“Definitions of the Radical Right” compiled by Dr Archie Henderson, Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right

Edited by Professor Matthew Feldman & Dr David Tucker, Academic Consulting Services Ltd.

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# Table of Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................... 5
1.0 Faces of the Radical Right ................................................................. 9
2.0 Radical and Extreme Right Organisations .......... 19
3.0 Radical and Extreme Right Ideologues ............... 25
Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 33
References .......................................................................................................... 35
Definitions of the Radical Right ............................................................. 39
Introduction
Introduction

Following the election of Donald Trump to the US Presidency in 2016, concern over a rising and emboldened radical right extremism has grown significantly. The strong electoral performance of radical right parties in Europe, the continued prevalence of anti-Muslim street demonstrations and rising hate crimes, as well as deadly terror attacks in Pittsburgh, Christchurch and El Paso, have all brought the issue of radical right politics to the close attention of the media, government, not to mention millions of concerned citizens. Indeed, we are living in an age where radical right politics is becoming increasingly ‘mainstreamed’, impacting more people’s lives than at any point since the Second World War. This survey will attempt to disentangle the radical right and its various forms. By highlighting the drivers which both bind and divide the radical right, it will analyse key radical right groups as well as significant individual ideologues.

Traditionally, the radical right operated in almost exclusively offline spaces but it is now defined by its online interconnectedness, entering a ‘post-digital age’. Offline activism includes political parties seeking public office, street-based marches and protests (which often have significant public-order implications) and, in the most extreme cases, hate crime and terrorism. The increased prevalence and diversity of online activism extends to sharing content on social media platforms, disseminating ideas, strategies and conspiracy theories, generating income and even publicising imminent terrorist atrocities. Increasingly, niche social media platforms such as Gab and encrypted forums and imageboards such as 8Chan are used by radical right activists to release messages, images, videos and to promote violent attacks.

The blurring of online and offline activism has caused difficulties for practitioners and researchers, and it requires new tools to understand the movement. Indeed, “the quantity, sophistication and interconnectedness of both unofficial activists and official party channels online has made it more and more difficult to carry forwards established academic categories to explain the far-right’s renewal.”

In large part due to the increased prevalence of online activism, the radical right has become a global movement which transcends borders and nation-states, and as a consequence the landscape of radical right research is changing. Right wing populist parties elected to the European Parliament collaborate in cross-national parliamentary groupings. Fascist and neo-Nazi organisations borrow ideas and actions from a range of national contexts, discussing them on online forums and messenger software, while the counter-Jihad movement bases its critique of Muslims in terms of its threat to ‘Western civilisation’ rather than one single country. The so-called ‘alt-right’ is the most

Figure 1: President Donald Trump, who unexpectedly defeated Hilary Clinton in the 2016 Presidential Election.
internationalist of all radical right movements with ideologues situated in a range of countries who collaborate in discussions, debates and the sharing of materials. No longer can the study of the radical right be limited to one country or even geographic region, for the dissemination of ideas is limitless.

What are the ideas that drive the radical right? As this report will show, there is significant overlap within various factions. The radical right, taken generally, is defined by its hostility towards those it perceives as weakening the nation state or ‘race’, notably immigrants, ethnic minorities, Muslims and Jews. Yet divisions over the importance of race, political strategy and violent methods of activism reflect but a few of the divisions within the radical right, and this makes it essential to understand the movement both as a whole and through its factions. Finally, this task is complicated by the radical right’s desire to obscure the true meaning of their policies and intentions. The decades-long stigma of fascist ideas has meant that the radical right has sought a softer, more inclusive rhetoric and style when appealing to the public, a process made even more necessary as radical right ideas receive even greater media exposure. One must therefore delineate between what the radical right tell each other within a trusted inner circle and what they tell everyone else, requiring researchers to distinguish between the ‘frontstage’ articulation of its ideology for public consumption and a ‘backstage’ truth understood by an initiated hardcore of political activists” – which can be openly racist, violent, even genocidal.
1.0 Faces of the Radical Right
1.0 Faces of the Radical Right

**Radical Right:** The radical right is first and foremost a nativist movement which seeks to promote the interests of the ethnic and cultural majority within a country. Radical right groups heavily emphasise themes of national and political decline, promising a social and cultural return to national glory. National decay is blamed on a range of factors, but most commonly targets perceived corrupt or indifferent elites from mainstream parties, who are defined by their liberal approaches to immigration and multiculturalism. These people are viewed as sowing the seeds of national weakness and, accordingly, the radical right is anti-immigration and in favour of cultural and ethnic homogeneity. Muslims are often the main target of radical right attacks as a symbol of a growing ‘enemy within’ as either a direct threat to the nation or as seeking to dilute and degrade the nation's traditional ethnic and cultural DNA. Radical right parties compete in elections and have, particularly in Europe over the last two decades, become ‘mass parties’ seeking to work within the existing constitutional structure of a country. They often adopt a ‘populist’ message which argues that the interests of the pure, decent majority are being overridden by a corrupt, small elite. Broadly speaking, radical right parties have – as a general picture – significantly improved their electoral performance in the 21st century across Western Europe (see Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Examples of Radical Right Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Rally (France)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formerly known as the National Front, RN is a French political party which is critical of immigration, multiculturalism and the ‘Islamisation of French culture’. Led by Marine Le Pen, the party came second in the 2017 French Presidential Election and first in 2019 European Parliament elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The UK Independence Party (UKIP) (UK)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP was formed in the mid 1990s as a single-issue libertarian party opposed to Britain’s membership of the European Union. It achieved little electoral success until 2014, when it came first in European Parliament elections. Under the leadership of the charismatic Nigel Farage, the party played a significant role promoting anti-establishment and anti-immigration politics in Britain, which contributed in large part to Britain’s vote in 2016 to leave the European Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The League (Italy)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The League (formerly known as the Northern League) was part of the Italian government coalition between 2018 and 2019 and came first in European Parliamentary elections in 2019. Leader Matteo Salvini has been vocally critical of immigration and, as Minister of the Interior, has sought to crack down heavily on immigration from the Mediterranean as well as even suggesting creating a census of Roma people in Italy with a view to deporting thousands.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 2: Leader of RN Marine Le Pen, who finished second in the 2017 French Presidential Election behind Emmanuel Macron.

Table 2: Performance in National Elections of Largest Radical Right Party in Western Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>National Rally (RN)*</th>
<th>Party for Freedom (PVV)</th>
<th>Ukip</th>
<th>The League (LL)</th>
<th>Alternative for Germany (AfD)</th>
<th>Sweden Democrats (SD)</th>
<th>Danish People’s Party (DF)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.5% (5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>3.9% (6&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td></td>
<td>12% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>17.8% (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.4% (8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.6% (5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.2% (4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.9% (5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>4.6% (5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>2.9% (8&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>10.44% (4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.3% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
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<td></td>
<td>15.4% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>3.1% (4&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.3% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>17.9% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>10.1% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.0% (5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>1.9% (7&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>12.9% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12.6% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21.1% (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>33.9% (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>13.1% (2&lt;sup&gt;nd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.8% (5&lt;sup&gt;th&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>11.5% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td>17.5% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17.4% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.7% (3&lt;sup&gt;rd&lt;/sup&gt;)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure relates to performance in presidential election. In 2002 and 2017, figure relates to FN performance in second round of voting.
**Neo-Fascism:** Fascist ideology shares much of the same intent as radical right ideology, such as a sense of national decadence and a hostile attitude to minorities. However, it is the violence inherent to fascism which draws a line between the two. Fascism is more likely to engage with more fundamentalist and hard-line stances on social and cultural issues, advocating the destruction of perceived threats to the race and/or nation. Crucially and most significantly, neo-fascism is anti-democratic, seeking a violent and/or revolutionary overthrow of the system in order to bring about an authoritarian state, rather than looking to participate within the democratic system. Terrorism is often seen as a legitimate strategy for weakening and eventually destroying the state, from which a fascist regime can then emerge.

**Neo-Nazism:** Neo-Nazism shares much in common with fascism, particularly in terms of its opposition to democracy and advocacy of violence. It is however more specifically derivative of the policies (and adopts the aesthetics and iconography) of Nazi Germany. This includes a specifically ‘biological’ racism and focus on the purported existential threat posed to the white race by demographic change and race-mixing. It is also more likely to be openly anti-Jewish, something that is similarly linked to the conspiratorial and biological antisemitism of Nazism. As indicated in Table 4, terror attacks with mass casualties have increased in recent years, many of which were perpetrated by neo-Nazis (such as David Copeland and Thomas Mair) following the ‘lone wolf’ tactics popularised by ideologues such as James Mason in the influential neo-Nazi publication *Siege.* Attacks are often rationalised by perpetrators as designed to instigate a race war, which will ultimately lead to victory for the white race and the establishment of a Nazi-style state.

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*Figure 3: David Duke. Duke is a former Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan and Member of the Louisiana House of Representatives (1989-1992).*
### Table 3: Examples of Neo-Fascist and Neo-Nazi Organisations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Action (United Kingdom)</strong></td>
<td>National Action became the first radical right organisation to be banned in the UK under counter-terror legislation in 2017 (it was banned on 16th December 2016). Offshoots of NA (NS131 and Scottish Dawn) were banned in September 2017. Possessing an anti-Jewish and revolutionary ideology, NA glorified the murder of Jo Cox MP by a white supremacist terrorist in 2016. One of its members, Jack Renshaw, was convicted in 2018 of plotting to kill Rosie Cooper MP with a machete. Another activist, Zack Davies, was jailed in 2015 for the attempted murder of an elderly Sikh man.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>National Socialist Underground (Germany)</strong></td>
<td>NSU was a highly secretive Nazi-inspired organisation uncovered in 2011. The group is associated with a number of criminal enterprises including bank robberies as well as a series of racially motivated murders of at least nine immigrants across Germany, bombings in Nuremberg (1999) and Cologne (2001 &amp; 2004), as well as the killing of a policewoman.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Atomwaffen Division (United States)</strong></td>
<td>Atomwaffen Division is a neo-Nazi organisation comprising a number of small cells across the United States. The group, which expresses violent fantasies about instigating a race war, engages in paramilitary training and has been linked to a number of hate crimes and murders and has also had members convicted for bombmaking. The group has an international reach, with a UK cell known as Sonnenkrieg Division.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 4: Venn Diagram of Radical and Extreme Right Ideologies

[Diagram showing intersections of Radical Right and Fascist/Neo-Nazi ideologies:
- Populism
- Biological racism
- Anti-Jewish Conspiracy theories
- Nativist
- Anti-elite
- Anti-liberal
- Anti-immigration
- Anti-Islam
- Belief in conspiracy
- Cultural racism/chaudvanism
- Seeking overthrow of government
- Violent direct action
- Participate in elections]
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Perpetrator</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 3, 2019</td>
<td>Walmart, El Paso, TX (USA)</td>
<td>Mass shooting attack</td>
<td>Patrick Crusius</td>
<td>Attack on Hispanic community</td>
<td>22 deaths; 24 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 15, 2019</td>
<td>Al Noor Mosque/Linwood Islamic Centre, Christchurch (New Zealand)</td>
<td>Mass shooting attack</td>
<td>Brenton Tarrant</td>
<td>Attack on Muslim community</td>
<td>51 deaths; 49 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 27, 2018</td>
<td>Tree of Life synagogue, Pittsburgh, PA (USA)</td>
<td>Mass shooting attack</td>
<td>Robert Bowers</td>
<td>Attack on Jewish community</td>
<td>11 deaths (including attacker); 7 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 19, 2017</td>
<td>Finsbury Park Mosque, London (UK)</td>
<td>Vehicle-ramming attack</td>
<td>Darren Osborne</td>
<td>Attack on Muslims</td>
<td>1 death; 10 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 16, 2016</td>
<td>Birstall, West Yorkshire (UK)</td>
<td>Targeted political assassination</td>
<td>Thomas Mair</td>
<td>Attack on Labour politician who had championed refugee rights</td>
<td>1 death; 1 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 17, 2015</td>
<td>Mother Emanuel Church, Charleston, SC (USA)</td>
<td>Mass shooting attack</td>
<td>Dylann Roof</td>
<td>Attack on the predominantly African American congregation</td>
<td>9 deaths; 1 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 22, 2011</td>
<td>Utøya island/Oslo, (Norway)</td>
<td>Co-ordinated bombing and mass shooting attack</td>
<td>Anders Behring Breivik</td>
<td>Attack on young left-wing activists and government building</td>
<td>77 deaths; 319 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 17-30, 1999</td>
<td>Brixton/Shoreditch/Soho, London (UK)</td>
<td>Series of three bomb attacks</td>
<td>David Copeland</td>
<td>Attack on black, Bangladeshi and gay communities</td>
<td>3 deaths; 140 injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 19, 1995</td>
<td>Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, Oklahoma City, OK (USA)</td>
<td>Bomb attack</td>
<td>Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols*</td>
<td>Attack on Federal Government building</td>
<td>168 deaths; 680 injured</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*McVeigh and Nichols are unique within this group in that they acted in collaboration rather than individually.
Counter-Jihad Movement: In the wake of growing anti-Muslim bigotry following the September 11th Attacks on the United States and other al-Qaeda-inspired atrocities (such as the 7/7 bombings in London), the counter-Jihad Movement emerged. Whilst having a close relationship to radical right ideology, counter-Jihad activism departs by focussing almost exclusively on the alleged threat posed by Islam to Western civilisation. Whilst a key emphasis of the counter-Jihad movement is on a perceived inferiority of Islam and the terror threat posed by Muslims, a large component of attacks on Islam are based on conspiracy theory, notably the 'Great Replacement' of whites by Muslims in the West being secretly carried out by elites. A diffuse movement with minimal organisational structure, it expresses itself through street protests and marches as well as pseudo-academic ‘thinktanks’. It exhibits many of the characteristics of the radical right – such as authoritarianism and hostility to immigration and multiculturalism – as well as an emphasis on national or even civilisational decline. Activists are likely to support radical right parties in elections and many on the neo-fascist and Nazi right are often attracted to street-based demonstrations, which often turn violent and come at a large cost to public resources.  

Table 5: Examples of Counter-Jihad Movements

| English Defence League (United Kingdom) | The EDL is a street-based anti-Muslim movement which rose to prominence between 2009 and 2013. Led by Stephen Lennon (a.k.a. Tommy Robinson), it led a series of demonstrations across towns and cities in England, protesting against the so-called ‘Islamisation of Britain’. Whilst the group claim to be non-racist and non-violent, there were numerous examples of racism and violence during its demonstrations where supporters often clashed with counter-protestors and police. At its |

Figure 5: Anders Behring Breivik delivering a Nazi salute during his court appearance following his 2011 attack.
height, the EDL attracted over 3,000 demonstrators to a march in Luton in February 2011.

**Pegida (Germany)**

Founded by Lutz Bachmann in Dresden in 2014, Pegida led a series of evening marches (mostly in Eastern Germany) and were critical of immigration, multiculturalism and Islam. One demonstration in December 2014 attracted as many as 10,000 activists. The group was energised by the 2015 refugee crisis and was highly critical of Angela Merkel’s decision to admit over 1 million asylum seekers into Germany by the end of that year. As of 2019, Pegida has declined in terms of numbers attending demonstrations and much anti-migrant sentiment has been channelled into the populist radical right party Alternative for Germany, who have achieved some electoral success.

**Stop the Islamization of America (USA)**

SIOA was formed in 2010 by anti-Muslim campaigners Pamela Geller and Robert Spencer. The organisation rose to prominence in campaigning against what they claimed was a proposed Mosque being built next to the site of the 9/11 terror attacks. Whilst claiming to be a human rights organisation promoting free speech, it regularly disseminates anti-Muslim narratives which link all Muslims to terrorism, as well as a host of other anti-Muslim myths.

**Alt-Right:** The ‘alt-right’ is a term which came to prominence during Donald Trump’s Presidential election campaign in 2016. Whilst it is ideologically similar to the contemporary radical right, it is defined by being a diffuse movement of individual, mostly online activists who connect on social media platforms such as YouTube, Facebook, 4Chan, 8Chan and Gab. The alt-right shares ideological similarities with the radical right as well as the counter-Jihad movement, but also focusses much of its attention on campaigning against feminism, political correctness and so-called ‘social-
justice warriors’ – the latter acting as a catch-all term for the liberal left. Despite the highly fragmented nature of the alt-right, with factions ranging from men’s-rights activists, anti-Islam commentators, conspiracy theorists, neo-Nazis and more general radical right populists, one broad distinction can be made between the ‘alt-right’ and the ‘alt-light’. The alt-right are hard-line white supremacists and neo-Nazis who could also be classified as extreme right. The alt-light focus less on biological racism and more on the alleged cultural decline of the West and tend to distance themselves from the alt-right. They argue that their focus on culture rather than race, rejection of anti-Semitism and inclusivity of ethnic minorities and LGBT individuals in their own movement, demonstrates key differences, though there are nevertheless more observable similarities between the two factions than either would like to admit.

Table 6: Examples of Alt-Right Ideologues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gavin McInnes (USA)</td>
<td>McInnes is a US-based alt-right activist and leader of The Proud Boys, a radical right political movement. McInnes is perhaps best known for founding Vice Media, but he has since gone on to become a well-known online figure expressing ‘white genocide’ conspiracy theories, anti-Islam and anti-feminism as well as a self-described ideology of ‘Western chauvinism’, which bears little difference to traditional white supremacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stefan Molyneux (Canada)</td>
<td>Molyneux is a radical right broadcaster based in Canada who hosts a podcast and his own YouTube channel. He frequently promotes conspiracy theories such as ‘white genocide’ and hosts white supremacists such as Jared Taylor on his talk shows.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milo Yiannopoulos (UK/USA)</td>
<td>Yiannopoulos is a British ‘free speech’ activist. Known for his provocative speeches where he criticises political correctness and feminism, Yiannopoulos is also a vocal critic of Islam and multiculturalism. He is relatively unique in the sense that he is openly gay and has an African American husband, meaning he often bats away accusations of being extreme.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7: Spectrum of Radical Right Ideologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Violent</th>
<th>Radical</th>
<th>Extreme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atomwaffen Division (US)</td>
<td>English Defence League (UK)</td>
<td>Golden Dawn (GRE)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Action (UK)</td>
<td>PEGIDA (GER)</td>
<td>Combat 18 (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ku Klux Klan (US)</td>
<td>Richard Spencer (US)</td>
<td>Generation Identity (EU)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Dawn (GRE)</td>
<td>Britain First (UK)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.0 Radical and Extreme Right Organisations
2.0 Radical and Extreme Right Organisations

The following four radical and extreme right organisations have been chosen to reflect the diversity of contemporary radical right politics in terms of ideology, activism and strategy. They reflect important groups but are nevertheless a snapshot of a movement which contains hundreds, if not thousands, worldwide, ranging from mass political parties to small, clandestine ‘groupuscules’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 8: Radical Right Group Membership and Followers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Members</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain First</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Football Lads Alliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Atomwaffen Division</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Britain First (BF) is a radical right political party in the United Kingdom founded in 2011 by the former British National Party councillor Paul Golding. Describing itself as a ‘patriotic party’ and ‘street-defence organisation’, Islamophobia, xenophobia and hostility to immigration nevertheless define the party’s message.\(^{11}\) BF became notorious in 2014 when they launched a series of ‘mosque invasions’ across the UK as well as provocative ‘Christian patrols’ designed to

Figure 8: Jayda Fransen (left) who served as deputy leader of Britain First (2014-2019) and current leader, Paul Golding (right).
intimidate the local Muslim population. As such, BF operate on the cusp between radical and extreme right, tacitly endorsing violence without openly calling for it. Despite direct action and street demonstrations being an important part of BF’s activism, they also compete in elections, although they have achieved no success. For example, Golding achieved just 1.2% in the 2016 London Mayoral Elections.

Until its recent banning by Facebook, the party had developed a strong and, importantly, entirely unrepresentative presence on social media, at one point possessing over 2 million followers on Facebook. Material shared online ranged from relatively mainstream messages which promoted the wearing of poppies around the time of Armistice Day – designed to attract followers unaware of the group’s extremism – to memes which compared Muslims with animals and misleading videos designed to incite hatred towards Muslims. The party achieved brief global notoriety in 2017 when Donald Trump retweeted two Islamophobic videos uploaded by Britain First’s then Deputy Leader Jayda Fransen. The party has been accused of inciting political violence and terrorism. During the trial of Darren Osborne, convicted of the Finsbury Park Mosque attack which left one person dead, it was discovered that Osborne had been radicalised by Britain First’s social media output. BF is ultimately a small and declining party. Golding, as well as his former deputy Jayda Fransen, have both been convicted and jailed on more than one occasion, on charges including racially aggravated harassment. Without access to Facebook as a means of obtaining new followers – undoubtedly one of their few success stories – it is difficult to see how the party can remain relevant.

