acknowledged. Islamophobia, by its very nature, appears to prioritise the anti-religious attitude, whether it sought to do so or not. Acknowledging the intersectional nature of anti-Muslim incidents is an important contribution to understanding the lived experiences of Muslim communities in Britain today. Crenshaw’s contribution is widely regarded as furthering the debate, introduced in ‘Mapping the Margins’ that raised limitations about identity politics. Crenshaw focused on violence against women and how it can be influenced by other identities such as ‘race’ and ‘class’ as much as gender (1991, p.1245).

Whilst feminist and anti-racist groups attempted to represent women, their failure to recognise the multiplicity of identities leading to different experiences brought about ‘tensions’:

> The problem with identity politics is not that it fails to transcend difference, as some critics charge, but rather the opposite – that it frequently conflates or ignores intragroup differences (1991, p.1242).

In failing to recognise the presence of multiple identities, women were being represented as a homogeneous identity that disregarded and overlooked significant differences that could culminate in prejudicial experiences. Similarly, intersectionality is particularly important today in better understanding anti-Muslim incidents and differences within and between Muslim communities. This helps counter the
essentialisation of Muslim communities by demonstrating differences, not just through religious denominations but culturally and ethnically, as well as in how religiosity can vary from individual to individual. Tell MAMA’s 2017 annual report highlighted how most victims of anti-Muslim incidents are women, demonstrating the gendered dimension to anti-Muslim hostility.

However, anti-Muslim incidents also intersect with other identities, including race. In the Tell MAMA 2016 report (13), one female respondent stated: ‘actually, 9 out of 10 times, the abuse I receive is based on race. Although they use religion because I am identifiable as a Muslim woman, the words that come out of their mouth have to do with race, so the race and the religion are tied up together in people’s minds.’ Compiling a working definition that allows all prejudice to be acknowledged is important in moving this debate forward and recognising the lived experiences of Muslims today.

Due to its influential and wide-ranging nature, the 1997 Runnymede definition of Islamophobia has come under considerable scrutiny in academic circles. For example, Nasar Meer and Tariq Madood (2009) criticised the use of ‘unfounded hostility’ in the original Runnymede definition – suggesting that whether such hostility is ‘founded’ or ‘unfounded’ is clearly subjective in terms of who interprets this hostility in the first place. Any national definition should, therefore, avoid this pitfall. Moreover, Dr Chris Allen – a leading writer on anti-Muslim hatred in the UK – takes issue with the report’s narrow focus upon anti-Muslim sentiments as a form of action – suggesting that we can also see anti-Muslim prejudice as a view shaping a wider climate of what is acceptable and normal in regard to Muslims and Islam. Furthermore, Allen criticises the ‘black and white’ nature of associating ‘closed views’ with Islamophobia and ‘open views’ with Islamophilia – omitting a substantial grey area of views in between. In a report on the far-right street protest movement, the English Defence League, Paul Jackson, and Matthew Feldman (2011: 10-11) touched upon another common critique of the Runnymede definition – namely its broad and over-simplified look at Islam. For example, Jackson and Feldman suggested that the report falls into the same trap as those who perpetrate Islamophobia – namely treating Islam as a monolithic entity, without any consideration of the various theological and cultural aspects within modern day Islam.
academic work that took up these critiques in putting forward a different terminology for anti-Muslim prejudice was Fred Halliday’s (1999) review article – called “Islamophobia Reconsidered”. There, Halliday uses the term ‘anti-Muslimism’ to define negative attitudes toward Muslims. Writing in the late 1990s – and reflecting on the Gulf War, Srebrenica genocide and other anti-Muslim mass atrocities – Halliday argued: ‘The attack now is against not Islam as a faith but Muslims as a people ... the enemy is not a faith or a culture, but a people.’ He thus criticised the use of the term Islamophobia, for he believed that it ascribed negative attitudes to Islam itself rather than a set of ‘more contemporary causes’ directed at individuals of the Muslim faith. Moreover, he suggested that it led to the ‘distortion’ that there is only one form of Islam, meaning that the Runnymede’s definition ‘inevitably runs the risk of denying the right, or possibility, of criticisms’, especially when it comes to different permutations of Islam; particularly Shia and Ahmadi sects.15

More recently, John E. Richardson has tried to tease out the important tension between Islamophobia and reasonable criticism of Islam as a religion. In ‘On delineating “reasonable” and “unreasonable” criticisms of Muslims’, Richardson agrees with Halliday’s (1999) critique of Islamophobia as a concept that pushes forward a ‘unified, singular and perhaps essentialised “thing” at which such prejudice can be directed’. He also echoes Halliday’s complaint that Islamophobia is sometimes used as a tool to suggest that any and all criticism of Islam should be off limits. In response, Richardson puts forward his own criteria of where legitimate criticism slips into ‘prejudiced, derogatory, and anti-Muslim discourse’. Richardson concludes by suggesting that any critique should be a) avoid descending into hostility or ad hominem attack; b) be accurate and relate to actual beliefs; c) be reasoned, logical and non-prejudicial; and d) be prefaced by the principle of freedom of religion.16 In what follows, we will draw upon the Runnymede’s distinction between open and closed to suggest that the distinction between legitimate and prejudicial criticism falls somewhere in the divide between fair-minded and prejudicial inquiry into the key tenets, beliefs and teachings of both the Muslim faith, Islamic practices, and individuals subscribing to this praxis.

Fast-forwarding to existing critiques from the present decade, Dr Chris Allen put
forward another influential definition of Islamophobia. In his 2011 article on the topic, Allen defined Islamophobia as an 'ideology ... that sustains and perpetuates negatively evaluated meanings about Muslims and Islam.' These, he suggests, contain misunderstandings and inaccuracies that ‘inform and construct thinking about Muslims and Islam as Other.’ Allen had earlier noted three specific components of Islamophobia, including 1) Islamophobia as an ideology that ‘provides meaning about Muslims and Islam’; 2) Islamophobia as a ‘mode of operation’ (disseminated through ‘rationalisation, universalisation and narrativisation; displacement, euphemisation and trope; standardisation and symbolisation of unity’ that invariably paints Islam and Muslim in a negative light); and 3) what Allen calls ‘exclusionary practices’ or ‘practices that disadvantage, prejudice or discriminate against Muslims and Islam in social, economic and political spheres.’ Exclusionary practices include both physical actions – such as pulling off hijab and other visibly religious clothing or attacks on Mosques – but also discrimination in employment, housing and other spheres of economic and social life.

Whilst Allen’s definition of Islamophobia helps frame this phenomenon more broadly, there are also a number of further considerations to be made – especially in aiming to move towards a consensus understanding of anti-Muslim hatred. For example, Allen gives a widened definition of Islamophobia to include ‘systems of thought and meaning, manifested in signifiers and symbols that influence, impact on and inform the social consensus about the Other.’ By psychologising Islamophobia in this way, or suggesting that it can be found in certain patterns of thought, Allen offers a deterministic model that infers that accusations of anti-Muslim sentiment can be levelled at a group or individual even before evidence of anti-Muslim actions exist. If this is applied to hate crime research, it may be open to charges of restricting ‘opinion’ rather than documenting and framing anti-Muslim hatred through evidence or tropes that are used against Muslims.

With regards to a national definition which incorporates hate crime work, there is a case to be made for a narrower characterisation of anti-Muslim hatred, which focuses less on ideas and develops a tighter focus on anti-Muslim attacks (such as anti-Muslim assaults, targeted property damage and verbal abuse). This does not take away from
issues of institutional anti-Muslim bigotry where structural barriers, discriminatory practises, comments, and the work-based exclusion of Muslims in the culture of the office must be included in any definition. Focussing upon practical expressions of anti-Muslim hatred can help reduce the space for denial of the phenomena to take place - re-focusing efforts on specific manifestations and impacts of anti-Muslim attacks. It also advances specialist analysis from the more abstract ‘defence of faith’ to one which is more delimited in scope, while reflecting the real-world impacts on the lives and life chances of Muslims.

Aiding in this endeavour, Erik Bleich advanced ‘a focal definition’ of Islamophobia that was quantifiable enough to be tracked across time and geographical boundaries. In his 2011 journal article, entitled ‘What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There?’, Bleich (like Halliday before him) conceptualises Islamophobia as ‘indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims’. In providing a rationale for this definition, Bleich suggests that ‘indiscriminate’ should be used to encapsulate differences between those who hold differentiated and undifferentiated views about Muslims and Islam. ‘Negative attitudes and emotions’, importantly, is an attempt to move away from the phobia or fear-based definitions of Islamophobia, toward a more expansive range of negative emotions and attitudes (e.g. aversion, threat-based fears, and hostility), and is directed at individuals or members of a group. Finally, Bleich suggests that ‘Islam or Muslims’ is used to recognise the importance and inter-relatedness of both the Islamic and Muslim dimensions of Islamophobia as well as the causal relationship between these two categories of individual and public perceptions.

Building upon Bleich’s definition, Marc Helbling employs a very similar definition of Islamophobia in his 2012 edited book on Islamophobia in the West. His guiding definition is: ‘indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims’. However, Helbling also suggests another important definition that might be useful when approaching a national definition and is broader in scope. This suggests that 'Islamophobia is a rejection of Islam, Muslim groups and Muslim individuals on the basis of prejudice and stereotypes.’ Added to this, Stolz suggests that such forms of prejudice ‘may [also] have emotional, cognitive, evaluative as well as action-oriented elements (e.g.
Picking up on the notion of underlying prejudice, another academic article which sought to redefine the boundaries of the debate on Islamophobia is Roland Imhoff and Julia Recker’s ‘Differentiating Islamophobia: Introducing a New Scale to Measure Islamoprejudice and Secular Islam Critique’. Published in the journal Political Psychology in 2012, they extend the existing critique that Islamophobia ‘confounds prejudiced views of Muslims with a legitimate critique of Muslim practices based on secular grounds’. They instead suggest that a more accurate moniker for this form of discrimination is ‘Islamoprejudice’. Moreover, the authors also put together a new Scale for Islamoprejudice and Secular Critique of Islam in order to test opposition and support for a new mosque in Cologne, Germany. Using the Runnymede Trust’s eight criteria of a ‘closed view of Islam’ and an online survey of 316 individuals, what they found was that ‘Islamoprejudice’ can be further related to ‘explicit and implicit prejudice, right-wing authoritarianism, and social dominance orientation’. In their conclusion, Imhoff and Recker suggest that ‘Islamophobia may be an expendable neologism for a phenomenon already long known: racist prejudice’.