Generation Identity

Generation Identity is a transnational movement which operates across Europe and North America. It is particularly active in France, Germany, Italy and Austria. It also set up a UK branch in 2017. First emerging in 2003 as the youth wing of the neo-fascist French group Bloc Identitaire, GI’s ideology derives from French nouvelle droite (new right) intellectuals of the late 1960s, who wanted to overturn liberal democracy through a ‘war of ideas’. To do so it advocated a metapolitics, or ‘Gramscism of the right’, that is centred upon the concept of ‘ethnopluralism’.

Figure 9: The ship leased by Generation Identity for their ‘Defend Europe’ campaign which had the aim of turning away refugees crossing the Mediterranean.
Ethnopluralism reflects an attempt by radical right advocates to distance themselves from the violent white supremacist ideas of European fascism, above all Nazism. GI reject multiculturalism and calls for different races to be separated. This is advocated in order to foster a ‘diverse’ world ‘in which all peoples have a right to preserve and promote their group identity within their homelands’. GI view (white) European identity as a biological fact and so they are sharply critical of immigration, Islam and refugees, even going so far as to endorse the ‘remigration’, or forced removal, of non-whites from Europe. Again, in an attempt to avoid accusations of extremism, they couch their language in moderate terms, despite the violent reality of what such policies of repatriation would entail. GI call for ‘the humane repatriation of anyone who has entered our countries illegally. Concerning legal immigration, The Great Replacement in Europe requires us to work towards reversing migration flows. The term ‘Great Replacement’ refers to a conspiracy theory popularised by the French ideologue Renaud Camus, which argues that elites are systematically replacing whites with non-whites in European countries as part of a conspiratorial attempt at ‘white genocide’.

GI have relatively few activists across Europe and North America despite its wide reach – especially online and amongst nationalistic youth in Europe – but they have gained attention for its provocative activism. In 2017, for instance, the group launched their ‘Defend Europe’ campaign at the height of the refugee crisis. This saw national GI chapters raise money to charter a ship in the Mediterranean in order to ‘monitor’ NGO ships, which were alleged to be deliberately transporting people from North Africa to Europe, and the group pledged to take refugees back to the Libyan coast. Although the engine on the ship they charted failed and activists had to be rescued, the botched mission nevertheless saw the group receive widespread media coverage. The group also received public attention when links emerged between GI and Brenton Tarrant, who killed 51 people and injured scores when he attacked two Mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand in March 2019. Tarrant appeared to share their ideology of militant white separatism and Tarrant’s alleged manifesto, ‘The Great Replacement’, was suffused with GI themes and arguments. It appears that Tarrant donated €1,500 to GI in January 2018, and he corresponded online with leading GI figure Martin Sellner. These suspected motivations are due to be heard in a New Zealand court in 2020.

Football Lads Alliance/Democratic Football Lads Alliance

Despite claiming to have no formal relationship with the radical right, the Football Lads Alliance (FLA) emerged from counter-Jihad street protests popularised by the English Defence League since 2009. Formed in 2017 by former football hooligan John Meighan, the FLA’s first rally was held in London, where demonstrators marched to London Bridge – the site of an Islamist-inspired terror attack which killed 11 earlier that month – and attracted some 10,000 demonstrators, more than treble the numbers attending the largest
ever English Defence League demonstration. The FLA’s message was also different. Rather than railing against a perceived pernicious influence of Islam in British life, the group claimed to be merely protesting against all forms of ‘extremism’ and ‘terrorism’. However, given the three contemporaneous terror attacks in Westminster, Manchester and London Bridge seemingly cited as a way of prompting the group’s foundation, it was clear that Islamic extremism was to be highlighted to the exclusion of almost everything else. Unsurprisingly, the result degenerated into anti-Muslim prejudice.19 Their third demonstration, also in London, attracted 30,000 protestors, again dwarfing previous counter-Jihad activism in Britain, while also indicating the success of its ‘anti-extremist’ messaging.

The façade of inclusion united against ‘all forms of extremism’ quickly began to unravel the year after the movement’s launch. In the group’s 65,000 strong (closed) Facebook page, scores of racist and misogynistic posts are visible, including calls for Muslim mayor of London Sadiq Khan to be hanged, and the black Labour Shadow Home Secretary Diane Abbot to be ‘run over’.20 The array of radical right speakers at a demonstration in March 2018 further highlighted the group’s growing extremism. Tommy Robinson, founder and leader of the EDL, rallied the crowd. Gerard Batten, the anti-Muslim leader of UKIP, asked activists during a speech why it wasn’t acceptable to hate the "totalitarian system of Islam". Anne-Marie Waters, leader of For Britain, who also has links to Generation Identity, railed against the EU, describing it as a "totalitarian fascist tyranny", claiming its open borders policy had "deliberately imported hell on earth".21 Other activists associated with the movement also had links to the extreme right, including Jacob Bewick – a former member of the proscribed terror group National Action – as well as Gary Crane, the former leader of Nazi ‘Right Wing Resistance’ who was jailed for his part in a violent rally in Dover in 2016.22

The FLA began to demonstrate internal divisions from March 2018. When the Royal British Legion returned a donation of £1,104 due to ‘inappropriate use of the poppy’ – also demonstrating anxiety over the extreme views of many FLA activists – Meighan resigned the leadership following criticism from within the movement.23 A split occurred shortly after when the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA) was set up. Both DFLA and FLA rhetoric moved away from softer campaigning against generic ‘extremism’ toward more explicitly radical right talking points such as campaigning against alleged Muslim grooming gangs and Islam more broadly. For example, the DFLA became active within the ‘Free Tommy’ campaign which railed against the former EDL leader’s imprisonment for contempt of court in May 2018. The movement, which had been ostensibly set up in order to campaign against all forms of extremism, was by now hardly distinguishable from the English Defence League and other counter-Jihad street movements.24
The Atomwaffen Division (AWD) is a US-based neo-Nazi organisation comprising up to two dozen small, terrorist ‘cells’ across the country. First emerging via the online neo-Nazi forum Ironmarch in 2013, the group reveals the radical right at its most violent extremes, particularly use of ‘terroristic violence to bring about the collapse of what its literature calls the ‘System’, e.g. ‘the government and other institutions that organise society’. Drawing inspiration from previous neo-Nazi organisations like the mid-1970s paramilitary group the National Socialist Liberation Front, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center this group of primarily young activists ‘fetishizes violence as the only vehicle for apocalyptic, racial cleansing and the imposition of order over its dystopian perception of the modern world.’ Since 2017, AWD has been heavily influenced by James Mason, a member of George Lincoln Rockwell’s American Nazi Party in the 1960s, who popularised the concept of terrorist ‘lone wolves’ in his 1980s newsletter *Siege* (which has been collected and republished in four editions since that time). Like Mason, AWD has lavished praise upon the convicted cult-leader Charles Manson, jailed for life in 1969 after his followers killed nine people. AWD organises military style ‘hate camps’ in the United States for activists, designed to train revolutionaries. Given its clandestine activities, AWD is highly secretive, although its members did join the ‘Unite the Right’ rally in Charlottesville during August 2017. AWD has become noted for its effective use of online technology in order to create powerful images – sometimes called ‘fashwave’ art – as well as memes and short propaganda videos with high production value.

The extreme violence defining AWD has become clear over the past few years. One activist, Devon Arthurs, allegedly murdered two AWD activists with whom he shared a flat after they disparaged his recent conversion to Islam. Arthurs was deemed not fit to face trial and has since been confined to a mental-health institution. When police searched Arthurs’ apartment in Tampa following the suspected murders, AWD leader Brandon Russell – who also lived in the flat – was then arrested for storing explosives (he also had a framed picture of the radical right terrorist responsible for the Oklahoma Bombings, Timothy McVeigh, above his bed). In early 2018, Russell was sentenced to 5 years in prison. AWD has also been linked to the hate-crime murder of Blaze Bernstein, an openly gay and Jewish college student from California. Samuel Woodward, an influential member of the group’s California cell, was charged with the murder. In December 2017 another suspected activist, Nicholas Giampa, murdered his girlfriend’s parents, shooting them both dead, after they found out about his political views. Giampa then turned the gun on himself but survived.
3.0 Radical and Extreme Right Ideologues
3.0 Radical and Extreme Right Ideologues

As radical right groups increasingly turn into ‘mass parties’ with broader electoral coalitions, the internet’s increasing importance allows individuals to engage on social media without traditional gatekeepers, such as editors or publishers. This has allowed otherwise isolated ideologues a decisive platform in the development of radical right movements. The following section provides an overview of five important contemporary actors.

Table 9: Radical Right Ideologue Followers and Subscribers (As of October 2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Facebook</th>
<th>Twitter</th>
<th>YouTube</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Richard Spencer</td>
<td>Banned in April 2018 (c.15,000 shortly before ban)</td>
<td>76.9K</td>
<td>2.91K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tommy Robinson</td>
<td>Banned in February 2019 (c.1 million shortly before ban)</td>
<td>Banned in March 2018 (c.413,000 shortly before ban)</td>
<td>381K</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Joseph Watson</td>
<td>Banned in May 2019 (c.700,000 shortly before ban)</td>
<td>995.6K</td>
<td>1.74 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katie Hopkins</td>
<td>74,520</td>
<td>996.5K</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Richard Spencer

Richard Spencer is an American fascist ideologue, credited with coining the term ‘alt-right’ in 2008, who has become an important figure for the movement.29 Spencer’s career began in relatively mainstream conservative circles, from which he was ostracised due to his extreme views. In 2011, Spencer became Director of the National Policy Institute, a white nationalist think-tank. Spencer claims his outlook is a form of ‘identitarianism’, and more specifically white identity politics. Central to Spencer’s ideology is the belief that white Europeans constitute a distinct biological race and culture, which mandates protection and should form the basis of a white ethno-state. He believes that white people are being dispossessed and eroded by immigration
and demographic change in Europe and North America. In consequence, Spencer has called for ‘peaceful ethnic cleansing’ in the foundation of a whites-only North America: ‘Our dream is a new society, an ethno-state that would be a gathering point for all Europeans’.Interestingly, for someone within a white nationalist movement suffused with anti-Semitism, Spencer has likened his idea of an ethno-state to Israel (disingenuously claiming that a white ethno-state would represent a homeland for white Europeans as Israel does for Jews), as an idea with intellectual similarities to Zionism.

Whilst details on the nature of this ethno-state have not been forthcoming, it would clearly necessitate the removal of non-whites – particularly African Americans and Latinos – from its territory. Spencer has called for this to be achieved through law, but ultimately using force not dissimilar to population transfers in East-Central Europe following the First World War. This path seems highly unrealistic, however, for an ethno-state could only be founded after some kind of race war in the United States (or anywhere else with a native non-white population). The forced population transfers which would follow would likely be violent and, perhaps, even genocidal. This latent eliminationism within Spencer’s worldview is often masked by his neat, clear-cut appearance, whereby he largely eschews many fascist stereotypes in terms of appearance. This cloak of moderation extends to his embrace of the language of ‘reasonableness’, where old-fashioned notions of allegedly biological white supremacy and anti-minority clichés are masked by euphemisms of racial ‘difference’ and identity. Yet there is little that is reasonable or indeed new in Spencer’s ideas, as is evident in a speech given by Spencer to Texas A & M University: ‘America, at the end of the day [...] belongs to white men. Our bones are in the ground. We own it. At the end of the day America can’t exist without us. We defined it. This country does belong to White people, culturally, politically, socially, everything.’

Like most ‘alt-right’ activists, Spencer supported Donald Trump in the 2016 Presidential election and gained sizeable media attention for a speech he gave shortly after, in which he exhibited Nazi propaganda nearly verbatim. He told his audience to ‘party like its 1933’ (the year Hitler came to power in Germany) before bellowing: ‘Hail Trump, hail our people, hail victory!’ with many in the audience responding with a Nazi salute. He was also a leading figure in the Charlottesville ‘Unite the Right’ rally that turned violent in August 2017. In 2018, Spencer was effectively banned from the entire 26-country-wide Schengen Area in Europe after he attempted to enter Sweden illegally.
Tommy Robinson’/Stephen Lennon

Lennon, through his alias Tommy Robinson, rose to prominence in 2009 after playing a key role in the founding of the EDL (see Table 5). At EDL demonstrations and in online videos, he gained notoriety for controversial speeches and statements which demonised the Muslim community. Lennon has advocated forced repatriation, in this case of Muslims: ‘I’d personally send every adult male Muslim that has come into the EU over the past 12 months back tomorrow if I could’.34 Perhaps the clearest example of Lennon’s prejudice against Muslims is the collective guilt he imputes to them following Islamist-inspired terror attacks. For instance, during a 2011 rally in Tower Hamlets – an area of London with a large Muslim population – Lennon shouted: ‘Every single Muslim watching this video on YouTube – on 7/7 you got away with killing and maiming British citizens […] We will not tolerate it. The Islamic community will feel the full force of the EDL if we see any of our citizens killed, maimed or hurt on British soil ever again’.35 Violent and threatening rhetoric such as this appears to have partly motivated Darren Osborne, the terrorist perpetrator of the Finsbury Park Mosque attack and a fan of Lennon.36

Since his time at the helm of the EDL, Lennon has become a transnational radical right hero and martyr. In March 2018 Robinson became closely associated with the extreme Generation Identity, giving a speech in Hyde Park to an audience of 1000 written by GI leader Martin Sellner – previously barred from entering the UK.37 Yet notoriety is largely due to his legal troubles, the most recent of which relate to a contempt of court conviction in May 2018. After filming outside a British court in breach of his bail conditions, he was jailed for jeopardising the trial of a group of Muslim men charged with sexual offences against young girls. The so-called ‘Free Tommy’ movement which followed has seen Lennon lionised as a political dissident and a victim of political correctness and the perceived clamping down of free speech.38 He himself has cultivated such an image through intensive media exposure, then shared across radical right social media networks. Following his release from Belmarsh prison in September 2019, he emerged with

![Figure 13: Banner in support of Tommy Robinson in rural Pittsburgh by National Socialist Movement activists, demonstrating the far-reaching influence of Robinson.](image)

![Figure 14: Robinson after his release from the high-security Belmarsh prison in September 2019.](image)
a beard – clearly designed to denote hardship and suffering at the hands of the state whilst incarcerated.

Paul Joseph Watson

Paul Joseph Watson is a radical right ‘influencer’ and YouTube personality. He currently has nearly 1.7 million subscribers to his YouTube channel, called ‘Prison Planet’. Watson is best known for his editor-at-large role for the US-based conspiracy theory website InfoWars, led by Alex Jones. InfoWars was founded in 1999 and has become notorious for peddling myths, fake news and conspiracy theories. This include suggestions that 9/11 was an ‘inside job’, or that gun attacks like the Sandy Hook elementary school shooting in 2012 and more recent terror attack on a Pittsburgh synagogue were actually faked, ‘false flag’ events. InfoWars has gradually become a ‘redpilling’ radical right outlet. The term ‘redpilling’ is an alt-right concept denoting the conversion of people away from supposed ignorance towards truth, often meaning making them aware of, and believers in, radical right conspiracy theories. Someone who is ‘redpilled’ may not be radical right, but they might share sympathies with that wider view of the world. InfoWars promoted anti-Clinton conspiracy theories during the 2016 Presidential election and gave generous support to Donald Trump. It has also promoted conspiracy theories with a white nationalist bent, such as the ‘white genocide’ and antisemitic myths blaming powerful Jews like George Soros for any and all ills in the world. In late 2018, moreover, Britain’s Board of Deputies of British Jews accused InfoWars of ‘propagating conspiracy theories and dog-whistle antisemitism’. Partly in consequence, the channel is now banned from Twitter, YouTube and Facebook. Watson has distanced himself from more obvious connections with white nationalism, even criticising many on the alt-right. Yet despite claiming to be a libertarian-conservative, many of his ideas, particularly his use of conspiracy theories, are popular amongst the radical right. Revealingly, the suspected radical right terrorist, Patrick Crusius, charged with the El Paso attack in August 2019 which killed 22 innocent people, shared Tweets by Watson before his attack. Within the shooter’s manifesto were white genocide conspiracy theories also popularised by InfoWars, such as the claim that the attack was an attempt at ‘defending my country from cultural and ethnic replacement brought on by an invasion’.

As part of the ‘alt-light’, Watson trains his attention upon criticising ‘social justice warriors’ (‘SJWs’), feminists, proponents of multiculturalism and Muslims. A key theme of the alt-light more generally – which tends to eschew open and explicit discussions of race and anti-Semitism – is the criticism of
alleged political correctness being forced upon the majority by elite liberals. The right to say or do politically incorrect things (such as criticise Islam or multiculturalism) is defended under the guise of ‘freedom of speech’. Via his Twitter and YouTube accounts Watson often points to examples of ‘political correctness gone mad’, spending much of his time ‘exposing’ hypocrisy and attacking left-of-centre activists. Another key theme is the alleged rise of ‘censorship’ of conservatives and right-wing activists by governments under the spell of liberal elites as well as social media companies.

Yet it is attacks on Islam and Muslims which most closely identify Watson with the contemporary radical right. Indeed, Watson joined UKIP under the leadership of the Islamophobic Gerard Batten in 2018 – along with other British ‘alt-right’ personalities such as ‘Count Dankula’ and ‘Sargon of Akkad’ – and has also supported the anti-Muslim policies of Marine Le Pen and Donald Trump. Following the Pulse Nightclub shooting in June 2016 committed by the self-described Islamist-inspired terrorist Omar Mateen, Watson claimed that the shooting, which killed 50 people, demonstrated that ‘we need Islam control, not gun control’. In a later exchange with InfoWars founder Alex Jones, Watson claimed of Islam in Britain: ‘We are importing a culture that is absolutely horrific and the media won’t tell us the truth about it’. He cited a string of acid attacks on Muslims, and, despite providing no evidence, claimed they were in areas of London which were ‘Muslim ghettos’. In the same video he claimed Islam ‘literally allows old men to rape young boys and that’s part of their culture’, he spoke of a deliberate attempt to install ‘slow sharia [law] creep’, and conspiratorially claimed that ‘The masterplan is the complete collapse of Western civilisation’.43

Andrew Anglin

Andrew Anglin and his website The Daily Stormer reflects one of the most extreme factions of the radical right. Founded in 2013, the Daily Stormer (named after the virulently antisemitic propaganda outlet from Nazi Germany Der Stürmer) mixes extreme antisemitism, Nazi ideology and Holocaust denial with alt-right memes and iconography. Anglin has much in common in terms of ideology with figures such as Richard Spencer and other ‘race realists’ (a euphemism used in US radical right circles to describe extreme white supremacists) such as Jared Taylor. This includes the need for the creation of a whites-only ‘ethno-state’ purged of alleged racial inferiors. Yet Anglin differs in terms of language and willingness to call on supporters to engage in direct action.

Anglin frequently exhibits public and crude antisemitism, which uses racial slurs such as ‘kike’ and evokes violent imagery of the Holocaust. Indeed, anti-Jewish rhetoric is one of the most noticeable features of his writing on The Daily Stormer and is somewhat rare on the radical right in terms of its openness. Many others equally obsessed with
alleged Jewish power (such as David Duke) tend to use euphemisms such as ‘Zionist’ or ‘globalist’ or indeed keep discussions entirely out of public view. Anglin is also prepared to use his platform for direct action. He is responsible for several campaigns of harassment against whomever he deems an enemy – usually Jews – by instructing his ‘troll army’ to shower them with abuse, threats and intimidation. In one case, the British MP Luciana Berger became a target after a British neo-Nazi belonging to National Action was jailed for abusive tweets sent to Berger. Anglin posted on The Daily Stormer: ‘I declare a new operation against the filthy communist Jewess, which will be known as Operation: Filthy Jew Bitch’. He went on to tell followers: ‘Call her a Jew, call her a communist, call her a terrorist, call her a filthy Jew bitch. Call her a hook-nosed yid and a ratfaced kike. Tell her we do not want her in the UK, we do not want her or any other Jew anywhere in Europe. Tell her to go to Israel and call for her deportation to said Jew state. Do it over, and over, and over and over again. Tell her that “#HitlerWasRight,” and then tell her that six million more times’. Thousands of abusive messages were directed at Berger, including death threats.