A final academic study in this area to be highlighted is Nasar Meer’s 2014 article, ‘Islamophobia and postcolonialism: continuity, Orientalism and Muslim consciousness.’ Meer investigates whether Islamophobia can be best understood as a postcolonial concept. He argues that postcolonial thought is useful in accounting for Islamophobia, notably given a) the continuity in how colonial dynamics are reproduced in contemporary postcolonial environment; b) translation, or the utility of ‘Orientalism’ in informing Islamophobia; and c) the process of ‘making of Muslims’ part of a wider ‘decentring’ of the West. In essence, Meer casts Islamophobia as part of an imperial legacy, while largely deriving from longstanding, reductive European depictions of ‘the East’. Meer uses Abdool Karim Vakil’s definition of Islamophobia, which suggests that ‘hostility towards Islam cannot be separated from discrimination of Muslims in neat or unproblematic ways’, and moreover, that the ‘denigration of Islam impacts on Muslim respect and self’ through the social inequalities that arise from anti-Muslim sentiment that cannot be ignored. This raises the importance of intersectionality when arriving at any new
definition of anti-Muslim hatred – especially the gendered aspects of many anti-Muslim attacks – which, unlike all other forms of hate incidents, inclines toward majority (white) male attacks upon (often visibly Muslim) females.

Picking up on this point, several studies have fleshed out key gendered aspects of anti-Muslim hatred. One of the earliest was provided in 2012 by Neil Chakraborti and Irene Zempi’s ‘The Veil under Attack: Gendered Dimensions of Islamophobic victimization’. This article explores how ‘the visibility of the veil in the public gaze marks its wearers as particularly vulnerable to expressions of Islamophobia’. What they find is striking: ‘Stereotypes about veiled women’s subservience coupled with the assumption that their Muslim identity cannot be mistaken, denied or concealed, renders veiled women “ideal subjects” against whom to enact anti-Muslim hostility.’ Chakraborti and Zempi conclude by outlining the ‘hidden’ nature of prejudice against wearing the veil – with anti-Muslim hostility often coded through underlying assumptions such as ‘oppression’ and ‘inequality’.

In a subsequent study from 2015, Chakraborti and Zempi added empirical evidence to the conceptual and theoretical approach in their first article. Drawing upon 60 individual and 20 focus group interviews with veiled female victims of Islamophobic hostility, both authors go on to outline the individual, familial and community harms associated with this gendered form of prejudice. ‘The emotional, psychological and behavioural harms associated with victimisation are not restricted to victims and their families’, they conclude, ‘rather, the harm extends to the wider Muslim community.’ Individual victims are thus replaced by collective victims – disrupting notions of safety within the wider Muslim ummah. Returning to varying definitions of Islamoprejudice, gendered dimensions of anti-Muslim hostility at an individual-level can, therefore, be linked to anti-Muslim hostility at a societal-level – promoting the notion of ‘parallel lives’ and self-enclosed communities due to actions perpetrated against British Muslim women.

Perhaps the most useful academic study in arriving at a fine-grained understanding of the gendered aspects of anti-Muslim hostility is Chris Allen, Arshad Isakjee, and Özlem Ögtem Young’s November 2013 report, “Maybe we are hated”: The
Experience and Impact of anti-Muslim Hate on British Muslim Women'. Conducting twenty face-to-face interviews with British Muslim women referred to the third-party reporting service, Tell MAMA, Allen et. al. found that experiences of anti-Muslim hostility varied greatly between the research participants – ranging from physical abuse in the street to harassment of individuals in online spaces. Moreover, the authors highlight that the impact of these experiences was ‘most significant’ – with a majority of participants feeling ‘more scared and fearful than before’. In conclusion, Allen et. al. note the importance of giving a ‘public’ and ‘media’ voice to the ‘often silent and overlooked victims’ of gendered hate – reinforcing Chakraborti and Zempi’s earlier contention in 2012 that the too-often ‘hidden’ nature of prejudice against Muslim women needs to be combatted.

Another area too little addressed is the relationship of anti-Muslim hatred to the connectivity between online and offline attacks. Indeed, Imran Awan and Irene Zempi have both analysed the online and offline nature and impacts of anti-Muslim hatred. In a 2015 report for Tell MAMA, for example, Awan and Zempi discovered a continuity between online and offline incidents of anti-Muslim hate crime, with participants describing living in fear because of the possibility of online threats materialising offline. Once more, they stress the gendered quality of anti-Muslim attacks: Muslim women more likely to be attacked, and Muslim men less likely to report a hate crime due to a fear of looking ‘weak’. Importantly, they also highlight the significant ‘real world’ impacts of online anti-Muslim attacks upon victims – with some experiencing depression, emotional distress, anxiety and fear.

Another early academic work considering the online aspects of hate incidents was Imran Awan’s 2014 study of anti-Muslim tweets on the social media platform, Twitter. Examining 500 tweets from 100 different users, he found that the majority of perpetrators were men (72%) and noted 8 characteristics of anti-Muslim tweeters. These included 1) the trawler (someone who goes through twitter accounts in order to target Muslim users); 2) the apprentice (someone who is fairly new to twitter but targets people with the help of more experienced offenders); 3) the disseminator (someone who retweets documents, pictures, and messages of an Islamophobic nature frequently); 4)
the impersonator (those who use fake accounts to target individuals); 5) the accessory (a person who joins others to perform an online anti-Muslim attack); 6) the reactive (users who begin online campaigns after a major offline incident); 7) the mover (someone who changes their account frequently to attack the same victim); and 8) the professional (someone with a major twitter following who nonetheless will carry out a major campaign of hate against a group or individual). In conclusion, Awan suggests that the 500 tweets he had collected ‘highlight[ed] the derogatory and systematic abuse that [Muslim] people are suffering as a result of online abuse’, and that tighter cyber hate regulations and protocols need to be enforced across the board.35 This issue of tighter ‘policing’ of hate speech has been highlighted a number of times by Tell MAMA, with the agency regularly receiving reports of anti-Muslim abuse online from concerned Facebook and Twitter users.36