Stopping short of explicitly calling for violence and death threats against his political enemies, Anglin and The Daily Stormer have clearly played a role in radicalising others prepared to commit mass atrocity. Dylann Roof, who in 2015 shot 9 dead in an attack on an African American church, visited the website and posted under the pseudonym AryanBlood1488. He was praised on the website following the attack, with one commenter posting that he would ‘give you [Roof] a medal and erect a monument to you in our future all-white nation’. The way in which The Daily Stormer glorified white supremacist terrorists such as Roof and mocked victims of violence has ultimately led to a clampdown on the site by webhosting companies. Anglin’s mocking of Heather Heyer – who died at the 2017 Charlottesville Rally after she was run over by a white supremacist – has forced The Daily Stormer onto the dark web and it experiences frequent accessibility problems. However, Anglin remains one of the most extreme radical right activists with a platform and followers.

Katie Hopkins

Katie Hopkins rose to prominence in 2006 through reality TV show The Apprentice. She later developed a reputation for being outspoken on right wing social issues. In recent years she has gravitated towards the radical right as a media columnist, radio talk-show host and social media personality. Hopkins prides herself on an ability to stir controversy in ‘saying the unsayable’, similar to other ‘alt-light’ activists like Milo Yiannopoulos. Hopkins revels in attacking political correctness, which she views as a malignant force in society as well as a threat to freedom of speech. Her biggest audience comes through Twitter – where she has nearly

Figure 17: Katie Hopkins during a street demonstration.
1 million followers – but also on her YouTube channel. The former is clearly used to express controversial views designed to antagonise. One example, tweeted shortly after the 2016 Nice terror attack, stated: ‘I am not Islamophobic. Islam disgusts me. This is entirely rational.’ She further tweeted: ‘Don’t spend 3 days mourning. Spend 3 days deporting.’ She has also benefitted from being retweeted by Donald Trump on several occasions, including one tweet criticising Mayor of London Sadiq Khan. Hopkins’ YouTube channel exhibits videos discussing similar themes to her Twitter account, particularly in videos railing against political correctness such as ‘James Bond is not black. Or a woman’. It also exhibits interviews and online conversations with likeminded activists as well as talks given by Hopkins.

Hopkins has not been associated with any outlet for a sustained period of time despite being employed by both mainstream and radical right outlets. Her talk show at LBC was immediately cancelled in 2017 following comments about Muslims – which echoed genocidal ambitions of the past – following the Manchester Arena Terror attacks. In response to that atrocity, Hopkins tweeted, in language immediately redolent of the wartime Holocaust: ‘we need a final solution’. She has had regular columns in The Sun (2013-2015) and Mail Online (2015-2017) in which she often penned anti-Muslim and anti-migrant articles. One text covering the refugee crisis in the middle of this decade was entitled ‘Rescue boats? I’d use gunships to stop migrants’ There, she notoriously argued that migrants were ‘Like cockroaches’ and that it was ‘time to get Australian. Bring on the gunships, force migrants back to their shores and burn the boats’.

After Hopkins left Mail Online, she briefly worked for the populist Canadian media outlet Rebel Media but left in 2018. Since leaving Mail Online, she has spoken much more directly to radical right audiences. One documentary film, entitled Plaasmorde: The Killing Fields (2018), deals with anti-white racism in South Africa, expressing alarm over the widespread murder of white farmers in South Africa. Another film, Homelands (2019), is more directly influenced by the white genocide ‘Great Replacement’ conspiracy theory, most notably “the silent exodus of Jewish and Christian families, forced out of Western Europe by Islamists”. Hopkins often demonstrates support for the Jewish diaspora and Israel, yet the feeling is far from reciprocated. Following a screening of Homelands in North West London attended by many from the Jewish community, the Board of Deputies of British Jews President, Marie van der Zyl, released a statement asserting: ‘This vile Muslim-baiting film should never have seen the light of day. Shame on those who hosted and promoted such an event’.
Conclusion
Conclusion

This report has introduced and summarised various ‘faces’ of the radical right. The radical right is a diverse movement possessing different factions ranging from ‘populist’ right wing mass parties to neo-Nazi terrorists. Operating in both online and offline spaces, ideological priorities differ across the radical right, and intense disagreement over the salience of key issues such as attitudes to Jews, violence and overall strategy exist. However, what unites all is an exclusionary nationalistic politics built on the promotion of a homogenous national community. Accordingly, all are xenophobic in varying degrees and are critical of those seeking to supposedly undermine the nation, whether racially or culturally defined. The risks associated with increased radical right activism reach far and wide; street demonstrations continue to drain public resources, and the spike in mass-casualty ‘lone wolf’ terror attacks are indicative of a growing national security threat. Furthermore, the normalisation of rhetoric from an increasingly emboldened radical right in the past decade risks poisoning public discourse, damaging community relations and weakening liberal democracy itself.
1 Maik Fielitz & Nick Thurston (eds.), Post-Digital Cultures of the Far Right: Online Actions and Offline Consequences in Europe and the US (Bielefeld, 2019).
4 Siege was the newsletter of the National Socialist Liberation Foundation, which Mason wrote between 1980 and 1986.
9 Hope not Hate, State of Hate 2019, p.60.
17 Ibid.


25 AWD has also cultivated links with extremists outside of the United States. The case of *Jones and others* at Birmingham Crown Court in the Spring of 2018 (alleging membership the banned group, National Action) exposed strong links between National Action and Attomwaffen. Brandon Russell described Attomwaffen to National Action as ‘practically a militia.’


44 Wendling, Alt-Right, p.132.


51 ‘Katie Hopkins Wrote This In The Sun About Migrants And Now Everyone Is Really Angry’, The Huffington Post, 18 April 2015. Accessed: https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2015/04/18/katie-hopkins-russell-bran_n_7091674.html?guccounter=1&guce_referrer=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbS8&guce_referrer_sig=AQAAAECTqSl5n2MGvTv1s9oOQ9m9NgqgsJ6FzoOcmxV4W67zD1UwTE8S6JVMp1GtClcpLonM6i7jbxLY3TDDwZDFoDAPRF1JpdpUXj4su7nykVlPWvBlV9kO1umjAmyCG38Ol5Q3ZUpxT7QPTAYmyYag7Ma8_ar1nMyR_BV


Definitions of the Radical Right
Definitions of the Radical Right

Note: Definitions are grouped alphabetically by author under the year of publication. Subsequent definitions by the same author are listed under the first definition by that author.

American tradition 1950s
Authors working within [the American] tradition use the term 'radical right' to denote a wide variety of groups and small political parties that rekindled a special American tradition of right-wing radicalism. This old school of nativism, populism, and hostility to central government was said to have developed into the post-World War II combination of ultranationalism and anti-communism, Christian fundamentalism, militaristic orientation, and anti-alien sentiment. \[\text{Ehud Sprinzak, } \textit{The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right} (NY: OUP 1991), p.10.\] (Cas Mudde, "The war of words defining the extreme right party family," \textit{West European Politics} 19.2 (1996): 225-248 (at 231); also quoted in Cas Mudde, \textit{The ideology of the extreme right} (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 13)

The term "radical right" came into vogue during the 1950s when (according to [William] Safire's \textit{Political Dictionary}, 1978, p. 592) it was coined by Telford Taylor in the foreword to his 1954 book \textit{Grand Inquest} and popularized by Daniel Bell in \textit{The New American Right} [New York: Criterion Books, 1955] which contained a chapter by Seymour Martin Lipset entitled "The Sources of the 'Radical Right.'" It is generally agreed that persons on the far right view contemporary developments in conspiratorial terms (such as the influence of communism or secular humanism), emphasize economic individualism tempered by a strong dose of militaristic nationalism, advance deceptively simple solutions to the complex problems of our time, and seek to modify or overthrow the liberal democratic welfare state.

Lipset 1955
This essay deals with the emergence and activities of an important American political phenomenon, the radical right.[I] This group, which is characterized as radical because it desires to make far-reaching changes in American institutions, is basically concerned with eliminating from American political life those persons and institutions which threaten either its sense of traditional American values, or economic interests. In general, it is opposed to the social and economic reforms that have been enacted in the last twenty years, and to the internationalist pro-British foreign policy pursued in that period.
The radical right, [as opposed to the moderate conservatives], refuses to accept the recent past, is radical in the sense that it rejects the status quo. It wants to turn the clock back all the way; it refuses to accept what has happened as something inevitable, or irreversible. In concrete terms, most though not all the sections of the radical right are opposed to: (1) the labour movement, preferring to see trade unions eliminated; (2) the income tax, the movement for the repeal of the sixteenth amendment is largely a movement of the radical right; (3) the welfare state and government planning, it would like a return to the days of limited government; [18] World War II, the radical right sees the war as an avoidable mistake, and prefers in retrospect a policy of Russia and Germany fighting it out alone.

In a larger sense, the radical right views our entire foreign policy from the recognition of Russia to Potsdam as appeasement, treachery and treason. It is opposed to membership in the United Nations, and to entangling foreign commitments. It tends to be Asia-oriented, rather than Europe-oriented; it is especially suspicious of Great Britain as a Machiavellian power which has manipulated us into two wars, and now refuses to back us in our time of need. Since the radical right believes that both our domestic and foreign policies over the last twenty years have represented tremendous set-backs for the country, it looks for an explanation of these calamitous errors and finds it in the penetration of the government and the agencies of opinion formation by a subversive alien group, namely the Communist movement. In many ways the attitude of the American radical right towards the New Deal is similar to the attitude of many German conservatives towards the Weimar Republic and everything that followed the downfall of the Kaiser.


The Fund for the Republic, a subsidiary of the Ford Foundation, became interested in the possibility of supporting a comprehensive study of the phenomenon of McCarthyism and asked the Columbia Bureau of Applied Social Research to undertake a preliminary investigation to see to what extent such an undertaking was feasible and to detail what substudies ought to be done. I took part in a Bureau committee which supervised this preliminary study. As part of the work I undertook some investigation of the social background of McCarthyism, both historically and contemporaneously. This work resulted in a long memorandum, revised version of which was eventually published as an article, "The Sources of the Radical Right," in the British Journal of Sociology. It also appeared shortly thereafter in slightly revised form in a book edited by Daniel Bell on the New American Right. This paper was, I believe, the first time that the term "radical right" was applied to extremist movements in the United States. In terms of my own intellectual development, it also has some importance in that in the course of examining the data concerning the bases of support for various extremist movements which advocated bigotry and intolerance, both in the past and present, I came to realize that many of them derived their support largely from the underprivileged and less educated elements in society. Much of the evidence for this statement was summed up in a very long footnote in that original article. These data sensitized me for the first time to the possibility that the less privileged
groups in the society were not only potential bases of support for leftist movements advocating what I thought to be progressive social change, but that they also constituted a potential mass base for reactionar


**Bell 1964**

Daniel Bell has sketched the following psychological posture of the American radical right: the breakdown of a moral fiber in the country, a conspiracy theory ("the government is selling out the country"), and a definite forecast regarding an alleged communist "takeover."7 [Daniel Bell, "The Dispossessed" in Daniel Bell (ed.), *The Radical Right: The New American Right* (New York: A Doubleday Anchor Book, 1964), p. 8] Bell also has pointed out the radical right accusation of the cosmopolitan intellectuals, who are supposedly subverting the old-fashioned patriotism, and further notes that the radical right is about the politics of frustration--its impotence to cope with the complex mass society that is today's polity.8 [Ibid., pp. 8 and 42]


**Rohter 1967**

For purposes of this study, the term "radical rightism" will refer to a certain set of beliefs and doctrines. The definition of rightism found in this study will be that used by Ira Rohter in his empirical analysis of the Radical Right [Rohter, Ira. Radical Rightists; An Empirical Study. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1967]. He says that there is a unique rightist theme which allows an empirical distinction to be made between the divergent groups and ideas all too often indiscriminately lumped together as rightist. This is their belief that "a Communist conspiracy has secretly worked its way into positions of great power and influence throughout the world, but particularly into the internal affairs of the United States." This trait distinguishes radical rightism from other political movements.


**Carter 1969**

Carter [Thomas M. Carter, "The Radical Right: Sources and Dimensions" (Unpublished Master's Thesis, LSU, 1969)] defines the radical right as persons who tend to: (1) see significant events as caused by actions of conspiratorial agents, (2) see themselves in a position of dissensus with non-radical rightists in American society or with some significant segment of the population, (3) view the "citizen-leader" as the ideal-type of leader required to alleviate the present crises, and (4) hold a millenarian conception of ultimate victory over the causes of existing crises. In addition, he posits a
tendency among rightists to engage in direct action outside the legitimate range of behavior. Following Carter, radical rightism can be defined as a general orientation labeled Weltanschauung, or world view, composed of the four aspects just mentioned.


Lipset 1971
Lipset defines the radical right as "anti-pluralist and politically moralistic and conspiratorial as well as ideologically anti-elitist and anti-statist, sociologically marginalized and dispossessed" (1971).

(Gülser Kaya Osmanbaşoğlu, "Typology of the Center-Right in Turkey" (Ph.D., Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University, 2014), p. 50, http://repository.bilkent.edu.tr/bitstream/handle/11693/18499/10046129.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y

Searle 1979 [re Edwardian England]
The Radical Right can perhaps best be described as a collection of super-patriots unable for one reason or another to identify with their 'natural' party, or as a movement of rootless nationalists who felt alienated to a lesser or greater extent from all the major political organisations of the day. . . . The distinguishing feature of the group was its unbounded confidence that 'the people' could be won over to the support of imperialistic objectives if a direct appeal were made to their patriotic instincts. The Radical Right was a 'populist' movement in the sense that it believed that ties could be forged between the masses and the Government by means which circumvented the party machines and the party leaders.7 The underlying assumption was that there existed vast numbers of 'silent voters' and 'little people' who were exasperated with the conventional system of politics, which ignored their interests and point of view, but who would eagerly respond to the patriotic call of duty.


Cofrancesco 1984
Dino Cofrancesco . . ., in a 1984 essay, . . . clarified that the "Radical Right" refers to those cultures that elevate "Tradition (understood as a heritage of customs, symbols, and myths to preserve against the unforgiving corrosion of time) to the stable foundation of the community."
Barrett 1987
Barrett [Is God a Racist? The Right Wing in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987), pp. 9, 10] differentiates the "fringe" from the "radical" right. Those individuals and organizations which conceptually fall on the fringe of the radical right wing are defined by Barrett as those who are deeply disturbed by liberal politics and the changing social and political environment, but who neither condone violence nor do they openly embrace racism, fascism and/or anti-Semitism. Conversely, the radical right is defined as those groups and individuals who identify themselves as racists, fascists and/or anti-Semites and who are prepared to use violence to realize their objectives. However, while Barrett's conceptual distinction between the fringe and radical right serves as a useful starting point, the inherent difficulty of his model is that there is no clear line separating the fringe from the radical right, or conversely separating the fringe right from mainstream conservative politics.


Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky 1990
According to Thompson (1990) [Thompson, M., Ellis R. and Wildavsky A. (1990). Cultural theory. Westview Press, Boulder, San Francisco & Oxford] radical right party defined as a party that scored high on social authoritarianism and nationalism. That type of parties could be called as either highly nationalistic or extremely socially conservative. If a party presents high score on one only level and low on the other dimension, it can not be classified as a radical right party (Bustikova, 2013 [i.e., Bustikova, 2014]).


Hainsworth 1992
Central to the extreme right's discourse is the question of identity, national identity drawing upon language, religion, culture, history and other aspects . . . The rhetoric of the extreme right is based upon a vision of the nation supreme, heroic, pure and unsullied by alien forces such as Third World immigration and communist ideology.
Betz 1993
Betz defines 'radical right-wing populist parties' as those 'rejecting individual and social equality, opposing the social integration of marginalized groups, and appealing to xenophobia' (Betz 1993: 413) In comparison, Ignazi claims that the generic group 'extreme right' consists of two particular strands. The 'old extreme right' is ideologically linked with fascism, whilst the 'new extreme right' does not have recognisable ties with fascism but is extremist in its anti-system attitudes - fitting Betz's definition.

Hans-George Betz defines radical right-wing populist parties as:
radical in their rejection of the established sociocultural and sociopolitical system and their advocacy of individual achievement, a free marketplace, and a drastic reduction of the role of the state. They are right-wing in their rejection of individual and social equality, in their opposition to the social integration of marginalized groups, and in their appeal to xenophobia, if not overt racism. [Betz, Hans-George. 1993. The new politics of resentment: Radical right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. *Comparative Politics* 25: 413–427, p. 413]
**Weinberg 1993**

Leonard Weinberg, in the introduction, points out the confusion in the use of various terms (extreme Right, radical Right, fascism) and offers a working definition that starts with a concept of political extremism, a basic differentiation of left and right, and the identification of themes common to the radical Right, such as nationalism and ethnocentrism (not necessarily anti-Semitism), the use of conspiracy theories, and populism (pp. 7-8).


(Iva Ellen Deutchman, "Pauline Hanson and the Rise and Fall of the Radical Right in Australia," *Patterns of Prejudice* 34.1 (2000): 49-62 (at 50))

**Kitschelt and McGann 1995**


**Payne 1995**

According to Payne, the radical right 'sought a radically distinct political regime with radically distinct content, but it sought to avoid major social changes and any cultural revolution'. In contrast, the conservative right 'emphasized direct conservative and legal continuity' but was prepared to break...

**Ramet 1999**
The term radical right is used interchangeably with the terms ultraright and extreme right and is generally applied to twentieth-century incarnations of organized intolerance. For the purposes of this chapter, organized intolerance will be defined as that segment of the political landscape which arose, historically, as a dimension of cultural "irrationalism," and is inspired by intolerance (of any defined as "outsiders"), and hostility to notions of popular sovereignty or popular rule. Intolerance may emerge from diverse quarters, but when it emerges from those quarters known, since the time of the French Revolution, as "the Right," it is also characterized by ideological and programmatic emphasis on "restoring" supposedly traditional values of the Nation or community and imposing them on the entire Nation or community.


In The Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe, editor Sabrina P. Ramet, one of the most prolific authors on Eastern Europe in general, has written the first chapter on "Defining the Radical Right." Her main assertion is that the radical right is characterized by "organized intolerance" of "the Other." In a sweeping tour d'horizon, Ramet outlines the characteristics of the extreme right in Central and Eastern Europe, concluding that it is not only hostile to the democratic process, but is populist, nationalist and obsessed by conspiracy theories. According to Ramet, "organized intolerance" in the post-communist states is divided into five sub-groups: ultra-nationalist, fascist or crypto-fascist, clerical, ultra-conservative and radical populist (pp. 24-5). Groups that fit into one of these categories, she claims, can be regarded as belonging to the far right. However, her attempt to label groups is risky, since the political map of the area is dynamic, and parties frequently redefine themselves.


As research on the post-war radical right was heavily influenced by studies of historical fascism, it comes as no surprise that the pathology approach initially also dominated that field. Early scholarship on the post-war American radical right seemed particularly affected. . . . Many studies of the
contemporary radical right in Europe have followed in this tradition. References to paranoia and other psychological disorders abound in the politically inspired studies, which unfortunately still occupy a prominent position in the field (particularly in Germany and France). But even serious scholarship regularly espouses such references. For example, Sabrina Ramet (1999: 4, 16) defines the radical right in terms of 'cultural 'irrationalism''' and considers 'an obsession with conspiracies' as one of its essential elements.


A promising start in coming to terms with the "taxonomic chaos" of the radical right has been provided by Roger Griffin, who has defined fascism (which subsumes the radical right) as a genus of political ideology whose "mythic core" is a form of populist ultra-nationalism that, while rooted in values of radical continuity, nevertheless has as its aim a new, alternative vision of modernity. Yet even Griffin is aware that any conceptual scheme is no match for messy reality, where the radical right has proven to be more flexible than scholarly categories will allow. This is obviously also a problem for Ramet, whose new coinage in the opening chapter of this anthology, "organized intolerance," attempts to subsume radical right politics under a broader theoretical framework. While "organized intolerance" avoids some of the difficulties encountered when using such terms as "fascism" or "radical right," it has the distinct disadvantage of blurring the distinctions between more extremist groups, on the one hand, and more mainstream groups on the other, since even the latter have been known to engage in organized intolerance as Ramet understands it.