Following his 2014 study of anti-Muslim tweets, Imran Awan published a 2016 study analysing Islamophobic content on Facebook. Conducting a qualitative analysis of 100 Facebook pages and 494 instances of online hate speech directed at Muslims, Awan finds that manifestations of online anti-Muslim hatred typically include accusations of Muslims as ‘terrorists’, ‘rapists’, a ‘security threat’, and prime targets for ‘deportation’.37 Moreover, he constructs another typology to understand the common characteristics and parallels associated with bigoted comments posted on Facebook. The five types of posts or comments he identifies are: 1) the opportunistic (posts and comments of hate directed at Muslims after a particular incident); 2) the deceptive (creating fear through the use of posts which specifically relate to false events in order to intensify Islamophobic hatred); 3) fantasists (those who use Facebook webpages to fanaticise over Muslim deaths and consequences with respect to Muslim events); 4) producers (those using and promoting racist images and videos which are used as a means to create a climate of fear); and 5) distributors (people who use Facebook in order to distribute messages of hate online via posts, likes, images, videos and comments).38 In conclusion, Awan suggests that online hate can be as ‘equally damaging’ as offline hate – with wider effects on communal and social cohesion as well as the Muslim community itself being of prime concern.
Looking at online hate incidents in particular, what is notable from reading these reports is that, between 2012 – 2015, cyberhate started to overtake offline hate as the major source of anti-Muslim attacks in Britain. For example, in 2013, Feldman, Littler, Dack and Copsey note: ‘The majority of the incidents of Muslim hate crime reported by Tell MAMA are online incidents and 300 – 69% - of these online cases reported a link to the far right.’40 This report also found that – like offline incidents – the majority of cyberhate was committed by males, while most posts included threats of offline action. Moreover, the subsequent year’s reporting of anti-Muslim attacks painting a similar picture, with 599 incidents of online hate versus 135 offline attacks.41 The final year reports, as with the previous year undertaken by Feldman et. al., further corroborated this trend, with two-thirds of anti-Muslim hate crimes having an online element.42 What this (and the other aforementioned reports) point to, therefore, is the sustained nature of cyberhate directed at Muslim communities in Britain – and beyond. This should, therefore, feature heavily in any working definition of anti-Muslim attacks.

Whilst academic definitions may be useful in parsing conceptual issues related to definitions of anti-Muslim hatred (such as the use of ‘phobia’ as against ‘prejudice’; distinctions between Islam as faith and Muslims as people; and especially the online/offline manifestations of bigoted attacks), it is also instructive to review recent policy approaches. This is especially the case in moving towards a sustainable, generic definition of anti-Muslim prejudice. In addition to the ground-breaking Runnymede Trust definition outlined above, there have been several other attempts within and outside the UK context to define what we mean by this particular form of hatred.

Based in Strasbourg, France, the Council of Europe published its first definition of Islamophobia in 2004. Contained within a report on ‘Islamophobia and its consequences on young people’, this defined anti-Muslim prejudice as ‘the fear of or prejudiced viewpoint towards Islam, Muslims and matters pertaining to them. Whether it takes the shape of daily forms of racism and discrimination or more violent forms, Islamophobia is a violation of human rights and a threat to social cohesion’.43 While useful in its all-encompassing nature, the use of ‘phobia’ here again is an overly general descriptor – curtailing other emotions that might be associated with anti-Muslim hatred, such as
hostility or anger. Also, problematically, the phrase ‘matters pertaining to them’ is too vague and requires further clarification.

A second policy definition that has emerged from international fora is that used by the Turkish Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research’s (SETA) European Islamophobia Report (EIR). This defines anti-Muslim prejudice as ‘anti-Muslim racism’ and sees it as ‘a dominant group of people aiming at seizing, stabilizing and widening their power by means of defining a scapegoat.’ This leads the report’s editors to suggest that anti-Muslim hatred ‘operates by constructing a static ‘Muslim’ identity’ that ‘tells us more about the Islamophobe than it tells us about the Muslims/Islam’. What is concerning about this definition, however, is its suggestion of complicity by a dominant group in the perpetuation of a particular form of prejudice. While discrimination may well operate at a societal level, it is ultimately individuals motivated by hatred of Islam or Muslims that undertake anti-Muslim attacks, whether physically, verbally or online. It is for these reasons that this well-meaning definition has not been adopted more broadly, unlike the Runnymede Trust definition.

A third and fourth policy definition of Islamophobia has also emerged from the UN’s Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, as well as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. In terms of the former, anti-Muslim hatred is defined as ‘a baseless hostility and fear vis-à-vis Islam, and as a result, a fear and aversion towards all Muslims or the majority of them.’ It also goes on to suggest that this has ‘practical consequences’, leading to the ‘unequal treatment’ and ‘exclusion’ of Muslims from political and social spheres. In terms of the latter, anti-Muslim prejudice is understood ‘in its essence [as] a religion-based resentment’. Again, this describes the practical expression of this prejudice through ‘racial hatred, intolerance, prejudice, discrimination and stereotyping’ and involves ‘an irrational or very powerful fear or dislike of Islam’.