**Anastasakis 2000**
I shall examine the validity of four different theses, which are dominant in the current literature:
• Historical: the extreme right as the revival of the fascist era;
• Structural: the extreme right as the by-product of post-industrial changes;
• Political: the extreme right as protest politics;
• Ideological: the extreme right as a xenophobic discourse


**Griffin 2000**
another type of radical right has crept up on European society, one which is potentially of considerable virulence, not in its ability to destroy liberalism from without, but to contaminate it from
within. Sometimes called 'radical right populism', or simply 'the radical right', its paradoxical qualities perhaps emerge more clearly in the term 'ethnocratic liberalism'. It is a type of party politics which is not technically a form of fascism, even a disguised form of it, for it lacks the core palingenetic vision of a 'new order' totally replacing the liberal system. Rather it enthusiastically embraces the liberal system, but considers only one ethnic group full members of civil society. As the case of apartheid South Africa illustrates only too clearly, a state based on ethnocratic liberalism is forced by its own logic to create institutions, including a terror apparatus, to impose a deeply illiberal regime on all those who do not qualify on racial grounds for being treated as human beings. This contaminated, restrictive form of liberalism poses considerable taxonomic problems because, while it aims to retain liberal institutions and procedures and remain economically and diplomatically part of the international liberal democratic community, its axiomatic denial of the universality of human rights predisposes it to behave against ethnic outgroups as violently as a fascist regime.


Hewitt 2000

The term Radical Right is used to refer to the influence of neo-liberal economic thought, especially that of Hayek, on the Conservative Party in Britain and its satellite think tanks which influenced the policy agenda in the 1980s and 1990s. Essentially this creed stands for the liberation of human energy and enterprise by removing the shackles of state bureaucracy and regulation and by reestablishing the private market as the central institution for allocating goods to meet human need. This project involves not only deregulating various economic institutions – by opening financial, manufacturing and service industries to international competition – but also privatizing former state agencies involved in the provision of health, welfare, education, security, culture, communication, transport and the production of basic raw materials and components.


Minkenberg 2000

In order to avoid the shopping list quality of most ideologically based definitions, this definition should be tied to theoretical concepts of social change which underlie most analyses of the radical right. Here, modernization theories are useful since they provide some conceptually grounded criteria for such analyses. A promising starting point is Dieter Rucht’s concept of modernization which he broadly understands as a growing autonomy of the individual (status mobility and role flexibility) and an ongoing functional differentiation of the society (segmentation and growing autonomy of societal subsystems). In this light, right-wing radicalism can be defined as the radical effort to undo such social change. The counter-concept to social differentiation is the nationally defined community, the
counter-concept to individualization is the return to traditional roles and status of the individual in such a community. It is this over-emphasis on, or radicalization of, images of social homogeneity which characterizes radical right-wing thinking. . . . In short: right-wing radicalism is defined as a political ideology, the core element of which is a myth of a homogeneous nation, a romantic and populist ultranationalism which is directed against the concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of individualism and universalism. The contemporary radical right does not want to return to pre-democratic regimes such as monarchy or feudalism. It wants government by the people, but in terms of ethnocracy instead of democracy.9 This definition focuses explicitly on the idea of the nation which is situated somewhere between the poles of demos and ethnos. The nationalistic myth, as the core of radical right-wing thinking, is characterized by the effort to construct an idea of nation and national belonging by radicalizing ethnic, religious, cultural and political criteria of exclusion and to condense the idea of nation into an image of extreme collective homogeneity. Here, an important distinction must be made. Right-wing radical ideas need not be anti-constitutional per se, as the example of the practice of slavery and racial segregation in the American South under the Constitution demonstrates. If this ideology contains an explicit challenge to the constitution of a liberal democracy, or if it advocates the use of violence to achieve its political goals, then it will be termed right-wing extremist. Thus, the radical right may or may not be anti-constitutional or violent, but the extreme right, as a variant of the radical right, is so by definition.


**Minkenberg 2001**

Many current definitions of the radical right focus on the combination of an anti-elite and anti-representational thrust and the populist style and rhetoric, aimed at mobilizing 'the people' against 'the system' or 'the state', often adding a particular nationalistic or xenophobic message to the concept and pointing out the contextual factor of a crisis, real or imagined. For example, Hans-Georg Betz in an early comparative work on the subject defines radical right-wing populism according to three 'supply-side' criteria: a) a critique of the welfare state, b) the refusal to integrate marginal groups in society, and c) a populist rhetoric (Betz 1994: 4). He argues that in the current phase of postindustrial capitalism, traditional political and social attachments are dissolved and both losers and winners of this process, i.e. unemployed and young entrepreneurs, vote, for different reasons, for parties of the radical right. With this broad definition Betz includes among the radical right very diverse phenomena, such as nationalist-authoritarian parties like the German 'Republikaner' and the Belgian 'Vlaams Blok' (now 'Vlaams Belang'), and more economically liberal, anti-tax parties such as the Scandinavian Progress Parties. Similarly, Mudde’s concept of the populist radical right postulates as a definitional minimum nationalism and/or nativism and adds aspects of xenophobia, a strong state and welfare chauvinism as core ideological features in an expanded definition (see Mudde 2007: 15-23).
Minkenberg 2003
Generally, modernization can be understood as a growing autonomy of the individual (status mobility and role flexibility) and an ongoing functional differentiation of the society (segmentation and growing autonomy of societal subsystems) (see Rucht, 1994). In this light, right-wing radicalism can be defined as the radical effort to undo such social change (Minkenberg, 1998, Chapter 1). The counter-concept to social differentiation is the nationally defined community; the counter-concept to individualization is the return to traditional roles and status of the individual in such a community. It is this overemphasis on, or radicalization of, images of social homogeneity that characterizes radical right-wing thinking the historical origins of which lie in the interdependence of nation building, democratization, industrialization, and the growing importance of the natural sciences. Hence, right-wing radicalism will be defined primarily by the ideological criteria of populist and romantic ultranationalism, that is a myth of a homogeneous nation that puts the nation before the individual and his/her civil rights. It is therefore directed against liberal and pluralist democracy (though not necessarily in favor of a fascist state), its underlying values of freedom and equality and the related categories of individualism and universalism (see Minkenberg, 1998, 2000; see also Mudde, 2000, Chapter 7). This definition focuses explicitly on the idea of the nation as the ultimate focal point, situated somewhere between the poles of demos and ethnos. The nationalistic myth is characterized by the effort to construct an idea of nation and national belonging by radicalizing ethnic, religious, lingual, other cultural and political criteria of exclusion, to bring about a congruence between the state and the nation, and to condense the idea of nation into an image of extreme collective homogeneity.

Minkenberg 2010
Most experts agree that the radical right can be defined as a radically exclusionist political force, which, more than other political currents and movements, employs rigid historical references in the imagination of the community it claims to fight for. In this vein, the core political programme or ideology of the radical right is a populist and romantic ultranationalism. More specifically, the radical right is involved in an effort to construct an idea of nation and national belonging by radicalizing ethnic, religious, lingual, other cultural and political criteria of inclusion and exclusion, that is, to condense the idea of nation into an image of extreme collective homogeneity and to bring about a congruence between the state and the nation in these exclusionary terms (Minkenberg 1998: 29-47, 2000, 2008; see also Carter 2005: 14-20; Kitschelt and McGann 1995: chapter 1; Kitschelt 2007: 1179; Mudde 2007: 15-26). As the main definitional criterion is not the opposition to democracy, this
concept of the radical right is rather inclusive in that it covers more extreme variants of openly antidemocratic or fascist movements and parties, as well as the more vaguely defined currents of right-wing populism, or religiously based nationalism (Minkenberg 2008: 12-15; see also Mudde 2007: 138-157).


**Minkenberg 2011**

To start with, I would like to propose a definition of right-wing radicalism based on modernisation theory, which refers to specific mechanisms and semantics of inclusion and exclusion. Ultimately, these arise from an exaggerated, radical concept of nation as the primary We-group that exhibits a tendency to closure, particularly in periods of accelerated social and cultural change. I define right-wing radicalism as a political ideology or tendency based on ultra-nationalistic ideas which tends to be directed against liberal democracy – although not necessarily directly or explicitly so. The ultra-nationalist core of radical-right-wing thought consists of the fact that in the construction of national affiliation, specific ethnic, cultural or religious criteria of inclusion or exclusion are accentuated, condensed into collective ideas of homogeneity and linked to authoritarian political models. In other words, this is top-down politics claiming to act in the name of the people.


**Minkenberg 2013a**

The radical right . . . includes all variants of collective actors (parties, movements, sub-cultural milieus) which emerge in times of accelerated socioeconomic and cultural change and fight such change by radicalizing inclusionary and exclusionary criteria (see Minkenberg, 1998, pp. 29–47, 2008; see also Carter, 2005, pp. 14–20; Kitschelt, 2007, p. 1179). More specifically, right-wing radicalism is defined as a political ideology, the core element of which is a myth of a homogenous nation, a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism which is directed against the concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of individualism and universalism.
My point of departure in what follows is modernization theory. Modernization can be understood as a process of social change characterized by increasing functional differentiation and personal autonomy. Accordingly, I define right-wing radicalism as the effort to undo or combat modernization by radicalizing inclusionary and exclusionary criteria of belonging. It is the overemphasis on, or radicalization of, images of social homogeneity that characterizes extreme right-wing thinking, with the nation serving as the primary "we-group." And this logic applies to a large extent to xenophobia, as well. In other words, right-wing extremism is a political ideology revolving around the myth of a homogenous nation – a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism hostile to liberal, pluralistic democracy, with its underlying principles of individualism and universalism. The criteria of exclusion in far-right discourse can be based on ethnicity, culture, religion, and/or gender (see Table 1 for elaboration).

Following my earlier modernization-theoretical conceptualization, the radical right in a democratic setting includes all variants of collective actors (parties, movements, sub-cultural milieus) which emerge in times of accelerated political, socioeconomic, and cultural change, and fight such change by radicalizing inclusionary and exclusionary criteria of belonging (see Minkenberg 1998: 29-47, 2013a; see also Carter 2005: 14-20; Kitschelt 2007: 1179). On the programmatic level, right-wing radicalism is defined as a political ideology, the core element of which is a myth of a homogenous nation, a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism which challenges the concept and reality of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of individualism and universalism. In other words: the radical right radicalizes inclusionary and exclusionary criteria of a primary 'we group', typically 'the nation'. While this definition does not include an explicitly anti-democratic stance, such as the fascist view of the desired political order, it places the radical right at the margin of the political spectrum in liberal democracies and allows a differentiation of the phenomenon according to the radical right's degree of extremism.
radical right in the political process, edited by Michael Minkenberg (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 27-56 (p. 28))

Minkenberg 2017
The radical right . . . includes all variants of collective actors (parties, movements, sub-cultural milieus) which emerge in times of accelerated political, socioeconomic, and cultural change and which fight such change by radicalizing the inclusionary and exclusionary criteria of national or ingroup belonging (see Minkenberg 1998, 29–47, 2013a; see also Carter 2005, 14–20; Kitschelt 2007, 1179).

Hence, right-wing radicalism will be defined primarily by the ideological criteria of a populist and romantic ultranationalism, a myth of a homogeneous nation which puts the latter before the individual and his or her civil rights and which therefore is directed against liberal and pluralist democracy (though not necessarily in favor of a fascist state), its underlying values of freedom and equality, and the related categories of individualism and universalism (see Minkenberg 2000; also Mudde 2000a, Chapter 7). This definition focuses explicitly on the idea of the nation as the ultimate focal point, situated somewhere between the poles of demos and ethnos. The nationalistic myth consists of the construction of an idea of nation and national belonging by radicalizing criteria of exclusion. These can be ethnically based, but also cultural, that is religious, and aim at an extreme cultural or ethnic homogeneity of the primary group and a congruence between the state and the nation (Smith 2001, 34). Whatever the criteria, this ideology involves a radical in-group/out-group distinction, to which can be added the propensity for a regime that strictly enforces these distinctions, that is an authoritarian order or strong state. Indeed, right-wing radical thinking, in its modernization-theoretical conception espoused here, is thoroughly intertwined with an authoritarian, that is fiercely anti-egalitarian and anti-emancipatory, view of the world which includes a top-down approach to politics and the corresponding emphasis on strong leadership as well as the absence of internal democracy in radical right groups and organizations (see Minkenberg 1998, 37–47; Mudde 2007, 22–23). This concept echoes the social theory developed in the grid/group model, the two political dimensions of which consist of boundary drawing between the in-group and the out-group, with the emphasis of a high level of in-group homogeneity on the one hand, and the level of strictness in enforcing the rules (strong or authoritarian state) on the other (see Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Kitschelt 2007, 1179). A list of such group boundaries drawn in radical right discourse and their underlying logic is provided in Table 2.1.


Anastasakis 2001
it is possible to identify, based on a comparative assessment of the current literature on the West European experience, four general theses that relate to the rise, resilience and nature of the extreme right. According to these, the European extreme right is perceived as (1) revival of the fascist era; (2) the by-product of post-industrial changes; (3) protest politics; and (4) a xenophobic and
exclusionary discourse. The following analysis favours an ‘eclectic’ approach reflecting the complementarity of the four theses and allowing for some flexibility in each particular case.


Givens 2001
I use the term radical right to describe the parties in this analysis. One of the main defining characteristics of these parties is their nationalism, which I describe in more detail below. For the purposes of this analysis, radical right parties also have the following traits in common:

• They take an anti-immigrant stance by proposing stronger immigration controls, the repatriation of unemployed immigrants, and call for a national (i.e., citizens only) preference in social benefits and employment.
• They consider themselves "outsiders" in the party system, and therefore are not tainted by government or mainstream parties' scandals.
• Although they may have started out pro-EU they are now critics of the Maastricht treaty and monetary union.
• In contrast to earlier extreme right or fascist parties they work within a country's political and electoral system and do not have the goal of tearing down the current political system. These criteria may change with time and the rise of new issues, but this definition fits well for the radical right in the 1980s and 1990s.


Givens 2005
I use the term "radical right" to describe the parties in this analysis. One of the main defining characteristics of these parties is their nationalism, which I describe in more detail. For the purposes of this analysis, radical right parties also have the following traits in common:

• They take an anti-immigrant stance by proposing stronger immigration controls and the repatriation of unemployed immigrants, and they call for a national (i.e., citizens only) preference in social benefits and employment ("welfare chauvinism").
• In contrast to earlier extreme right or fascist parties, they work within a country's political and electoral system. Although they do not have the goal of tearing down the current political system, they are anti-establishment. They consider themselves "outsiders" in the party system, and therefore are not tainted by government or mainstream parties' scandals.

(Terri E. Givens, Voting Radical Right in Western Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 20)

Givens also, notably in chapter 2, offers useful and informed commentary on the discussion surrounding the definition of the radical right.


**Plotke 2001**

*TRR*s controversial point of departure was to regard the basic positions of what it termed the radical right as so excessive in their estimation of the Communist threat and so unrealistic in their rejection of New Deal reforms as to be unreasonable. Thus Richard Hofstadter cited the "dense and massive irrationality" of the radical right (Richard Hofstadter, "The Pseudo-Conservative Revolt," 81). From this starting point the authors sought to understand the radical right in ways that went beyond the programs and self-descriptions of its leaders and organizers (Daniel Bell, "The Dispossessed," 8, 13; Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Sources of the ‘Radical Right,’” 360-65; Talcott Parsons, "Social Strains in America," 209). In this context "radical" was intended not merely as a way to underline that these groups were very conservative in conventional left-right terms, but to stress that these currents aimed at a real break with prevailing institutions and practices, though they disagreed among themselves about just how profound a break was required.


**Beichelt and Minkenberg 2002**

See the 'homogeneity' definition of 'radical right' by Beichelt and Minkenberg (2002, p. 249), claiming that the fundamental trait of the radical right is its overemphasis on and radicalisation of social homogeneity.


**Ignazi 2002**

Radical right has an ambiguous connotation due to its original (and twofold) adoption. On one hand, this term was introduced by the famous, pioneering study by Daniel Bell, *The Radical Right* (1963). Two main difficulties arise from this and further studies. First, radical right refers to both the John Birch Society and the MacCarthyism that are movements and not parties and that have been convincingly labeled as extreme conservative but not as "extreme right" (Kolckey 1983, 35ff).
Although these movements are characterized by a strict moral traditionalism and an obsessive anti-communism, they cannot be considered as anti-system (Himmelstein 1990, 73ff). Second, the radical right is identified through individuals' personality traits (largely derived or influenced by the research of Adorno et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* [1950]) rather than through a set of values. Therefore, this definition is too ideographic and too loose to account for the right-wing political organizations, especially in contemporary Europe. On the other hand, radical right has been used to designate those movements and groups that find their ideological imprinting in a counterrevolutionary anti-modern tradition of thought and that boast and even adopt violent means up to terrorist actions (Ferraresi 1996). Following this tradition, radical right would tap a very limited space of contemporary right wing extremism.

The use of the term New Right has raised even more confusion. New Right indicates the neoconservatist agenda, a cultural movement sustained by some think tanks and publishing enterprises that originated from and operate within the conservative political space. The French version of the term, Nouvelle Droite, is even more specific as it connotes a tiny group of brilliant intellectuals, based originally in France with Alain de Benoist at their head. The Nouvelle Droite is similar to the New Right for the reference to the cultural domain, but it does not share anything in terms of values: To summarize, the Nouvelle Droite is anti-liberal and anti-socialist, while the New Right is anti-socialist but pro-liberal.

A term that has found wide audience in the more recent literature is "populism." Hans-Georg Betz (1993) speaks of the "populist extreme right." Several authors have offered varying definitions of populism; most highlight the highly charismatic dependence on "common sense" and a rejection of existing political institutions (see Betz 1993, Taggart 1993, Pfahl-Traugher 1993, and Kitschelt 1995).

Compared to these terms, "extreme right" has a series of advantages. First, it recalls the notion of extremeness in a political and ideological space. A more substantive element is particularly relevant in the German tradition of study on this field. The German term extremismus refers in fact to the anti-democratic, anti-liberal, and therefore anti-constitutional standings (Backes and Jesse 1993, Ueltzhoffer 1992, and Minkenberg, Chapter 11 in this volume): In other words, those issues and organizations that are "extreme" are at the same time "anti-system." It is precisely the anti-system connotation of the extremismus that gives the term "extreme right" more accuracy in identifying the phenomenon under scrutiny.

If we adopt this approach, it follows that the class of parties of the extreme right is ascertained through the double screening on ideology and location in the political spectrum. The first criterion revives the classical analysis by "familles spirituelles" by Maurice Duverger; the second one states the usefulness of the left-right continuum as an approximate rule of thumb to differentiate the extreme right from the conservatives. The ideological criterion has higher priority because the "nature" of the party is provided by its identity; it serves to identify the party's political culture. The second criterion is less relevant as it works as a prerequisite. It assesses the "right extremeness" of the party: It ensures that the party is located close to the extreme right of the political spectrum, or at least closer than any other party. While this second criterion does not raise any problem of analysis, especially given its function of mere screening, the first one is quite problematic and needs a further discussion.

**Schain, Zolberg, and Hossay 2002**

All radical right parties display a strong reliance on a romanticized "imagined community" and a related atavistic scapegoatism.


**Zaslove 2004**

This article's definition of 'radical right populism' makes reference to five political, organisational and ideological characteristics that define these political parties: populist party organisation, the politics of resentment, the politics of exclusion, economic policy that wavers between support for free-market economic policies and opposition to globalisation, and the ability to form cross-class coalitions.

(Andrej Zaslove, "The Dark Side of European Politics: Unmasking the Radical Right," *Journal of European Integration*, 26:1 (2004), pp. 61-81 (p. 70))

**Carter 2005**

Elisabeth Carter (2005) seeks to broaden the group of parties included in her study in order to increase the soundness of the basis for generalization, and thus opts for a more inclusive definition. She includes parties that have been labeled as on the border or fringe of the radical right party family by other scholars (Ignazi 2003). Her definition is based on two anti-constitutional and anti-democratic elements: "a rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic constitutional state" and "a rejection of the principle of fundamental human equality" (Carter 2005, 17). This more general definition allows for additional parties to be included in her study than have been by other scholars. Carter acknowledges that borderline cases do exist, and establishing a dividing line between the mainstream right and the radical is less than obvious, but maintains that this "does not mean that parties of the extreme right cannot be identified and analyzed" (Carter 2005, 20)

(Jason K. Gettel, "Cordonning, Competing, and Co-opting: Examining the Political Effects of Radical Right Parties in Western Europe Through an Analysis of Political Space" (M.S., University of Oregon, 2010), p. 7, https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/10669))
I follow Carter's (2005) distinction between extremist and radical right parties. Extremist parties pose a danger to democratic order. I use the term radical right to denote parties and voters who do not challenge the institution of competitive repeated elections.