A final policy definition that is useful for definitional purposes relating to anti-Muslim attacks is Tell MAMA’s own working definition of anti-Muslim hatred. Drawing upon both the quantitative and qualitative work undertaken by the leading third sector organisation in this area, Tell MAMA’s 2013 formulation asserts:

Anti-Muslim prejudice or hatred is a certain perception of Muslims, which may
be expressed as hatred or outward hostility towards Muslims. Hatred may take the form of anti-Muslim rhetoric and physical manifestations that are targeted towards Muslims or non-Muslim individuals considered to be sympathetic to Muslims and/or their property, towards Muslim community institutions, religious and other related social institutions.47

Moreover, concrete categories that Tell MAMA employs for recording anti-Muslim attacks include an online-offline distinction – privileging abusive behaviour, threats and anti-Muslim literature for the former as well as physical attacks, threatening behaviour, discrimination, vandalism and hate speech for the latter.48 Furthermore, annual reports of anti-Muslim attacks conducted by Tell MAMA have highlighted the geographical and gendered nature of this type of prejudice – often happening in public spaces or transport and perpetrated by white men on Muslim women.49

Having considered several academic and policy definitions of anti-Muslim hatred, there are several issues that need to be considered to better define this metastasising phenomenon. Firstly, a vague or all-encompassing definition would not be helpful for government and policy-practitioners involved in the day-to-day identification and response to hate crime. Accordingly, any definition of anti-Muslim hatred should, therefore, be precise in its use of terminology and specific in scope. Examples of where this has not been the case extend to a generalised ‘fear’– containing a lack of clarity regarding the relationship between perpetrator and victim.50 Borrowing from Bleich’s 2011 definition, it is clear that anti-Muslim hatred is motivated by hostility or discriminatory bias against the Islamic faith that is based on preconceived negative opinions, stereotypical assumptions, intolerance or hatred directed at its undifferentiated adherents.

Secondly, and relatedly, any useful definition should enumerate examples or ‘manifestations’ of the phenomena in question. It is no good talking about exclusionary practices or a generalised racism without also specifying how this happens in concrete reality. It is, therefore, clear that anti-Muslim hatred can take on certain manifestations that involve (but are not limited to) physical, verbal and online attacks perpetrated against Muslim individuals (predominantly women), community institutions and religious buildings. This more concrete focus will be a useful guide for frontline staff, policymakers
and recording bodies. Thirdly, and borrowing from the Runnymede report’s distinction between open and closed forms of Islam, it is clear that what separates legitimate criticism from anti-Muslim hostility is a closed view of the Muslim faith. We can, therefore, suggest that anti-Muslim attacks are driven by a prejudiced understanding of the Islamic faith that does not engage in open intellectual inquiry into its key tenets, beliefs, and teachings. This suggests a prejudicial understanding of Islam rather than an unbiased one.
Section 3: Toward a definition of anti-Muslim hatred in the Context of Hate Incidents and Crimes

For reasons set out in the initial two Sections above, anti-Muslim attacks and the hostility toward Islam and Muslims that motivates it should be considered hate incidents. Put another way, underlying hostility can lead to anti-Muslim hatred – a form of religious hate incident, manifested as an attack upon Muslim persons or property (including sites of worship) – that is aggravated by the perpetrator’s prejudice or bias, and a victim’s perception that they are attacked because of their Muslim faith. In fleshing out this characterisation, this final Section moves toward a working definition of anti-Muslim attacks. To do so, it will first review established legislation on hate crimes and non-crime incidents, before turning to four key considerations regarding anti-Muslim attacks that were repeatedly stressed in stakeholders’ qualitative interviews toward this report. After highlighting these four points, a working definition and characteristics will then be set out in the conclusion.

By way of an essential context, broadly, hate attacks were firmly established in Britain’s national consciousness in the years following the race-hate murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993. Following an extensive review, governmental action on hate crimes and non-crime hate incidents was galvanised by the Macpherson definition of racism in 1999. By 2007, five strands of hate crime had been established, including attacks motivated by a hostility to a victim’s perceived ethnicity, sexuality, disability, sexual orientation, religion, or transgender identity. In 2014, the College of Policing published operational guidance for police in Britain also enumerated these five strands. In respect of religious hate attacks, and derivatively anti-Muslim hate attacks, non-crime incidents are defined as ‘Any non-crime incident which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on a person’s religion or perceived religion.’

A hate crime is similarly defined, with the difference being a criminal offence was determined by police to have been committed:

Any criminal offence which is perceived, by the victim or any other person, to
be motivated by a hostility or prejudice based on a person’s religion or perceived religion.\textsuperscript{51}

This latter approach to hate crimes is also reflected in the most recent Code for Crown Prosecutors. Accordingly, the CPS may provide increased sentences for crimes that cause alarm or distress for minority communities in Britain:

Prosecutors must also have regard to whether the offence was motivated by any form of discrimination against the victim’s ethnic or national origin, gender, disability, age, religion or belief, sexual orientation or gender identity; or the suspect demonstrated hostility towards the victim based on any of those characteristics. The presence of any such motivation or hostility will mean that it is more likely that prosecution is required [....] The greater the impact of the offending on the community, the more likely it is that a prosecution is required.

In considering this question, prosecutors should have regard to how community is an inclusive term and is not restricted to communities defined by location.\textsuperscript{52}

More recently, the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights published a European directive for understanding hate crime. This suggests that such views express underlying ‘bias motivation’ whereby the perpetrator in question has ‘preconceived negative opinions, stereotypical assumptions, intolerance or hatred directed to a particular group that shares a common characteristic’. Added to this, there must also be a criminal offence leading to a hate crime designation; this can include threats, property damage, assault, or murder against a group that share a protected characteristic (such as the Muslim community).\textsuperscript{53}

Parallel with these evolving descriptions of hate crimes and hate incidents have been the influential work of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. For several years, key stakeholders from the Jewish community in Britain advocated a characterisation of antisemitism that would be both publicly available and used as a template for understanding when hate incidents and crimes against Jews took place. A working definition was formally adopted in May 2016 by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA), which offered a working definition of antisemitism as ‘a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish
individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities."\(^{54}\)

As noted by Dr Chris Allen and Fiyaz Mughal OBE, a simple amendment of this definition that is applicable to Britain’s Muslim community would have the added benefit of highlighting the comparable – though not synonymous – nature of hate crime associated with these two forms of prejudice more broadly.\(^{55}\) In applying the IHRA framework to anti-Muslim attacks, therefore, it may be asserted that religious-based hostility toward, or hatred of, Muslims, manifested as an attack on Muslim persons or property (including sites of worship) should be considered a form of religious hate incident or crime, since it is aggravated by the perpetrator’s bias and a victim’s perception that they are attacked on the basis of their faith.

Yet, to arrive at a heuristically useful working definition of anti-Muslim attacks, we need to be clear in spelling out recognisable forms that ‘hostility’ or ‘hatred’ toward the Muslim community might take, as well as identifying specific ‘rhetorical and physical’ manifestations or characteristics. Some of the overlapping themes which emerge from the IHRA’s definition might include stressing institutional expressions of anti-Muslim prejudice, or intra-Muslim hostility. In dialogue with community voices interviewed for this report, a number of other salient concerns regarding anti-Muslim hatred and corresponding hate attacks merit closer description below.

The first of these is a brief recounting of some of the key tropes used in anti-Muslim attacks. Most prominent today are accusations all are ‘terrorists’ or ‘paedophiles’. The former of these relates to political violence, which remains a leading security threat in many countries globally. Yet, this is wholly unrelated to the vast, overwhelming majority of peaceful, law-abiding Muslims. So too with child sexual abuse scandals – sometimes wrongly termed ‘Muslim grooming gangs’ such as that in Rotherham. This is wrong for several reasons: child abuse carried out by, say, Christian priests or pastors similarly do not indict all confessions and cultures of Christianity. To do so merely advocates the kind of bigotry in which faith-based hatred teems. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Islam instructs parents, carers, or anyone else associated with the faith to engage in child sexual exploitation or abuse.
Likewise, misogyny, terrorism and child abuse can be carried out by individuals from other faiths, or by those rejecting religion entirely. Furthermore, such bias against an entire faith largely depends upon a conspiratorial framework; that is, the view that a secret group of, in this case, Muslim elites (such as politicians, Imams or other ‘community leaders’), somehow encourages this kind of criminality as a way of weakening non-Muslim majority states via demographic change, political violence or grooming. These assumptions exemplify prejudice against Islam by reducing its complexity and varied traditions to monolithic – and invariably negative – stereotypes. For these reasons, attacking an individual Muslim with a permutation of ‘paedophile’, ‘terrorist’ or similar slur should be understood as an expression of anti-Muslim hatred.

Judging the whole for actions of a part is a form of scapegoating which, in terms of anti-Muslim hostility, also extends to criticism of cultural or political practices in Muslim-majority practices when targeted at an individual for their faith. This might include forced marriage, gender segregation or Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), which is still practised in several Muslim-majority countries. In Egypt, for instance, the practice goes back to the Pharaohs but has been banned since 2007; likewise, there is no tradition of this practice in Muslim-majority Turkey or Pakistan, while the highest indications are in Indonesia. Put simply, this is a cultural (and in most countries, illegal) practice rather than an Islamic religious tenet, shown by the existence of FGM in several Christian-majority countries in central Africa (such as Nigeria, Kenya, and Tanzania). Herein lies the bias involved in viewing Islam as a single ‘thing’ rather than a monotheistic faith that, like Judaism or Christianity, contains a number of social and cultural permutations.

The same obviously goes for human rights abuses in some Muslim-majority nations. Criticising foreign policies or human rights violations is one thing; doing so as a proxy to attack individuals having nothing to do with these practices on the assumed basis of their Islamic faith, on the other hand, constitutes anti-Muslim hatred. Here the parallels with the IHRA working definition of anti-Semitism are instructive: ‘Manifestations might include the targeting of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish collectively. However, criticism of Israel similar to that leveled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic’. Trenchant opposition to unjust policies and practices is welcome in terms of widening
public debates and understanding. By contrast, holding individuals responsible for imputed views or religion – the latter, part of their identity, which is protected for minorities in Britain, Europe, and many other countries – is precisely the kind of prejudice that may prompt a hate attack. The above represent clear abuse targeting individuals, specific groups, or places of worship, which emerge from hostility to Islam and/or hatred of Muslims. Yet manifestations of anti-Muslim hatred is not always so clear. Intersectionality can be a major component here, especially in conjunction with the wider social prevalence of Islamophobia noted in the Introduction of this report. Put simply, people have multiple identities. In Britain as elsewhere in Europe, Muslims are likely to have multiple protected identities (e.g. disability, ethnicity, or sexuality). More relevantly, a majority of Muslims are non-white and might, therefore, be victims of hate crime on the basis of ethnicity and faith. This is one reason some third sector agencies prefer the term ‘anti-Muslim racism’ to ‘anti-Muslim hatred’. A generation ago in Britain, for instance, Muslims might have been victims of abuse via the ‘P-word’; slurs like ‘terrorist’ or ‘paedophile’ are much more common today than before. Islam is a faith, not an ethnicity, and millions of Muslims are also white. For this reason, intersectional prejudice can be an aggravating factor in anti-Muslim attacks – especially if the victim is disabled, LGBTQ or non-white: all of these are protected minority identities in British and European law.