**Carter 2018**

Having examined the features mentioned most often in existing definitions of right-wing extremism/radicalism, and having organized these properties in a meaningful way, we have argued that authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and an exclusionary and/or a holistic kind of nationalism are defining properties of right-wing extremism/radicalism. By contrast, xenophobia, racism, and populism are accompanying characteristics of the concept. We can, therefore, propose a minimal definition of right-wing extremism/radicalism as: an ideology that encompasses authoritarianism, anti-democracy and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism. As well as being confined to the necessary features of the concept, this definition strikes a balance between parsimony and denotational adequacy. It is not overly long and yet it has empirical usefulness in that it allows us to identify parties that belong to the extreme/radical right family, be they longstanding members, new arrivals or even possible future additions.

(Elisabeth Carter, "Right-wing extremism/radicalism: reconstructing the concept," *Journal of Political Ideologies* (2018))

**Sykes 2005a [re Edwardian England]**

Alan Sykes defines the radical right by its belief in the purposive and interlinked roles of property, state, nation, and race, expressed in prognoses of imminent catastrophe and diagnoses requiring urgent action.9 [9 A. Sykes, *The Radical Right in Britain: Social Imperialism to the BNP* (Basingstoke, 2005), 1–10]


**Sykes 2005b**

The term 'Radical Right' is used here to describe those sections of the 'Right' which were nationalist, but in pursuit of their interpretation of the national interest found themselves obliged to question the rights of private property. Thus understood, the English 'Radical Right' had its roots in the ideas of Edwardian social imperialism.


**Art 2006**
Attempts to define the radical right party family produced a "war of words" in the mid 1990s (Mudde 1996; Mudde forthcoming). Although this definitional debate persists, a consensus has emerged that radical right parties are both nationalist, in the sense that they seek to dramatically restrict or roll-back immigration, and occupy a policy space on the extreme right of the spectrum in their respective states, as an expert survey conducted by Marcel Lubbers has demonstrated (Lubbers 2000). Using the above definition means that several parties that have often been labeled radical right need to be re-coded, at least for certain time periods. For example, the Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway do not qualify as radical right parties until they adopted the immigration issue in the 1980s (Rydgren 2004). Similarly, the Austrian Freedom Party should be coded as radical right only after Jörg Haider captured control of it in 1986 and shifted it in a nationalist direction.


Art 2011
The term "radical right" requires an immediate definition, particularly since scholars have used a number of designations - extreme right, right-wing populist, far right, to name a few - to refer to the same basic party family. In this book, I use "far right" as an umbrella term for any political party, voluntary association, or extraparliamentary movement that differentiates itself from the mainstream right. The term is problematic for a number of reasons, but given its wide usage it is a convenient way of referring to political movements across time and space. "Radical right" refers to a specific type of far right party that began to emerge in the late 1970s. This term, too, is potentially misleading because parties that have carried the adjective "radical" include left-liberal parties in nineteenth-century France and Italy, as well as anticommunist conservative movements in the postwar United States. However, since there has been a convergence around the term in the literature, I will use it rather than invent another.

My definition draws from Betz (1994) and Mudde (2007), who both identify an ideological core of this party family. For Betz, these parties are on the right because they reject individual and social equality, oppose the integration of marginalized groups, and make xenophobic appeals. Neoliberalism is the economic dimension of this ideology, while nativism forms its cultural component. For reasons that will become clear later, culture has trumped economics as the signature feature of the radical right. A minority of these parties adhere to a biological form of racism, which holds that some ethnic groups are genetically superior to others. The majority tend more toward ethnopluralism, which does not posit a racial hierarchy but holds that the mixing of ethnic groups creates insurmountable problems. But they all see ethnic differences as basic, immutable, and impervious to political projects that seek to change them. From this follows their demand that immigration be dramatically reduced or even reversed through deportation, which has led some scholars to describe these parties simply as anti-immigrant (Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2005). The subtitle of this book recognizes the centrality of this idea to radical right parties. Yet it is important to note that radical right parties also seek to defend the nation from forces other than immigration, such as globalization and European integration.

The foregoing features are clearly not confined to radical right parties: mainstream conservative parties, and even some social democratic ones, have made nationalist and xenophobic appeals. To
further distinguish them, we need to focus on their "radical" nature. There is clearly a discursive component here: radical right parties use language that mainstream parties would normally shy away from. But there is a deeper critique of liberal democracy in this radicalism as well. Although they regularly pledge their allegiance to the democratic system, in some cases to avoid being banned by state authorities, they are clearly at odds with its central liberal features, such as pluralism, the protection of minorities from the will of the majority, and checks on executive authority (Mudde 2007).


David Art's *Inside the Radical Right: The Development of Anti-Immigrant Parties in Western Europe* (2011) effectively synthesizes the literature on radical right parties in Europe from the 1970s to the 2000s. Art defines the far right to include any right-wing interest group that distinguishes itself self-consciously from the mainstream right, and he defines the radical right as a particular subset of far-right political parties characterized by nationalism, a rejection of ethnic diversity, a willingness to use radical rhetoric, and a skeptical attitude toward liberal democratic protections for minority rights (2011, pp. 10–11). In practice, as his subtitle indicates, these are anti-immigrant parties, and in the twenty-first century they are more specifically anti-Muslim. Skocpol and Williamson's Tea Partiers, many of whom expressed concerns about the spread of Islam in the United States, and explicitly distinguished themselves from mainstream Republicans by characterizing themselves as ‘far right’ or ‘ultraconservative’ (2012, p. 28), would certainly fit this characterization of the radical right.


**Art 2013a**

This article defines radical right parties as parties that view ethnic differences as basic, immutable, and potentially destructive features of political life. The positions they take on these issues places them to the right of their mainstream conservative competitors. The concern with the cultural dimension of politics – which, as argued later, comes at the expense of the economic dimension – has led radical right parties in Western Europe to adopt positions on immigration that are much stricter than those of their mainstream conservative competitors or any other political party in their respective countries.

(David Art, "Rise of the Radical Right: Implications for European Politics," *Brown Journal of World Affairs* 19.11 (Spring/Summer 2013): 127-137 (at 130)).
Art 2013b

Borrowing from Hans Georg Betz and Mudde, David Art defines the radical right as parties that, "reject individual and social equality, oppose the integration of marginalized groups, and make xenophobic appeals," noting that, "Neoliberalism is the economic dimension of the ideology, while nativism forms its cultural component." . . . Art's radical right is a group of parties that respects the institution of democracy and rejects paramilitarism, but whose views on ethnic differences place them to the right of the established conservative parties. 26 [David Art, "Why 2013 Is Not 1933: The Radical Right in Europe," Current History 112, no. 752 (2013): 89] Though they may appeal to voters on a range of issues, these parties are mostly defined by their anti-immigrant stances. 27 While they are farther to the right than other parties in their respective countries, for the most part they reject fascism, Nazism, and other legacies of WWII 28. Art contrasts radical right parties with right-wing extremists, who reject and seek to replace liberal democracy, engage in and condone political violence, and embrace biological racism and other ideologies of a fascist interwar past. 29 Similarly, Mudde argues that the radical right is nominally democratic, despite opposition to some aspects of liberal democracy. 30 He contrasts this group with what he calls the 'extreme right', "which is in essence antidemocratic."


Docekalová 2006

In order to define the radical right-wing party family, it is necessary to outline not only ideological and programmatic features, but also to describe its common political style and discourse. Scholars tend to agree that the common core doctrine shared by the extreme right-wing parties is nationalism (Eatwell, 1998: 412; Mudde, 1999: 187; Hainsworth, 2000: 12; Fieschi, 2000: 519), which is usually accompanied by ethnocentrism and ethnopluralism (i.e. only one's “own” nation is given positive qualities; foreign influences and cultures are perceived as threats to a nation and nations should be kept apart in order to preserve their qualities). Other features which are most often referred to are xenophobia, racism (usually cultural racism), support for a strong state, welfare chauvinism, emphasis on law and order, opposition to multiculturalism and immigration, etc. These parties are usually representatives of populism. Kai-Olaf Lang defines populist style as comprising following elements: “the appeal to the “people’s will” and a strong anti-establishment attitude; oversimplification of problems and possible solutions; confrontation and antagonism; the construction of a dichotomy between “them” (establishment and bureaucracy) and “us” (the people) which cuts across the lines of social class and social layer; a high level of personalization based on strong leaders” (Lang, 2005: 7). 5

Radical right-wing parties therefore often benefit from popular dissatisfaction with established parties (Hainsworth, 2000: 9). These parties appeal to emotions (mainly anxiety and insecurity) in their discourse. They overemphasize threats, and use stereotypes and prejudice. The representatives of
these parties often use politically incorrect and socially unacceptable expressions and in some cases cross the boundaries of free speech.


Retallack 2006

What may surprise readers is the degree to which the radical Right in Imperial Germany corresponds to a definition of the radical Right in twenty-first-century Germany: both comprised ‘parties, organizations, and individuals whose self-knowledge and activities are formed by the majority, if not all, of the following characteristics: nationalism; ethno-centrism; xenophobia, particularly in the guise of anti-Semitism and racism; anti-pluralism; anti-communism [in Imperial Germany, anti-socialism]; anti-parliamentarism; militarism; a law and order mentality; the longing for an authoritarian state under one leader; often a sympathy for conspiracy theories; and the acceptance of violence as a suitable means of political discourse.'

(James N. Retallack, The German Right, 1860-1920: Political Limits of the Authoritarian Imagination (University of Toronto Press, 2006), pp. 19-20)

De Lange 2007

Although the debate about the appropriate terminology to describe the party family under study in this chapter is still ongoing, we use the term radical right. According to our definition radical right parties adhere to an ideology of ethnocentrism/nationalism and populism. We are well aware that the ideology of the MSI (now AN) does not fully meet this definition. However, since the party is in many ways a predecessor to the radical right parties discussed in this chapter we include it in our analysis and refer to it as part of the radical right party family.


Kitschelt 2007

We adopt Kitschelt’s discussion and definition of radical right parties as parties who are „(1) nationalist in a xenophobic way, (2) racist or at least culturally conformist, and (3) […] either reject democracy (regardless of their stance on xenophobia and racism), or they embrace democracy, but make xenophobic mobilization against immigrants and insistence on a dominant national cultural paradigm obligatory for all residents the central planks of their policies” (Kitschelt 2007: 1178). In addition, we subscribe to the arguments that the modern radical right parties have a strong populist component, which emphasize the failure of the establishment to fulfill the needs and demands of the
people, on the one hand, and the lack of genuine alternatives offered by mainstream parties, on the other. These strategies allow radical right parties to present themselves as champions of democracy and as the only parties concerned with transposing people’s needs in policies (Rydgren 2007; Mudde 2004; Taggart 2000). (Romana Careja and Florin N. Fesnic, “Left-Right Position, Authoritarianism, Euroskepticism and Support for the Radical Right, East and West” (2011), p. 2, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Florin_Fesnic/publication/228198996_Left-Right_Position_Authoritarianism_Euroskepticism_and_Support_for_the_Radical_Right_East_and_West/links/02e7e52deb8d381cc8000000.pdf)

Lauridsen 2007
The radical right is a bourgeois rightist current which aims to overthrow the bourgeois constitutional state by abrogating the constitution, primarily through administrative manoeuvres, i.e. a cold coup, or alternatively by armed force, i.e. a bloody coup, but without seeking mass support or engaging in party politics. It need not be a paramilitary organization or part of one, and it may not require the support of one. It can just as well be the bourgeois power elite or part of it, or dominant forces in conservative parties and the state apparatus - with or without the connivance of paramilitary organizations, depending on the armed forces at the disposal of the ruling elite.

(John T. Lauridsen, Nazism and the Radical Right in Austria, 1918-1934 (Museum Tusculanum Press, 2007), p. 63)

Mazzoleni and Skenderovic 2007
We use the term radical right-wing populist parties in order to emphasize two specific dimensions that characterize these parties: The concept "radical right" denotes their political ideology which is mainly based on an exclusionist worldview, including nationalist and xenophobic beliefs, and their neo-liberal agenda which draws on a social-Darwinist conception of society. The term "populist" refers to their anti-establishment strategies which emphasize the fundamental antagonism between the people and the established elites. See Betz, 1994; Kitschelt, 1995; Taggart, 2000; Rydgren, 2004. (Oscar Mazzoleni and Damir Skenderovic, "The Rise and Impact of the Swiss People’s Party: Challenging the Rules of Governance in Switzerland," Extrême-droite et pouvoir en Europe, ed. Pascal Delwit and Philippe Poirier (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2007), pp. 85-116 (at 115 n.2), http://www.academia.edu/download/31099919/Extreme-droite_et_pouvoir_en_Europe.pdf#page=80)

Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007
Mudde 2007
The ideological core of the populist radical right – defined as a combination of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism (Mudde 2007)


Cas Mudde (2007; 2011),¹ ... defines the radical right party-family as nativist, authoritarian and populist. Nativism – the combination of nationalism and xenophobia – is the key ideological feature of these parties (Mudde, 2007, p. 22).

(Tjitske Akkerman and Matthijs Rooduijn, "Pariahs or Partners? Inclusion and Exclusion of Radical Right Parties and the Effects on Their Policy Positions," *Political Studies*: 2015 VOL 63, 1140–1157 (at 1144))

Our definition of radical right parties is based on the classification that Cas Mudde provides in his comprehensive study of this party family.3 [Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007]. Ideologically, these parties are primarily committed to a xenophobic type of nationalism; central to their policy programmes is an "anti-immigration" position.⁴


One of the most influential works on the radical right is Mudde's (2007) book "Populist radical right parties in Europe", in which he defines the ideological core of these parties as nativism, authoritarianism and populism, with nativism being the central feature, combining xenophobia and nationalism: "an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state" (Mudde 2007: 19, 22). Authoritarianism is most visible in the party's advocacy of a strict enforcement of "law and order" politics as well as "punitive conventional moralism" (Smith 1967: 5 following Mudde 2007: 23). . . . Mudde (2007) defines "radical right" as "opposition to some key features of liberal democracy, most notably political pluralism and the constitutional protection of minorities" (Mudde 2007: 25; 2005, 2006).

According to Mudde (2007), three elements contribute to define radical right populism: nativism, authoritarianism and populism. First, nativism is "an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state" (Mudde, 2007: 19). Second, authoritarianism is the idea that the people should totally comply with the law and that outlawed people should be severely punished. This comprises the primacy of law and order policies. Third, the concept of populism is often perceived as a fuzzy concept. Nevertheless, despite the lack of unanimity on a precise definition of the concept, there is a consensus among scholars on a minimal definition of populism. The 'people' and the elites are the two basic components of the definition. The first is presented by populists as a courageous, virtuous and homogenous group that the State should protect. The latter is perceived as a lazy, vicious and corrupted group that rules the world (in politics, economy, media, society) in favour of the business interests, at the expense of the people. Populists put both of these groups in a vertical relationship and propose to reverse the order by restoring the sovereignty of the people.

(Benjamin Biard, "How do radical right populist parties matter? The influence of the Swiss SVP on policy-making" (September 2016), pp. 4-5, https://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/f6bbf54d-7654-4928-a9e0-ad0dc3169b8c.pdf)

The 'radical right' could be better defined as the belief that the prevailing system is totally corrupt and should be replaced by a much more hierarchical order, whereas moderate rightists believe that it needs only incremental change. In this vein, the notion 'radical' is used also in a more historically justified sense. After all, it referred originally to the idea that man is capable of changing society – down to its roots (radices). Conservatives have always opposed this idea that emerged in the Enlightenment. Initially, radicals strove for more equality. Yet the attempt of reactionaries during the nineteenth century to restore the ancien régime with aristocratic privileges and an absolute monarchy could be seen as 'radical' too. Indeed there may be a tension between radical right and democracy, as the latter requires substantial equality in the political system and the former is associated with substantial inequality. We can agree with Mudde that the radical right tends to be authoritarian. Mudde does not make clear, however, why it should be nationalist or even nativist – a more extreme form of nationalism, defined by him as 'an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state' (p. 19). The radical monarchists of the nineteenth century usually detested any kind of nationalism. So did the Catholic and Calvinist parties that emerged at the end of that century or the beginning of the twentieth century in many parts of Europe. Yet they also opposed fundamental values of liberal democracy, such as the separation between church and state and the idea of popular sovereignty – even if they usually accepted the liberal parliamentary system in operation. Even today, fundamentalist Christian parties (such as the Dutch Calvinist party, Staatkundig Gereformeerde
Partij [SGP]) as well as Islamist groups do not accept all aspects of liberal democracy, without necessarily embracing any form of nationalism.


Mudde 2009
The combination of nationalism and xenophobia (i.e. nativism) and authoritarianism, which I term 'radical right', is more generic and has been found in previous decades and in other geographical areas. The prime question that Lucardie asks is whether that combination should be termed radical right. Or better, whether the term radical right should be reduced to the combination of nativism and authoritarianism. Although I do not necessarily agree with his definition of radical right, I must concede his key point: the radical right cannot be defined exclusively on the basis of nationalism.


Mudde 2012
For purposes of this report, the radical right is defined as a broad grouping of political parties and nonparty organizations that share characteristics of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.


Mudde 2016
The term radical right is best used for right-wing ideologies that accept democracy, i.e. popular sovereignty and majority rule, but oppose fundamental values of liberal democracy, notably minority rights and pluralism. The most relevant subgroup within the radical right is the populist radical right, which includes almost all relevant far right parties in contemporary Europe, including the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), Danish People's Party (DF), the French National Front (FN), the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), and the Swiss People's Party (SVP). What all these parties have in common is a core ideology that combines nativism, authoritarianism, and populism.

(Cas Mudde, "Definitions: Right, Far-Right, Outside Right and . . . Just Trying To Be Populist," HOPE not Hate Magazine 23 (Jan.-Feb. 2016), reprinted with revisions in Mudde, The Far Right in America (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, and New York: Routledge, 2018))

Rydgren 2007
Their program [of the new radical right-wing parties] is directed toward strengthening the nation by making it more ethnically homogeneous and by returning to traditional values. They generally view individual rights as secondary to the goals of the nation. They also tend to be populists in accusing elites of putting internationalism ahead of the nation and of putting their own narrow self-interests and various special interests ahead of the interest of the people. Hence, the new radical right-wing parties share a core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and antiestablishment populism.


Rydgren 2013
Another definition of the radical right by Swedish sociologist Jens Rydgren is that:

The radical right-wing parties share a core of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-establishment populism. In their political platforms this ideological core is often embedded in a general socio-cultural authoritarianism that stresses themes such as law and order and family values. (Rydgren 2013:2) [Introduction: class politics and the radical right. J. Rydgren (red.) (2013). Class politics and the radical right. London: Routledge. 1–9]

(Linnéa Lindsköld, Contradicting Cultural Policy: - A comparative study of the cultural policy of the Scandinavian radical right, Nordisk kulturpolitisk tidsskrift 01 / 2015 (Volum 18), https://www.idunn.no/nkt/2015/01/contradicting_cultural_policy_-_a_comparative_study_of_the)

Rydgren forthcoming
We use Rydgren's (forthcoming) [The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right. Oxford: Oxford University Press] definition of the radical right as a subset of right-wing extremism, which is hostile to democratic governance or constitutions but not necessarily actively opposed to democracy per se (also see Mudde 2000, 2005; Miller-Idriss forthcoming-a).

(Cynthia Miller-Idriss & Hilary Pilkington (2017) In search of the missing link: gender, education and the radical right, Gender and Education, 29:2, 133-146 (p. 134))

Almeida 2008
The term 'radical right' is applied to parties sharing a common location at the right-wing periphery of the societal left-right dimension and displaying the following ideological correspondences:
(i) A self-proclaimed identity as ‘genuine’ representatives of the people against the ‘political establishment’ (Mudde 2004; Schedler 1996);
(ii) The defence of an essentialist conception of the nation;
(iii) A conspiracy-centred approach towards socio-economic issues based on 'sympathetic' causalities and the blaming of ethnically, politically or sexually defined minority groups.

Almeida 2010
The term 'radical right' is applied to parties sharing a common location at the right-wing periphery of the societal left–right dimension and displaying the following ideological correspondences: (i) a self-proclaimed identity as 'genuine' representatives of the people against the 'political establishment', (ii) the defence of an essentialist conception of the nation and (iii) a conspiracy-centred approach to socio-economic issues based on the blaming of ethnically, politically or sexually defined minority groups.

Berna 2008
Radical right-wing political parties are anti-system because of their rejection of the established socio-cultural and socio-political system. They apply racial, ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and/or religious criteria to define who belongs and does not belong. They are opposed to the social integration of minorities, immigrants, and they facilitate xenophobia, homophobia, racial discrimination, and overt racism. 87 The term radical right is used interchangeably with the terms ultra-right and extreme right and is generally applied to 20th century incarnations of organized intolerance. 88 Stoss (1988) identified four characteristics with right-wing extremism. First, exaggerated nationalism involving hostile attitudes toward other states or peoples; secondly, denial that all people have equal rights of life, liberty, security, freedom of religion, freedom of speech, assembly and association, and an associated denial of the fundamental equality of human worth. Third, there is a rejection of parliamentary-pluralist systems based on the principle of majority rule; and finally, a folk-ethnocentric ideology. Falter and Schumann (1998) listed ten features as the core of right-extremist thinking: extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anti-communism, anti-parliamentarianism, anti-pluralism, militarism, law-and-order thinking, a demand for strong political leader and/or executive, anti-Americanism and cultural pessimism.
(D. Dustin Berna, "A Revolutionary Perspective on Social Movements: Fundamentalism in the Islamic World" (Ph.D., University of New Orleans, 2008), pp. 86-87, https://scholarworks.uno.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1650&context=td)

Hainsworth 2008
Hainsworth calls the ideological mission of the radical right . . . to save "the endangered nation and people from cosmopolitan, decadent, alien and anti-national influences" (Hainsworth, P. (2008). *The Extreme Right in Western Europe*. Oxon: Routledge, p. 67).
Apart from nationalism, the self-definition of radical right-wing forces includes opposition to the system, the fossilized, clientelistic partocracy. These political forces often define themselves as the representatives of the true interests of the people and the nation, unlike the regime of the establishment.

van der Brug and Fennema 2008
When Fennema (1997) studied the ideologies of the Western European parties that belong to this group, he concluded that the main thing these parties have in common is their fierce opposition against immigration, reason why he proposed to call them anti-immigrant parties, and more recently anti-immigration parties. This term is well suited to describe West-European parties of the radical right. However, if we include parties from central or Eastern Europe, the term 'anti-immigration' does not capture the core concerns of these parties. Because immigration into these countries is very limited, these parties have not mobilized against immigrants. Rather, they have promoted strong right wing nationalism and as such they have mobilized anti-EU sentiments, as well as anti-Semitism (in particular the Polish Self Defence and the Hungarian Life and Justice) and hate against other ethnic groups, in particular the Roma. So, when looking beyond the context of Western Europe -as we do in this paper- the term radical right is to be preferred (see also Norris 2005).

Zaslove 2008
The radical right refers to the new right-wing political parties that began to appear in Western Europe in the 1970s, and which became particularly successful in the 1980s and the 1990s. Conceptually, I distinguish between two types of right-wing parties currently active in Western Europe. First, there are neo-fascist parties such as Forza Nuova and Movimento Sociale Fiamma Tricolore in Italy, the National-Democratic German Party (NPD, Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands), the German People’s Union (Deutsche Volksunion, or DVU), and the British National Party. These parties espouse fascist or neo-fascist ideology. . . . The second and most important category of right-wing parties are radical right populist parties (Betz and Johnston, 2004; Rydgren, 2005a). More specifically, I am referring to parties such as the French National Front, the Austrian Freedom Party, the Swiss People’s Party, the Danish People’s Party, the Lega Nord, the Danish and the Norwegian Progress parties, and the Vlaams Blok (since 2004 the Vlaams Belang). These radical right populist
parties boast diverse origins. Many began as reformed extremists (French National Front), others as anti-tax parties (Progress Parties in Denmark and Norway), and in some cases they evolved from regional or minority nationalist movements (Vlaams Blok and Lega Nord). Despite these diverse beginnings, the radical right now constitutes a new party family (Zaslove, 2004a; Rydgren, 2005a). It has a particular ideology, specific organizational structures, and a populist mode of action. Ideologically, the radical right is a nationalist, or in some cases a minority nationalist, movement that champions a politics of exclusion, objecting to immigration and multiculturalism (Betz, 2004; Zaslove, 2004a; Rydgren, 2005a; Minkenberg and Perrineau, 2007, 30–31). An emphasis on cultural and ethnic belonging is fused with an organic and autochthonous concept of civil society, based loosely upon Christian/Catholic principles. And most importantly for the analysis proposed here, it opposes economic and cultural globalization. This was not always the case; early on, the radical right supported a neo-liberal political economy. Finally, the radical right has a particular mode of organization, structured around a charismatic and populist leader and based upon a strong organizational presence within civil society (Art, forthcoming). These ideological and organizational components have been crucial for the initial and the continued success of the radical right (Zaslove, 2004a; Rydgren, 2005a).


Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009
We base our definition of the radical right parties on their authoritarian cultural conservatism and exclusionary character. We relate these two dimensions to the gridgroup theory (Wildavsky et al., 1990), where the group stands for exclusionary appeals based on group membership, such as nationalism, and the grid stands for socio-culturally conservative appeals that seek to subordinate individual choices to normative constraints, for example, exclusion of gays from public life.


Bustikova 2014
My classification system for the parties is built on the grid-group theoretical framework, first developed by Douglas (Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990). Two ideological dimensions define this typology—radical nationalism and radical socio-cultural conservatism—and these dimensions correspond to two modes of social control: grid and group. The grid-group typology generates four ideal types of parties in a gridgroup space. A radical right party is defined as a party that scores high on social authoritarianism and nationalism (high grid and high group). These parties are either highly nationalistic and/or extremely socially conservative. If a party scores high on only one dimension and low on the other dimension, it is not classified as a radical right party. This applies, for example, to
some of the communist parties who support social minorities and gender equality (low on grid), yet are nationalistic (high on group).4

(Lenka Bustikova, "Revenge of the Radical Right," Comparative Political Studies 2014 47: 1738-1765 (at 1740-1741))
http://true-european-voter.net/sites/default/files/Rhodes_bustikova.pdf

Skenderovic 2009
Drawing on Norberto Bobbio's distinction between right and left, anti-egalitarian and exclusionist ideology represents the key feature in defining the radical right. . . . [The] common characteristic [of radical political movements] remains criticism of the existing socioeconomic and sociocultural system and the demand for basic transformations of the status quo to be carried out. In contrast with the concept of extremism, the conception of radicalism does not denote that all means are acceptable in pursuit of this goal. It might even be called a reformist position which therefore distinguishes it from the rather revolutionary rationale of extremists. . . . Unlike the extreme right, the radical right accepts the rules of the democratic game and does not reject the political and legal system of postwar democracies. While the radical right embraces ideological traits characteristic of the extreme right's worldview, e.g., nationalism, (neo)racism and xenophobia, it does not share other key ideological features of the extreme right, in particular a total hostility towards liberal democracy and its basic foundations, such as the electoral system, parliamentary decision making and the notion of a pluralistic society.18 Features more central to the radical right's critique would include, for example, the achievements of 'what has come to be known as the social-democratic consensus', in particular the social welfare state and the multicultural society. One last important point to note is that, in contrast to the extreme right, the radical right is not characterised by strategies and activities that would advocate the use of all means necessary in order to achieve its objectives.


Despite variation in definitions of the radical right, one can still distinguish key features of ideology inherent in some sort of 'radical right minimum'. The core ideology, which provides the frame of reference for various actors of the radical right, consists primarily of manifestations of an exclusionist ideology. They serve the radical right as the foundation for a worldview based on demarcation, both internally, within a collective group, and externally, towards the outside of the group. In other words, the exclusionist ideology is expressed in the radical right's quest for separation and segregation within the nation-state and isolation from the outside world. All radical right-wing actors are united in their commitment to some sort of national, ethnic or cultural exclusionism and can thereby be distinguished from conservative or other contemporary political strands. The core of the radical right's ideology is based around the principle of fundamental human inequality and inegalitarian beliefs and 'divides society into those who belong and those who do not'. As pointed out by Elisabeth Carter, 'institutionalized social and political inequality may be based on a number of different criteria, but those overwhelmingly favoured by parties and movements of the extreme right have been
nationality, race, ethnic group and/or religious denomination’. Following this perspective, the radical right's exclusionist worldview is most commonly characterised by ideological toolkits of nationalism, (neo)racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.


The concept of 'radical right-wing populism' accurately captures the essence of these parties. Above all, the term 'radical right' denotes ideological and political aspects. It points to the exclusionist worldview of these parties, which is shaped by nationalist, neoracist and xenophobic ideas, finds expression in their political program and agenda, and is translated into their identity politics. The concept 'populism' describes both ideological and strategic dimensions. On the one hand, populism points to a Manichean worldview which divides politics and society 'into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, “the true people” versus “the corrupt elite”. It is further argued that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’. It follows from this view that populism stands in basic conflict with the pluralism and heterogeneity of contemporary politics and societies. Since populism is a 'thin-centred ideology', it is commonly linked to other ideologies and political demands, as shown for example by the radical right with its exclusionist ideology and identity politics. On the other hand, the concept also refers to the political strategies and techniques of political parties striving to get popular legitimisation against the established elites. Their populist nature is disclosed in their appeal to the 'common man', which evokes the notion of 'the people' in the everyday sense of the word, and finds expression in their stated conviction of running against established parties in order to return power to 'the people'. They all 'involve some kind of revolt against the established structure of power in the name of the people' and hence consistently try to evoke and mobilise resentments against the alleged holders of power in politics and society. With their anti-establishment rhetoric and resentments, however, radical right-wing populist parties also aim to transform the foundations of the existing socioeconomic system and sociocultural values. They promote their own program as a popular alternative to the prevailing system of elites, institutions and political agreements. Consequently, they ask for more direct democracy, claiming that popular will and popular decision should be taken into account in concrete policy making and that this would return political power to the people.


**Woodbridge 2009**

the Radical Right in 1920s Britain [is] defined here as 'Die-hard' Conservatives together with the first official British Fascists. . . . At the heart of the configuration of themes espoused by the Radical Right was a concern with national identity and the preservation of Empire in the face of growing 'internationalism', and a concurrent desire for the 'regeneration' of Britain to halt impending catastrophe and decline.
Lerman 2010
The term "Radical Right" is used here to represent a coalition of conservative organizations such as the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition, Focus on the Family, right-wing Republicans, the new "Tea Party," and views that encompass xenophobia, rejection of individual and social equality, and anti-immigration, anti-gay and anti-reproductive rights policies, among others. (Judi Lerman, "Political Activism," (M.A., Skidmore College, 2010), pp. 23-24, http://creativematter.skidmore.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1077&context=mals_stu_schol)

Sum 2010
Ramet (1999: 13) has defined the radical right as a particular brand of "organized intolerance" that refuses "to allow that alternative ideas have a right to exist." However, the nature of this intolerance requires further definition. Ideologically, radical right parties in Europe demonstrate wide variance across space and time (Bulgaric, 2008: 192; Norris, 2005). Indeed, the term, radical right, is somewhat misleading since these parties do not occupy a single space on the traditional class-based left–right ideological dimension commonly found among European political parties (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995: 89-90). Instead, radical right parties are "a collection of nationalist, authoritarian, xenophobic, and extremist parties that are defined by the common characteristic of populist ultra-nationalism" (Minkenberg and Perrineau, 2007: 30). These shared components interact and reinforce one another so that raising the banner of nationalism to defend the national community justifies limits on democratic freedoms in favor of paternalistic forms of decision-making (Kitschelt and McGann, 1995: 14). In this respect, they emphasize anti-egalitarian and anti-universalist ideas over cosmopolitanism (Ignazi, 2003: 22; Kitschelt, 1992: 14). Elements of populism are also incorporated into the radical right programs. Charismatic leaders paint society as divided and conflict-ridden: the "people" against the corrupted elite or against an enemy within (Mudde, 2007: 24-25). Framing the polity as "us against them" defines exclusive networks of access to political resources that underpins nationalist imagery. Thus, the politics of exclusion through identity politics, authoritatively implemented, unites the European radical right across space and time. European integration has emerged as an important issue for radical right parties. On the whole, they are skeptical and see the EU as an overly-bureaucratic and elitist encroachment on the national community (Hainsworth, 2008: 82). This plays well to the politics of exclusion and the pitting of the national community against a menacing, outside force. In post-communist societies, the radical right shares the definitional features of other European radical right parties. Commonly, their brand of paternalistic nationalism blends with the authoritarian tendencies of the former communist states (Mudde, 2005).
(Paul E. Sum, "The radical right in Romania: Political party evolution and the distancing of Romania from Europe," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43 (2010): 19-29 (at 20))

**Vasilopoulou 2010**

The thesis favours the term 'radical right'. Radical right is seen to be anti-democratic and to share the nationalism of the extreme right, 'without being totally hostile to liberal democracy' (Hainsworth 2008: 8-9). Radical right parties—similarly to extreme right parties—espouse a narrow and largely ethnically based exclusionary representation of the nation, which is combined with an authoritarian political perspective. Unlike extreme right parties, however, they have 'accepted' to operate within a democratic political system. They are radical not in terms of being outside the existing political order but in terms of being radical within that order (Minkenberg 1997). They do not openly oppose the values and practices of liberal democratic regimes, do not favour a totalitarian form of government nor embrace violence in their discourse.

(See Sofia Vasilopoulou, "Euroscepticism and the Radical Right: domestic strategies and party system dynamics" (Ph.D., European Institute of the London School of Economics, 2010), p. 40, http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/633/1/Vasilopoulou_Euroscepticism_Radical_Right.pdf)

**Obucina 2011**

The radical right is a strongly heterogenic party family, with national specifics, election successes and with very different reasons for their survival in the political arena. Cas Mudde mentions 58 different definitions of the radical right, and their most common characteristics, as parties and movements that embrace nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democratic values and statism. Consequently, Mudde counts 23 terms describing these movements: extreme right (Schain et al. 2002a; Perrineau 2001; Hainsworth 2000a; Ignazi 1994; Pfahl-Traughber 1993; Stouthuyisen 1993), far right (Jungerstam-Mulders 2003; Roxburgh 2002; Marcus 2000; Cheles et al. 1995), radical right (Ramat 1999a; Minkenberg 1998; Kitschelt & McGann 1995; Merkl & Weinberg 1993), right (Betz & Immerfall 1998; Hockenos 1993), radical right populism (Zaslove 2004a; Betz 1994), right populism (Eismann 2002; Decker 2000; Pfahl-Traughber 1994), national populism (Backes 1991; Taguieff 1984), new populism (Lloyd 2003; Taggart 1995), neopopulism (Betz & Immerfall1998), exclusionist populism (Betz 2001), xenophobic populism (DeAngelis, 2003), populist nationalism (Blokker, 2005), ethnic nationalism (Rydgren, 2004a), anti-immigrant parties (Gibson, 2002; Fennema, 1997), nativism (Fetzer, 2000), racism (MacMaster, 2001; Husbands, 1988; Elbers & Fennema, 1993), racist extremism (Mudde, 2005), fascism (Ford, 1992; Laqueur, 1996), neofascism (Fenner & Weitz, 2004; Karapin, 1998; Cheles et al, 1991), postfascism (Mell, 2002), reactionist tribalism (Antonio, 2000), integralism (Holmes, 2000) and anti-partisanship (Belanger, 2004)*. Of course, the attempts to give the parties a special name are associated with the definition of radical right parties by individual researchers. However, although all authors agree that the approach to these parties should still be individual, on case-by-case basis; there is general agreement on the authoritarian nature of the radical right. It includes dogmatism, rigidity, exclusivity, authoritarianism, nationalism, xenophobia, racism, intolerance and so on.
A review of the articles on radical right parties over the last couple of decades reveals that these parties share the following characteristics: They object to the notion of a multicultural society and call for lower levels of immigration and rejection of foreign refugees seeking asylum, as well as more restrictive immigration policies (Knigge 1998). Further, they share authoritarian and hierarchical views on the governmental structure (Ignazi 1992 in: Knigge 1998). So, most of the radical right parties share a common platform which is based on populism, social conservatism and an anti-establishment attitude (Gidengil et al. 2005). Mudde (2007) specifies the key features of the radical right in a slightly different manner. He consistently calls it the "populist radical right," with the characteristics described as nativism, authoritarianism and populism.

Hasle 2012
The presentation of the 'modern' nation-state of the New Radical Right as a natural historic unit, based on unchanging principles can easily be refuted. Nevertheless, several parties representing this political view have achieved success in garnering public and electoral support in Western countries20. In fact, the term "radical right" may be somewhat of a misnomer, since there is growing evidence of leftist elements in their discourse often coupled with a firm rejection of the allegation that they are promoting a racist or fascist ideology21. Additionally, the new radical right differentiates itself from historical forms of European fascism by adopting an economic liberalist stance and by accepting the constitutional framework. Therefore, these parties and movements represent new anti-systemic formations that go beyond the older right and left. They are lacking in any coherent ideological programme22 (unlike fascism, which had an intellectual appeal in its early forms and influenced the project of modernity by promoting values such as technology, the primacy of the state and charismatic leadership). Instead, they focus on public appeal while separating themselves from fascism and other thematically related ideologies with negative connotations. However, shared among them is a strong expression of xenophobia and intolerance (Delanty & O'Mahoney, 2002, p. 149). The background for the rise of the New Radical Right must be found in changes in the social lives of people caused by globalization processes. . . . the rhetoric of fear employed by the new radical right . . . appeals to groups who feel that globalization, and in particular immigration, poses a threat to their culture, their security and job opportunities coupled with a personal feeling of being down-prioritized, unappreciated and even unwanted by the state. The discourse of the new radical right (with a few variations) addresses these fears in a very direct manner and seeks to reinforce them by underlining cultural differences and the non-viability of multicultural societies. In their view, multiculturalism promotes the destruction of individual cultures – nations are better off remaining
ethnically pure (Guibernau, 2010, p. 13). They proclaim themselves as 'defenders of the homeland' with an aggressive anti-elite rhetoric based on "the common sense of the people". The title 'defenders of the homeland' finds its political expression in the 'national preference principle', advocating priority access of citizens to social welfare and to the protection of their own culture and language, compared to foreigners. Some parties of the radical right, such as the Front National in France, endorse this principle to an extent where the preservation of national identity is deemed of superior importance to the achievement of economic goals (Guibernau, 2010, p. 12). Another main pillar in their program, one that is specifically anti-EU, is to carry out a democratic reform to restore the power and sovereignty of the nation-state from its entrapment in EU politics. Clearly, growing support for the new radical right poses a threat to the stability of the European Union. (Frederik Hasle, "Divisive Forces – Nationalism and globalization in the context of the Eurozone crisis" (M.A., Aalborg University, 2012), pp. 41-43, http://projekter.aau.dk/projekter/files/68359847/Nationalism_Globalization_Eurozone_crisis.pdf)

Jupskås 2012

Polyakova 2012
While much ink has been spilled on arguments over definitions, there is still a lack of scholarly consensus on how to define the "radical right" and which parties to include in this definition (see Anastasakis 2000; Merkl 2003). I suggest that the difficulty in defining the radical right in both Western and Central Eastern Europe has to do with the fact that such parties do not clearly align along the Left-Right dimension in terms of economic ideology, historical legacies, social policy, or the parties' constituencies. I argue that grouping both Western and CEE radical right parties together only makes sense if such parties are defined in terms of their cultural ideology, which is based on romanticized notions of pure nationhood, exclusionary politics of minority groups, and xenophobic rhetoric especially in relation to non-white, non-Christian immigrant groups. This ethnic vision of nationhood, as opposed to a civic one, is precisely what makes these parties both "radical" and "right" (see Billig 1995; Brown 1999).

(Alina Polyakova, "Explaining Support for Radical Right Parties in New Democracies: The Limits of Structural Determinants and the Potentiality of Civil Society" (2012), pp. 3-4, http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5vc1s21q.pdf and https://escholarship.org/content/qt5vc1s21q/qt5vc1s21q.pdf and https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt5vc1s21q/qt5vc1s21q.pdf)
Polyakova 2013
As Mudde (2007:139) points out, the most striking commonality in the rallying cries of radical right parties is the various take on the slogan, "France for the French!" or "Bulgaria for the Bulgarians!" This ubiquitous motto speaks directly to the distinguishing feature of radical right parties: ethnic nationalism, or the idea that the state exists to promote the interests of the titular ethnicity. In the broadest sense, radical right parties across Western and Eastern Europe share a strong nationalist and anti-establishment ideology with grievances aimed at immigrant or minority populations (Betz 2003; Hainsworth 2000, 2008; Lubbers et al. 2002; Mudde 2000; Norris 2005). Radical right parties' ideological platforms emphasize the imagery of cultural loss—be it language, tradition, or religion—which allows them to fashion themselves as the legitimate heirs to national culture, traditions, values, and history. As ideology, right-wing radicalism's "core element is a myth of a homogenous nation, a romantic and populist ultranationalism directed against the...principles of individualism and universalism" (Minkenberg 2002: 337).