At the same time, as with all hate crime, the perception of the victim is decisive. Therefore, if a victim perceives a hate attack to be the result of a perpetrator’s hostility to their faith, this should be construed as a religious-based hate incident or crime. Nor does this need preclude other, intersectional identities that may also be protected by hate crime legislation. Anti-Muslim racism may well be a valid term if a non-white Muslim person is the victim of a hate attack targeting their ethnicity or faith; however, it may be better to understand such an incident as an attack on two protected identities: protected minority faith and protected ethnicity (or sexuality, disability, or transgender identity). While gender is not currently a protected characteristic, it bears reiterating that anti-Muslim hate attacks are frequently male-on-female, and as recent research has shown, the gendered dimension of Muslim victims is an essential consideration.

In changing focus now, while hate crimes and non-crime incidents like those
described above rely upon a victim’s (or other person’s) understanding of the nature of an attack, manifestations of anti-Muslim hatred can also derive from the perpetrator’s perceptions. This underscores a point made above, namely, that most Muslims are non-white – and anti-Muslim hatred can act as a proxy for hate attack against a victim’s ethnicity. To an extent, therefore, the context and motivation of the perpetrator may be an important consideration (particularly in the case of hate crime prosecutions). Similarly, other faiths – which sometimes also wear visibly-religious clothing, such as head coverings, or in the case of men, have beards– have also been the victims of anti-Muslim attacks. According to Imran Awan and Irene Zempi, for instance: ‘The rise in Islamophobic hate crime has made many Muslims live in fear. But this kind of hatred is pervasive and can affect anyone perceived to be Muslim. “You all look the same”, one man was told after explaining that he wasn’t Muslim to somebody who abused him on the train.’ Their findings were based upon 20 interviews with non-Muslim men who ‘believed that their skin colour, their beard or turban meant that they were perceived to be Muslim – and targeted for it.’ In these and similar incidents, faith-based hostility prejudice leads a perpetrator to attack a person – whether in person or online, physical or otherwise – because they think their victim is Muslim based upon name, appearance or other characteristic (even if this is not actually the case); this should also be considered a manifestation of anti-Muslim hatred.

A person might also be a victim of anti-Muslim hatred, inversely, for sectarian reasons. This raises the penultimate issue stressed in qualitative interviews toward this report; namely, inter-communal anti-Muslim attacks. Simply put, Muslims can also be the perpetrators of anti-Muslim attacks. In examples of other inter-communal hate attacks, a perpetrator’s definition of what a Muslim ‘should be’ is discriminatory and leads to expressions of (sectarian) anti-Muslim hatred. Importantly, intersectional Muslim identities are also protected by hate crime legislation such as being LGBT and Muslim. As in the case of non-sectarian anti-Muslim prejudice, the guiding principle here should be that individuals have the right to practice their faith free from religious-based hate attacks.

It is these fundamental human freedoms that must be balanced against individuals’ rights to free expression and the responsibility to not harm the dignity of
others. This might include satire or comedy directed at Islam as a faith, let alone
trenchant criticisms of policies in Muslim-majority countries or certain cultural practices.
These and other cautions are vital caveats to raise before arriving at a working definition
of anti-Muslim hatred. Bigotry and faith-based hostility may be despicable, but they are
not in and of themselves hate attacks. The latter is understood, instead, like verbal, or
physical expressions of anti-Muslim hatred when targeting individuals or property on the
basis of their perceived faith. Criticism of cultures, faiths and practices is itself legally
protected – even if ignorant, uncivil or in bad taste – when not targeting a person or group
on the basis of hostility to, in this case, Islam and Muslims. Just as conflating extremism
with all Muslims is evidence of an underlying prejudice that can result in anti-Muslim
attacks, however, this understanding should provide no comfort to criticisms of illiberal,
criminal, or extremist behaviour. In terms of the latter, extremism of any form should
rightly be met head-on – especially that which would deny human rights to others. A
working definition of anti-Muslim hatred needs to be a useful characterisation for those
who might be victims of a hate attack or discriminatory practise on the basis of hostility or
prejudice to their perceived Muslim faith.

These parameters, finally, entail that manifestations of anti-Muslim hatred can be
directed at non-Muslims for ‘looking’ Muslim. Anti-Muslim attacks can be perpetrated by
Muslims toward other sects. Criticising specific practices or politics in Muslim-majority
countries or in general, like the right to give offence in general terms, is protected under
free speech laws; targeting individuals, religious sites, or property on the basis of a
person’s perceived Muslim faith is not. Furthermore, an anti-Muslim hate attack can be
physical (assault, attacking a mosque) or it can be communicated (either in person,
through symbols, verbally or written, including at an individual online). Anti-Muslim
hatred targets individuals or property on the basis of hostility towards Muslims as a
collective.
Bearing these features in mind, finally, a working definition of anti-Muslim hatred is as follows:

**Anti-Muslim hatred is motivated by hostility or bias towards people perceived to be Muslim. Manifestations take the form of online and offline attacks upon an individual or their property, which the victim perceives to be driven by hostility or prejudice toward their Muslim identity. Anti-Muslim hatred can be physical, discriminatory, communicated visually or in writing (most frequently online), and typically takes the form of the targeting of an individual on the basis of (alleged or real) faith-based actions and religious doctrines of either Muslims or Islam, with the two being interchangeable or conjoined at points.**

In terms of anti-Muslim hate attacks against individuals, specific manifestations often include the following:

- Expressing hatred toward members of the group. This includes assaults on Muslim property – such as places of worship, homes, and belongings – including graffiti, desecration, or deliberate use of offensive objects (such as placing pork products on Muslim property);

- Holding individual Muslims responsible for the criminal actions of other individual or group behaviour (whether crimes like paedophilia, human-rights abuses in Muslim-majority countries, or terrorist attacks committed by extremists);