Polyakova 2015
As Mudde (2007, 139) points out, the most striking commonality in the rallying cries of radical right parties is the various take on the slogan, "France for the French!" or "Bulgaria for the Bulgarians!" This ubiquitous motto speaks directly to the distinguishing feature of radical right parties: ethnic nationalism, or the idea that the state exists to promote the interests of the titular ethnicity. In the broadest sense, radical right parties across Western and Eastern Europe share a strong nationalist and anti-establishment ideology with grievances aimed at immigrant or minority populations (Betz 2003; Hainsworth 2000, 2008; Lubbers et al. 2002; Mudde 2000; Norris 2005). Radical right parties' ideological platforms emphasize the imagery of cultural loss—be it language, tradition, or religion—which allows them to fashion themselves as the legitimate heirs to national culture, traditions, values, and history. As ideology, right-wing radicalism's "core element is a myth of a homogenous nation, a romantic and populist ultranationalism directed against the...principles of individualism and universalism" (Minkenberg 2002, 337).


Helseth 2013
Given the thesis' emphasis on British far-right groups, it is important to specify what is meant by far-right radicalism. A rather uncontroversial understanding of radical right ideas and doctrines will
emphasize three pillars. Firstly, ideas of inequality and hierarchical relationships are central to far-right actors. People and peoples are inherently different, and in a further extent, of different value (Mammone et al. 2012:5-6). Secondly, these ideas are manifested in an ethnic form of nationalism in which conserving a nation's and people's biological or cultural heritage is the highest of values. Finally, radical means such as violence, extreme rhetoric and rejection of democratic rule of law may be employed in the pursuit of achieving such aims (Mammone et al. 2012:5-6, Caiani et al. 2012:4-6). This thesis has its emphasis on groups associated with respectively the neo-Nazi, nationalistic, and anti-Islamic varieties of far-right ideas. Despite their differences, the three variations can be placed within an understanding of the far-right as specified above. They all emphasize differences between cultures or people which make their coexistence very troublesome. Additionally, all strains of thought are setting these differences in context with ethnicity and their own nation's superiority. Lastly, although only a few of the actors under study explicitly promote violence, most actors view other channels than the democratic one as legitimate for voicing discontent and anger.

(Sverre Gjone Helseth, "Going Online or On-Street?: A Social Network Analysis of the Far-Right Environment in the United Kingdom" (M.A., University of Oslo, 2013), p. 14, https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/36935/Helseth-MasterPECOS.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)

Kelly 2013
Throughout my thesis, I will use the term "radical right" to refer to political parties, organizations, or movements that are nationalist, xenophobic, and Euroskeptic.

Norocel 2013
The definition of radical right populist ideology at work in the present study acknowledges that its ideological production is indicative of a thin-centred ideology, in a similar fashion to nationalism (cf. Canovan, 1999; Freedeen, 1998b; Mudde, 2004; Stanley, 2008). The ineliminable components of radical right populist ideology are the identification of a Manichean opposition between a 'corrupt elite' and a 'pure people'. The said people of radical right populist ideology is not only pure, but also constitutes an indivisible whole, whose sovereign will finds its most appropriate manifestation in the figure of a respected leader. What is worth underlining here is that the aforementioned purity of people, and the intrinsically interrelated fear of pollution, rests on exclusivist definitions of the 'rightful' inhabitants of a certain nation–state, in a decidedly nativist nationalist manner (Betz & Johnson, 2004: 323; Betz & Meret, 2009: 318; Canovan, 2002: 34; Meret & Siim, 2013: 93; Mudde, 2007: 19). This has a key economic aspect – namely, welfare chauvinism – which delineates the 'pure' people and their birthright to the nation–state's welfare infrastructure from those underserving Others: a dynamic category that may include allegedly parasitical social groups, resented


Saint-Martin 2013
Although many definitions exist, scholars have pointed to a few distinctive ideological features which characterize the new radical right. For instance, scholarship suggests that radical right parties rely on appeals to national sentiments defined in ethnic terms; reject cosmopolitan conceptions of society; react to rising non-European immigration; oppose globalization and reject European integration which they see as undermining national sovereignty and identity; and brand themselves as anti-parties, criticizing domestic political elites as corrupt and removed from the 'common people' (cf. Betz, 1994; Kitschelt and McGann, 1995; Hainsworth, 2000, 2007; Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 2008). More succinctly, Rydgren claims that contemporary radical right-wing parties promote xenophobia, ethno-nationalism, sociocultural authoritarianism, and anti-system populism (2007: 242). Based on this scholarship, I have chosen to categorize the radical right according to three (3) defining features: nativism, socio-authoritarianism, and populism.


van der Brug, Fennema, de Lange and Baller 2013
We have argued elsewhere (Fennema 1997; van der Brug et al. 2005) that West European radical right parties are better labeled 'anti-immigrant' or 'anti-immigration' parties, because their anti-immigrant stance is their unique selling point. However, this argument pertains to West European radical right parties only. In Central and Eastern Europe the rhetoric of radical parties is primarily against ethnic minorities, like indigenous minorities, Jews, or Roma. In this chapter we will therefore use the more inclusive term radical right.
(Wouter van der Brug, Meindert Fennema, Sarah de Lange and Inger Baller, "Radical right parties: their voters and their electoral competitors," Class Politics and the Radical Right, edited by Jens Rydgren (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 52-74 (at 73 n.1))

Wolff 2013
In Italian historiography the notion of the Radical Right was introduced by Giorgio Galli, La crisi italiana e la Destra internazionale (Milan: Mondadori, 1974), who referred to the studies of Talcott Parsons. Later on, the historian Franco Ferraresi defined the Radical Right in ideological terms: Opposition to any democratic political system and, more generally, to the process of modernisation (rationality, science, individualism). See Franco Ferraresi, Minacce alla democrazia: la destra radicale e la strategia della tensione in Italia nel dopoguerra (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1995), 24. In Italian historiography, "Radical" is often synonymous with "Extreme", though in my view it is important to
make a distinction, at least in theory. The Radical Right refers to ideological opposition, i.e. to anti-democratic thought without direct involvement in practical political action; the Extreme Right refers to violent and armed opposition, i.e. to anti-democratic attitudes transferred into political action. In practice, in the Italian context, where neo-fascist militants were engaged in both ideological and political activity, the distinction is less relevant. In the present chapter, I consistently use the term "Radical Right".


Wolff 2016
This article's historical exploration has problematized the relation between right-wing radical ideology and right-wing extremist acts. On the whole, in Italian historiography, 'radical' is used synonymously with 'extreme', but it is important to make a distinction, at least in theory. The radical right refers to ideological opposition, that is, to anti-democratic thought without direct involvement in practical political action. In contrast, the extreme right refers to violent and armed opposition, namely, to anti-democratic attitudes translated into political action. In practice, in the Italian context, where neofascist militants were in the past engaged in both ideological and political activity, the distinction seems to be of little relevance. Yet, in terms of moral responsibility for terrorist acts, a distinction between a radical ideological stance and an extreme practical attitude is quite important. (Elisabetta Cassina Wolff, "Evola's interpretation of fascism and moral responsibility," Patterns of Prejudice, Vol. 50, Nos. 4–5 (2016): 478-494 (at 492))

Aslan 2014
The operational definition of radical right sets four criteria to identify radical right parties in CEECs. These criteria are 1) anti-multiculturalism, 2) support for strong state authority and a traditional society, 3) scepticism about EU membership, and 4) opposition to an increase in the power of supranational institution over nation-states. The operational definition does not set a criterion concerning economic policies, as these are of secondary importance to radical right parties. Instead, cultural policies, whose central aim is 'internal homogenization' of the society (Koch, 1991), are of primary interest to radical right parties (also see: Minkenberg, 2000; Mudde, 2007; Kitschelt, 2007). Therefore, though four criteria have been established to identify radical right parties in CEECs, this study attaches more importance to the first of the four criteria, anti-multiculturalism.

(Mustafa Çağatay Aslan, "A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis of the Electoral Success of Radical Right Parties in Central and Eastern Europe, 2000-2010" (Ph.D., University College London (UCL), 2014), pp. 58-59, http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1457377/)
Çam 2014
The left-right political spectrum has been one of the most popular models of classifying parties and ideologies. According to Bobbio (1996), the main difference between left and right is their perception of equality. Left wing, from a Rousseauan perspective, considers most of the inequalities as "social", hence eradicable. On the other hand, right wing, from a Nietzschean perspective, considers most of the inequalities as natural and ineradicable. Therefore, the struggle between left and right on moving towards further egalitarianism or less egalitarianism is the core of this distinction. However, the problem with Bobbio's broad definition is that it is too abstract to be operationalized in party family studies since it includes many issues ranging from gender equality to economic equalities between social classes. . . . Left-right distinction can also be considered in terms of socio-cultural politics, i.e. issues of family values, abortion, gender equality, minority rights. Left fringe represents libertarianism and right fringe represents authoritarianism. (Rydgren, 2007). . . . the term "right" in "radical right party family" taken in this study refers to the "socio-cultural" connotation of the word since what makes them "radical" is their radical positioning on the right fringe of this axis. The reason why these parties are on the right fringe of the axis is their "ideological core" that is shaped by a radical understanding of nationalism, namely "nativism". (Mudde, 2007, p.17) The content of this nativism in practice is comprised of a rejection of individual and social equality, opposition to the integration of marginalized groups and xenophobic appeals. (Art, 2011, p.11) Ethno-nationalism is rather popular term to signify this common denominator core.

(Ozan Utku Çağm, "Ethnic – Civic Distinction: Does it Distinguish Radical Right Party Family? The Cases of Sweden and Turkey" (M.A., University of Gothenburg, 2014), pp. 9, 10, https://gupea.ub.gu.se/bitstream/2077/37444/1/gupea_2077_37444_1.pdf)

Dafnos 2014
A distinguishing characteristic that applies to the variant forms of the radical right is a persistent feeling of group identification; a common trait in human relationships which results in a dichotomous vision of the world and refers to the sorting of individuals into 'us vs. them' categories (Moskalenko, McCauley & Rozin as cited in Nijboer, 2012) corresponding to the demarcated principles of each group (Caiani & della Porta, 2010). The partisans of the radical right stand against beliefs that disrupt their meaning assumptions and perceptions of a homogeneous society; ethnic, religious or linguistic diversity and immigration are concepts that may fail to keep up with their values and beliefs. In addition, emphasis should be placed, at this point, on the concept of the so-called new radical right. As pointed out already, the radical right has adopted a moderate, democratic stance in its rhetoric (and admittedly not all of its variants, albeit this tendency has been recorded as a general trend and factor of success) so that it can avoid isolation and exclusion from societal processes. Particularly, this framing shift associates with the successful communication strategy espoused by the French Front National, under the leadership of Jean-Marie Le Pen in the 1980's, which deviated from expressing hard to assimilate views and spread to Europe thereafter (Ivaldi, 2012) and mostly to Western countries. Minkenberg (2013) elaborates on the latter claiming that Eastern Europe should be approached and studied under a regime change prism, since in countries, where volatile political transitions have occurred, there is fertile ground for the adherents of the radical right to hold more
extreme positions. Therefore, the new radical right has stopped short of defending biological racism (i.e. superiority of races) and has focused its rhetoric on cultural racism (i.e. ethno-pluralist doctrine). This new type of racism concerns about the effects of cultural intermingling and places the immigration issue at the top of the political agenda asserting that ethnicities should be kept apart, otherwise the nation runs the risk of losing its pure identity (Mudde as cited in Widfeldt, 2000). An extra axis underscores the populist nature of the radical right thinking which is integrated in an anti-political-establishment discourse (Ignazi, 1992). The new radical right tries to operate within the limits of constitutional democracy, is hostile to elites and established political parties and finds no differences among them (Rydgren, 2005). Their rhetoric aims to attract, among others, vulnerable and disillusioned people who feel uneasy to settle well in a globalized, fast paced and post-industrial landscape and think of mainstream political powers as unable to sort out their anxieties; be it, for instance, lack of job and educational prospects, worries on multicultural nations or social cohesion. Globalization appears to have affected individuals' life and the ways they locate themselves in society (Guibernau, 2010).


McGowan 2014

Today right-wing extremism is the generally accepted term and is applied to any parties, organizations and individuals whose self-knowledge and activities are formed by the majority, if not all, of the following characteristics: nationalism; ethnocentrism; xenophobia, particularly in the guise of anti-Semitism and racism; anti-pluralism; anti-communism; anti-parliamentarism; militarism; a law and order mentality; the longing for an authoritarian state under one leader; often a sympathy for conspiracy theories; and the acceptance of violence as a suitable means of political discourse. The role and emphasis of each of these may vary from party to party and movement to movement and authors have placed different emphases on different characteristics. Some have focused on xenophobia and racism, others have concentrated on nationalism while yet others have stressed the need for 'law and order' and demands for strict immigration control. However, a general survey of 26 definitions in three distinct linguistic areas (Dutch, German and English) has revealed that the principal ingredients of right-wing extremism tend to be racism, xenophobia, nationalism, anti-democracy and a belief in the strong state.

(Lee McGowan, The Radical Right in Germany: 1870 to the Present (Routledge, 2014), pp. 5-6)

Tsagkroni 2014

The term radical right will be used to here to refer to the sections of the extreme right that encourage views which are conservative in terms of the traditional left-right scale (Plotke and Bell, 2001).
Widfeldt 2014

The working definition of an extreme right party is a party that is in opposition to all other relevant parties on the conflict dimension it prioritises, and that it is to the right on that dimension. As already noted, this means that there are several ways of being to the right, where nativism, xenophobia or criticism of immigration, i.e., a right-wing position on the sociocultural conflict dimension, is only one possibility. The proposed definition of extreme right is in contrast to Cas Mudde’s work, where extreme right, or populist radical right, parties are defined in terms of programmatical content. In his book from 2000, he identifies five ideological ingredients in the extreme right ideology, namely nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the advocacy of a strong state. When these ingredients are applied to concrete parties, however, Mudde finds that they do not all appear as core values in studied party documents and publications. Instead, he found nationalism, xenophobia, law and order and welfare chauvinism as the most recurring ideological features. In his book from 2007, Mudde proposes a minimalist definition of populist radical right parties, and argues that this definition comprises authoritarianism, populism and nativism. In Mudde’s latter work, the minimalist definition of populist radical right parties leads on to a classification, which excludes some parties often classified as extreme/radical/far right in many other publications, such as the Norwegian Progress Party and the German NPD. The former party is not found to be nationalist or xenophobic, and therefore neo-liberal populist rather that populist radical right (something it shares with its Danish namesake party, and the Swedish New Democracy). The NPD is not populist radical right because it is not populist, but instead extremist, in the sense that it is undemocratic. The problem, then, remains that a definition based on a “shopping list” of ideological ingredients does not seem to remove all ambiguities. The definition proposed here has the advantage that it is more open-ended than one that rests on a predefined set of ideological ingredients. It also leads on to a workable subclassification, which Mudde attempts in his earlier work, but largely abandons in his 2007 book.

Here, the argument is that the criteria for subclassification should not be related to the degree of radicalism, but instead to the form of rightism. Extreme right parties can be subclassified according to their prioritised conflict dimension. Thus, we can have sociocultural extreme right parties, economic extreme right parties and materialist (as opposed to post-materialist) extreme right parties. Various combinations are also possible, to the extent that parties give equal weight to different conflict dimensions. In contrast to Mudde, this means that extreme right parties are not necessarily populist - although in practice they often are. Nor are they by definition authoritarian - although they often are that too. They are, finally, not by definition nativist/xenophobic/anti-immigration either - and we will come across a few examples of the latter in this book.

We use the far right as a container term for both the extreme right and the radical right. With regard to the terms left and right, we follow the Italian political theorist Norberto Bobbio, who distinguishes between these two key political terms on the basis of the propensity to egalitarianism.\(^3\) The term right refers to ideologies that hold that the main differences between groups of people are natural and should not be altered by the state. Or, more broadly and succinctly, according to right-wing ideologies, political order is grounded in nature.

We distinguish between the mainstream right and the far right on the basis of their position on liberal democracy, which is accepted by the former and rejected by the latter. More specifically, the extreme right rejects democracy per se, that is, both popular sovereignty and majority rule, while the radical right accepts democracy but challenges liberal democracy, in particular pluralism and minority rights.\(^4\) While most successful far right parties have been radical right, such as the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the French National Front (FN), there are some recent examples of extreme right success too, most notably Golden Dawn in Greece and the Movement for a Better Hungary or Jobbik in Hungary.


**Andreescu 2015**

I associate radical right behaviors with a rejection of liberal democracy, pluralism, and - particularly within the Romanian context - the radicalization of inclusionary and exclusionary criteria in terms of 'the Orthodox nation' (Minkenberg, Chapter 2, this volume). However, I avoid relying on strict definitions that inherently overlook the complexity of nuances and contexts. In this, I follow the example of some normative systems: framework concepts, such as 'people,' 'minority,' or 'person' are used without providing a strict definition, thereby allowing an adaptation of the meaning to the context.

(Gabriel Andreescu, "The emergence of a new radical right power: the Romanian Orthodox Church," in *Transforming the Transformation? The East European radical right in the political process*, edited by Michael Minkenberg (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 251-277 (at 254))

**Campione 2015**

The radical right is a political ideology focused [on] preserving national identity through socially and politically exclusionary measures while rejecting globalization and limiting the influence of the outside on its people.


**Cinpoeş 2015**

The lowest common denominator that characterizes the varieties of right-wing extremism points to the extreme version of nationalism articulated in populist and anti-pluralistic terms, that insists upon
criteria of group inclusion and exclusion, and that reacts in a strong negative fashion to social change (see Minkenberg, 2001, 2002a, 2002b; also Mudde 2007; Minkenberg, Chapter 2, this volume).

(Radu Cinpoeş, “‘Righting it up’: an interplay- based model for analyzing extreme right dynamics in Romania,” in Transforming the Transformation? The East European radical right in the political process, edited by Michael Minkenberg (London and New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 278-298 (at 280))

Mondon 2015
Defining the radical right is a task in itself, and one which cannot be done justice in this short article. For clarity and brevity, I will focus on the three aspects I believe to be core to contemporary radical right parties: nativism, neo-racism and right-wing populism. However, many examples suggest that UKIP has moved towards other traditional core concepts of the radical right such as a strong symbolic leadership and authoritarianism (Mudde 2007; Mondon 2013).

(Aurelien Mondon, "UKIP, from a single issue party to the radical right: real symptom, wrong diagnosis," TOR: The Open Review for the Social Sciences (South West Doctoral Training Centre (SWDTC)) Issue 1 (June 2015) 25-27 (at 26), http://opus.bath.ac.uk/45253/1/TOR_Issue_1_June_2015_FINAL.pdf)

Mondon 2016
In order to make the radical right a useful term of analysis, I have identified in it four ineliminable/core concepts. Not only can these concepts be found in both the Front National and One Nation, but also in many other extreme right parties which have become successful in Western democracies over the last three decades. These four concepts are the cautious denunciation of parliamentary democracy, a strong symbolic leadership, ethno-exclusivism or neo-racism and a right-wing populist style and discourse.

(Aurélien Mondon, The Mainstreaming of the Extreme Right in France and Australia: A Populist Hegemony? (Routledge, 2016), pp. 21-22)

Pirro 2015
Defining the populist radical right
The professionalisation of the discipline has surely contributed to defining and thus delimiting the object of this book (Sartori 2004: 786). When reference is made to this party family, the term ‘radical right’ has largely supplanted ‘extreme right’, for extremist organisations position themselves “against the free democratic constitutional order and outside the democratic consensus” (Minkenberg 2011: 38). This differentiation essentially draws on the official definition of the German state, which distinguishes between extreme and radical organisations. Whilst the first are those opposed to the constitution (verfassungswidrig), the latter are simply hostile towards its principles (verfassungsfeindlich) (Mudde 2000b: 12). Although legal and political constraints vary across
countries, rightwing parties are deemed radical for their “rejection of the established sociocultural and social-political system . . . without, however, openly questioning the legitimacy of democracy in general” (Betz 1994: 4). In this regard, they cannot be defined as ‘anti-system parties’ in a strict Sartorian sense, in that they do not seek to overturn the democratic system (Sartori 1976). They do not participate “in order to destroy” (Daalder 1966: 64), but rather to delegitimise and remould (certain aspects of) the liberal-democratic system.