- Discriminatory practices from employers at the recruitment or employment stage because of the religious identity of Muslim staff;

- Hate attacks upon persons or property that ‘look’ Muslim based on skin colour or visible religious appearance (such as Hindus or Sikhs), including pulling religious clothing, or calling someone with dark skin a ‘terrorist’ or ‘paedophile’;

- Discriminatory faith-based words or actions from an individual of Muslim background directed at another Muslim person of a different sect;
• An anti-Muslim attack can be classed as a hate incident – which is an attack perceived by a victim that falls short of a crime, such as anti-social behaviour – or as a hate crime; that is, a criminal act motivated by hostility or prejudice against a person because of their faith;

• Unlike all other forms of hate crime, women consistently are the predominant victims of anti-Muslim hate attacks. This can include having a hijab or niqab pulled, as well as physical or verbal assaults that might also be gender-based;

• Most Muslims have multiple protected identities (e.g. ethnicity) and a victim of an anti-Muslim attack usually has another protected identity (racial, sexual or ableism).
Endnotes

1 See the five annual reports (2013-2017), listed in the ‘Resources’ section for Faith Matters, online at: https://tellmamauk.org/resources/ (all websites last accessed 30 April 2018).

2 Interviews were undertaken between 31 January and 7 March 2018 with the following persons: Zlakha Ahmed MBE, Director, Apna Haq (23 Feb. 2018); Mike Ainsworth, Chair, Independent Advisory Group on Hate Crimes and Stop Hate UK (31 Jan., 2018); Elizabeth Arif- Fear, Copywriter and Activist (1 Mar. 2018); Commander Mak Chishty (ret. Met Police Hate Crime Lead, 18 Feb. 2018); Alexa Dunn, Campaigner and activist (23 Feb. 2018); Mick Conboy, Equality Advisor, Crown Prosecution Service (2 Feb. 2018); Paul Giannasi OBE, National Lead, Government Hate crime Programme (2 Feb. 2018); Shada Khan (7 March. 2018), Human Rights Activist; Dr David Rich, Head of Policy, Community Security Trust (CST; 31 Jan. 2018); Asif Sadiq MBE, Chair of the London Hate Crime Board (19 Feb. 2018); Anas Sarwar MSP, Shadow Secretary for Public Health (Glasgow Central, Labour, 19 Feb. 2018); Anthony Silkoff, Interfaith and Social Action Officer, Board of Deputies of British Jews (31 Jan. 2018); Danny Stone MBE, Director, Anti-Semitism Policy Trust (2 Feb. 2018). The authors would like to express their gratitude to all interviewees, for both their willingness to take part as well as for their collective insights into anti-Muslim hatred.


4 As stressed by then then-BNP (British National Party) leader Nick Griffin in seeking respectability for his radical right movement: “in real politics in the real world, one’s proper choice of enemy is a group who you gain a worthwhile level of extra support by identifying, who you have a realistic chance of beating, and whose defeat will take you the furthest towards your goal. With millions of our people desperately and very reasonably worried by the spread of Islam and


8 Travis, A. (19 June 2017), ‘May says Islamophobia is a form of extremism, marking shift in rhetoric.’ The Guardian, online at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/19/may-says-islamophobia-form-extremism-marking-shift-rhetoric.


16 Richardson, J.E. (August 2006), 'On delineating "reasonable" and "unreasonable" criticisms of Muslims', Fifth-Estate-Online: International Journal of Radical Mass Media Criticism, online at: www.fifth-estate-online.co.uk/criticism/ondelineatingreasonableandunreasonable.html, pp.4-5 and 16-17.


18 Allen, C., Islamophobia (Farnham, Ashgate: 2010), pp.188-189.


21 Ibid., p.1587.


Scale to Measure Islamoprejudice and Secular Islam Critique’, Political Psychology 33(6), p.811.

25 Ibid., pp.811, 822.


28 Ibid., pp.280-281.


30 Ibid., pp.52-53.

31 Allen, C., Isakjee, A, and Young, Ö. (Nov 2013), “‘Maybe we are hated”: The Experience and Impact of anti-Muslim Hate on British Muslim Women’ (London: Tell MAMA), online at: https://www.tellmamauk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/maybewearehated.pdf.

32 Ibid., pp.1-2.


36 See Cockcroft, S. (3 January 2015), ‘Facebook and Twitter are 'allowing Islamophobia to spread by refusing to report offensive postings’, Mail Online, online at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2895458/Facebook-Twitter-allowing-Islamophobia- spread-refusing-report-offensive-postings.html; and Grierson, J. (13 December 2016) ‘Twitter fails to deal with far-right abuse, anti-hate crime group tells MPs’, The Guardian, online at:


38 Ibid., pp.7-8.


45 Diène, D. (21 August 2007), ‘Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and


49 See also Tell MAMA (29 June 2016), ‘The Geography of Anti-Muslim Hatred’.


55 Allen, C. (June 2017), Towards a Working Definition of Islamophobia, University of Birmingham, online at: https://wallscometumblingdown.files.wordpress.com/2017/07/chrisallen-

57 See IHRA (27 June 2016), online at: https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/media-room/stories/working-definition-antisemitism (emphasis added).

58 A good example is provided by the American website ‘Islamophobia is Racism’, online at: https://islamophobiaisracism.wordpress.com.


61 See further examples of anti-Shia hate attacks recorded by Faith Matters, online at: https://www.faith-matters.org/2018/02/12/imam-muhammad-yasir-ayub-also-goes-into-anti-shia-rants