**Pupovac 2015**

Only a small number of authors attempted to define the radical right by reference to a minimal number of ideological features. For instance, Husbands uses racial exclusionism (Husbands, 1981), while Eatwell's definitions of the radical right primarily revolve around the concept of nationalism (Eatwell, 2000). Furthermore, based on Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), Kitschelt introduces the grid/group conceptualization of the radical right (Kitschelt, 2007). . . . above all the radical rightism is an exclusionary ideology which revolves around relations and concepts such as: homogenous versus heterogeneous, universalism versus particularism, friend versus foe, group, other, and outsider (Betz, 2001; Ramet, 1999; Eatwell, 2000; Kitschelt, 2007). . . . The radical right party family is the group of parties which occupies the utmost rightist position on the exclusionary dimension.


**Pytlas 2015**

This study thus wants to argue that political ideologies can be demarcated much better through an idea-critical approach. Karl Mannheim's notion of 'core intention' (Grundintention) is helpful here. 'Core intention' describes the time- and context-sensitive, basic mindset of a particular world-view pattern (Mannheim [1925] 1984: 102). It identifies its essential, core common ground or, in other words, its lowest common denominator. At the same time, this approach is a dynamic one. It takes into consideration the readjustment of the specific articulation or frames of this worldview core to a specific setting of time and space. Hence, while the basic logic and structure of ideological reality construction of a given worldview remain stable, its contents, narratives, or legitimation patterns are adjustable to varying contexts. To account for this conceptualization, this study thus follows the idea-critical definition, introduced as an answer to 'shopping list' approaches, proposed by Michael Minkenberg (1998, 2000), supplemented by the notion of nativism (Mudde 2007). Right-wing radicalism will thus be perceived as an ideology that is based in a mythicized, nativist ultranationalism. Based on this core narrative, and in an attempt to introduce a populist answer to the processes of societal modernization, it articulates radical criteria of societal exclusion and aims to counter the principles of a liberal and pluralistic democracy (cf. Minkenberg 1998: 33-5; 2000: 174-
5). On the one hand, the definition includes the notion of 'ultra-nationalism' as the idea of a romanticized process of political myth-building around an idea of a homogenous, naturalized understanding of the 'nation' (Minkenberg 1998: 41-2). As will become clear, the focus of the radical right on socio-cultural policies of collective identity renders mythicized ultra-nationalism a particularly useful term for the presented research. 'Nativism', on the other hand, can be seen as the functional element, or a particular, agency-related, exclusionary content of the idea of the mythical, homogenous national community. Nativism articulates the primacy of interests and status of one's own ethnic or cultural group against internal or external minorities. It therefore argues for the exclusion of non-native cultural and ethnic elements as 'fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state' (Mudde 2007: 19). By that, the term nativism encompasses several other similar cultural, ethnic, or economic exclusionary notions such as ethno-pluralism, culturism, or welfare chauvinism.


**Akkerman, de Lange and Rooduijn 2016**

The term 'radical right-wing populism' describes a group of parties that are right-wing in their rejection of individual and social equality. The parties take radical, non-centrist positions on issues that are central to their ideology, and they are populist 'in their appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior common sense' (Betz 1994: 4). In more substantive terms, the parties adhere to an ideology that includes authoritarian, nativist and populist elements (Mudde 2007). Central to their ideology is nativism, a combination of nationalism and xenophobia. According to Mudde (2007: 19), nativism is 'an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state'. When translated into programmatic positions, nativism leads to anti-immigration stances, and in recent years, to anti-European Union and anti-Islam stances. Since the early 2000s, the focus has shifted to Islam as a non-native religion in Western Europe. The nativist critique on Islam stems from the observation that Islamic values are at odds with liberal democratic values, such as the autonomy of the individual, democracy, emancipation of homosexuals and women, equality of men and women, freedom of expression, and separation of church and state (Akkerman 2005, 2015; Betz 2007; Betz and Meret 2009; Zúquete 2008).


**Fagerholm 2016**

A minimal definition of the European far right party family can be composed of the single attribute of nativism, which, indeed, is the only attribute that (explicitly or implicitly) seems to be included in all
(non-idiosyncratic) definitions of the family. A maximal, or ideal-typical, definition of the far right includes eight additional attributes. According to this maximal, or ideal-typical, definition, far right parties are nationalist and xenophobic actors that are critical towards current liberal democratic and elitist structures, believe in law and order and traditional ethics, adhere to welfare chauvinism and anti-leftism, and criticize the European Union as well as the current globalization process. To be sure, the extension of this ideal type is very small, or even zero: although most radical right parties probably meet several of the eight additional requirements, it is likely to be a difficult or even impossible task to find parties that meet all of them.

Table 1: Min–max definitions of the far right
Attribute (abbreviation) min max
nativism (nat) min max
anti-systemness (asy) max
populism (pop) max
authoritarianism (aut) max
traditional ethics (con) max
socioeconomic centrism (cen) max
anti-leftism (ale) max
Euroskepticism (eur) max
'globophobia' (glo) max


Mareš and Havlík 2016
In this article we use the expression "extreme right," that refers to a party family composed of "traditional" extreme right parties as well as from the "modern" extreme right. "Traditional" extreme right parties are understood to be such parties that utilize a history of fascist or right-wing authoritarian movements and regimes from the first half of the 20th Century, put significant emphasis on the resolution of territorial disputes stemming from the post-World War I arrangement of borders in Europe (either irredentism or, conversely, the defense of territorial gains), usually use anti-Semitic motives, criticize political pluralism and liberal values as such, and often employ a militant political style, for example, paramilitary and vigilante organizations, ties to violent subcultures and others. "Modern" extreme right parties are those which intolerance is not grounded in a comprehensive ideology and historical context, they do not define themselves as against liberal democracy per se, focus primarily on the Roma minority, immigrants, and Muslims, and advocate the strengthening of state actors in the context of homeland security, rather than the formation of non-state vigilante structures. Modern extreme right is usually not anti-Semitic (in contrast -- it can support Israeli official policy). In East Central Europe, the majority of parties under study fall under the "traditional" typology, with the exception of the SPR-RSC and Dawn in the Czech Republic, and Self-Defense in
Poland. The Slovak National Party also has transformed its profile from a traditional to a modern extreme right party in recent years.

Some authors use the term "radical right" to denote these parties (Minkenberg, 2012; Kitschelt, 1997), though they use this in an essentially synonymous sense as we conceptualize "extreme right" in this article. While conducting his research on this area of the political spectrum in Western Europe, Herbert Kitschelt distinguished between the "old radical right" -- here, the parties with their roots in a history of fascism -- and the "new radical right," which was related to new anti-immigrant parties. His approach corresponds to our definition in this article as well.


Moscovitz 2016

While recognizing that differences exist, the various versions of radical right parties remain in the same larger family and share common features. Their similarity stems primarily from their exclusionism which provides a 'frame of reference' for different elements of the radical right. This study bases its understanding of radical right on this overarching conception. The term 'radical right exclusionary ideology' (RREI) is used to refer to those parties that include the following ideological features; nativism, authoritarianism/law and order and an anti-liberal conception of democracy. Those features have been conceptualized by Cas Mudde as describing the European radical right in what is commonly agreed to be the most comprehensive account of the party family's ideology.


Stockemer 2016

While it is impossible to create an ideal definition of a far right-wing party, I use an encompassing definition, which defines a far right-wing party as such if it comprises three features: authoritarianism, populism and the issue ownership of national identity against foreign influences (see Mudde 1996 and Balent 2012). Many of the other features of radical rightwing parties such as xenophobia or strong anti-immigrant rhetoric, anti-pluralism, (strong) nationalism, racism, (strong) anti-European rhetoric and anti-Islamism can be subsumed under this definition (Betz 1994; Rydgren 2005; Art 2011). This definition also allows for the inclusion of the same far right-wing parties prior cross-national research on the topic has included (e.g. Golder 2003; Rydgren 2005; Art 2011). In total, I define 31 parties as far right (see Appendix 1).


Weinberg and Eliot Assoudeh 2016
What do we mean when we use the term 'radical right'? In our view, and in the American context, we are really dealing with two phenomena. Both represent extremist 'takes' on our public life. The first one consists of several elements. As Lipset and Raab put it many years ago, radical rightists are those who are intolerant of ambiguity. Distinctions between right and wrong and between true and false are clear-cut. Given this view, extreme rightists reject the normal give and take of democratic politics. Instead, they are prepared to employ violence or 'Second Amendment' remedies to prevent the wrong side from prevailing. They also perceive the world in conspiratorial terms. A small conspiratorial elite, often an international cabal of bankers or 'insiders', really controls the American government. It does so on behalf of racial, ethnic, or religious groups at the expense of 'real' Americans who now regard themselves to be aliens in their own land. The American people are what the late Robert Mathews, the neo-Nazi founder of the Silent Brotherhood, described as 'sheeple', too ignorant and passive to topple the conspiratorial elite. That task belongs to small revolutionary groups of the enlightened.

Far-right populism provides a somewhat different narrative. Berlet and Lyons suggest that populists are those who trust the people but believe their preferences are being ignored by a small and largely self-selected elite at the top of the American political process, who manipulate and pervert the political process. As they write: 'One of the staples of repressive and right-wing populist ideology has been 'producerism', a doctrine that champions so-called producers in society against both 'unproductive' elites and subordinate groups defined as lazy or immoral'. The ideology tends to demonise and scapegoat various groups it links to current misfortunes: Jewish bankers for example. The right-wing populists assert the existence of a massive deception involved in the repression of the people's will.

(Werkmann and Gherghina 2016)

We have to determine how radical right parties differ from other political actors. Our starting point for this process is the general scholarly consensus that ‘radical right’ refers to a specific type of ideology (Carter 2005: 14). Earlier studies have revealed that radical right actors differ both from mainstream actors and from extremist or other actors situated at the periphery of the political spectrum (e.g. populists). Common conclusions are that radical right parties are characterized by their rejection of liberal democracy and express their rejection in an anti-pluralist, anti-minority rights and antiparliamentary ideology. Radical right parties differ, however, from extreme right – that is, anti-democratic – parties because they accept the concept of democracy and use democratic means of political participation, for example by contesting elections (Ignazi 2003; Mudde 2000, 2014; Norris 2005; Rydgren 2007).

In addition to these features, most scholars agree that nativism as a specific form of nationalism has to be included in the core ideology of a party if it is to be considered radical right (Betz 2003: 78–9; Liang 2007: 7; Mudde 2007: 19). Thus, radical right parties strive to create a nation state in the nativist sense that the state ‘should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state’ (Mudde 2007: 19). Authoritarianism is considered another feature of the
radical right core ideology (Heinisch 2003: 95; Karácsony and Róna 2011: 63; Liang 2007: 4; Mudde 2007: 22). All parties of the radical right in this study emphasize in their programme a law and order doctrine aimed at threats from outside the nation, such as mass immigration, and against internal political enemies (Heinisch 2003: 95). Moreover, parties of the radical right are sceptical of the European Union (EU). They oppose the shift of power from the national to the supranational level and seek to re-strengthen national sovereignty. However, it is rare for them to clearly reject a country's EU membership.

Furthermore, there are additional features that distinguish the radical right parties in post-communist Europe from similar parties outside this region. One is a strong statist position on economic issues, expressed in condemnation of privatization and calls to re-nationalize recently privatized industries (Ghodsee 2008: 36). The pro-state position of radical right parties is also protectionist: that their own nation should be put first – for example, to 'buy Hungarian' – and can therefore be labelled economic nationalism (Biró-Nagy and Róna 2013: 8–9). Furthermore, radical right parties in post-communist Europe share a clear anti-establishment attitude. They present themselves as opponents of the political elite, which they usually portray as corrupt and not representative of the will of the people (Eatwell 2004: 12; Rydgren 2005: 427). Outside the post-communist region these are features of populism. Mudde (2007: 23) claims that such an ideology 'considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of the people'. In the light of these features, we define as radical right those political parties from post-communist Europe that fulfil more or less the following criteria: they reject liberal democracy (have an anti-parliamentary ideology), use an anti-pluralist and anti-minority rights rhetoric, strive for a nation-state in the nativist tradition, promote a law and order doctrine aimed against external threats to the nation (including scepticism about the EU), favour a statist position on economic issues, and display an anti-establishment attitude.


Buhr 2017

Please note that the definition of "radical right" used in this paper includes two key characteristics—(1) exclusive notions of national belonging and (2) anti-system sentiment. While early work on the radical right highlighted the neoliberal economic tendencies of the radical right (e.g. McGann and Kitschelt 1995), this is not a requirement for inclusion in this category, and populist tendencies are covered well in the literature (see Mudde 2007). Thus the shift of the FN from neoliberal economic policies to populist ones does not change their placement in the radical right category.

(Renee L. Buhr, "Mapping the political opportunity space of secularism: French republican appeals to laïcité," French Politics (2017), n.4)

Cavallaro 2017
In this study we rely on nativism as a necessary and sufficient ideological feature to consider a party as belonging to the RR family. This family then is often associated with populism and authoritarianism, but these two features, although shared, are neither necessary nor sufficient. They are considered in the following chapters, which develop the hypotheses, because of the importance accorded to them in the literature. However, we agree with Zaslove (2009) that focusing on them identifies a subgroup rather than the whole party family.


Caiani and Kröll 2017
Recent academic attempts to define the (new) radical right have tended to shift attention from "old" fascism to "new populism". If the "old" radical right was identified with ultranationalism, the myths of decadence and of rebirth, conspiracy theories and anti-democratic stances (Eatwell 2003), then the current "populist radical right parties" (Mudde 2007; original emphasis) combine populist anti-establishment critiques with ethno-cultural nationalism (nativism), xenophobia and socio-cultural authoritarianism (law and order, family values) (Mudde 2007, 21; Rydgren 2007; Loch and Norocel 2015). Populism and ethno-cultural exclusionary nationalism are increasingly indicated among scholars as distinguishing populist radical right parties from parties of the mainstream (Rydgren 2006). Whilst populism and nationalism are sometimes conceived of as two sides of the same coin, this article conceives them as two distinct concepts, thus problematising the often "naturalised" relation between these nationalist and populist dimensions of the identity-building process of the radical right.

(Manuela Caiani & Patricia Kröll, "Nationalism and Populism in Radical Right Discourses in Italy and Germany," Javnost - The Public (2017), pp. 1-19 (at 1-2))

Michel 2017
I define radical right parties with two criteria: being nationalist (i.e. insisting on a "dominant national paradigm", Kitschelt 2007) and xenophobic or exclusionist (Rydgren 2005). This study focuses on the electoral arena; therefore a number of other political groups that share both features are not included in this definition. Fascist, neo-Nazi, identitaires political groups are not considered to be radical right parties in this study on the count that they do not comply with the democratic electoral rules of Western democracies and often foster political violence. The present analysis is also limited to Western Europe, where such radical right parties have emerged within stable party systems. In addition to these criteria, all West European radical right parties share an additional common feature: the populist ideology (Mény and Surrel 2002, Kriesi and Pappas 2015). . . . However, defining these parties as exclusionist and nationalist covers the central characteristics of populism. Hence, the concept of populism is not discarded from the definition of radical right parties; but rather considered a dimension to study when working on the radical right (a section of the present chapter presents how the populist ideology explains the radical right's success through the mobilization of protest voters).

LITERATURE REVIEW BY ENSSER (2012)
There is hardly a way around ideology (and party policy as its everyday manifestation) as a criterion for the classification of parties. All serious attempts at defining or classifying parties take into account the centrality of ideology. However, the multitude of – at best partly overlapping – definitions present in the scientific literature implies that the parties of the radical right ‘can be regarded as highly diverse in their ideological appeals' (Norris, 2005: 43). Ignazi (1992, 2003), for instance, suggests classification in three steps: by (1) a spatial criterion, that is, placement on the far right, (2) anti-system stances, and (3) a reference to fascist ideology. While the first two criteria are understood as necessary features of what Ignazi terms ‘extreme right' parties, the latter serves as an indicator for distinguishing ‘old' from 'new' right-wing extremism. The limitations of this definition clearly lie in its exclusiveness: If the anti-system criterion is applied too rigidly, some parties that are commonly perceived to be among the ‘usual suspects' may be left out. More recently, Ignazi's classification scheme has been modified by Carter (2005), who defines ‘right-wing extremism' (Carter's terminology) as encompassing a rejection of (1) democratic principles and norms, and (2) human equality. While arguably improving on Ignazi's spatial criterion by specifying right-wing as rejecting human equality, the anti-system criterion appears even more uncompromising now. Betz (1998, 3; see also 1994), on the contrary, argues that ‘what unites these parties and movements is programmatic radicalism and populist appeal'. While the first feature seems to be compatible with Ignazi's anti-system criterion, the notion of populism hinders reconciliation between the two approaches. However, in synthesizing the reasoning of Ignazi and Betz, Taggart (1995) considers a party's location on the right, its antisystemness and populism central to the conceptualization of the radical right party family. One of the most technical and pragmatic approaches is Norris's (2005) method of relying on two 11-point scales (left–right and immigration) drawn from Lubbers's (2000) expert survey. All parties averaging above 8 on these scales are considered right-wing radical. Thus, Norris combines a spatial and a policy-related criterion while omitting the anti-system criterion. Introducing another concept, Eatwell (2000: 412) suggests that ‘the extreme right family of parties have a common core doctrine [... ]. This is nationalism'. Yet, while it is true that radical right-wing parties tend to exhibit nationalist attitudes, this is neither a defining feature (considering regionalist parties such as the Northern League) nor one that necessarily distinguishes these parties from others on the centre–right. In response to the latter problem, Mudde (2007: 19) has recently made a case for the term nativism as an alternative to nationalism. In a nutshell, nativism argues for a homogeneous nation-state inhabited only by members of the nation. In what may be the most well-founded attempt at defining the radical right (populist) ideology to date (Mudde, 2007: 15–31), he complements this core concept with those of authoritarianism (‘the belief in a strictly ordered society') and populism (an ideology of "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite"). Mudde (2007: 24) also offers a meaningful distinction between
the terms 'extremist' and 'radical', of which the former is a specification of the latter: the extreme right encompasses all features of the radical right plus anti-democratic features as a defining element.

(Laurenz Ennser, "The homogeneity of West European party families: The radical right in comparative perspective," *Party Politics* 2012 18: 151-171 (at 155-156))

**LITERATURE REVIEW BY TIPALDOU (2015)**

1.3.1. Definition of the radical right in the existing literature

The definition of the 'radical right' has been under extensive scholarly debate and has produced multiple definitions, which have brought about confusing academic uses (Klandermans & Mayer 2006: 4). By the middle of the 1990s, Cas Mudde (1996) found 28 competing definitions and 58 different ideological dimensions of the contemporary extreme right in the literature. The radical right has been considered one 'style of thought' of the 'right', together with the reactionary right, the moderate right, the extreme right and the new right.

The term 'right' can be distinguished in three different cultural-ideological traditions. The first one is based on British conservatism and Edmund Burke's thinking, it emphasizes order and tradition while accepting modernity. Specifically, this definition stresses the need for authority, law and religion, the 'necessity' of hierarchical societal organization and the importance of family and natural community bonds. Post-1980s neo-conservatism belongs to right wing democratic ideology and is clearly distinguished from anti-democratic thinking (Ignazi 2003:14).

The second tradition stems from the German conservatism of the early nineteenth century and is influenced by Karl Mannheim. Its basic features are backward looking, pragmatism, anti-egalitarianism, and opposition to market capitalist property rights. It is counter-revolutionary, rejects modernity and aims at recasting society according to nature (Ignazi 2003: 15).

The third tradition is a new phenomenon of the twentieth century: Fascism. Roger Griffin's influential study on fascism defines it as a "genus of political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism" (Griffin 1991:26). Populist ultra-nationalism rejects the principles of absolutism and of pluralist representative government, repudiates 'traditional' and 'legal/rational' forms of politics with 'charismatic' leaders,

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6 According to Ignazi, the new right refers to a cultural movement of some conservative think tanks and publishing enterprises. It is anti-statist and pro-liberal, whereas its French version, the Nouvelle Droite, is anti-statist and anti-liberal, therefore misleading as it does not convey extremist anti-system ideas (Ignazi 2003:28ff).

7 The affiliation of some fascist and neo-fascist fringes with the Left makes it complicated to comprise it with the Right. The scholarly debate on the nature of fascism, its taxonomy on the Right-Left axis and the degree of its revolutionism is broad and extends beyond the scope of this research.
The term palingenetic refers to a 'new birth' occurring after a period of perceived decadence (Griffin 1991 :36).

According to Anthony Smith (2001: 9), nationalism is an ideology that places the nation at the centre of its concerns and seeks to promote its well-being. This is comprised of three goals: national autonomy, national unity and national identity. For a nationalist, the nation cannot survive without attaining all three. Smith suggests an inductive working definition of nationalism: "An ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential 'nation'".

tends to be associated with a nation\(^{10}\) as a 'higher' racial, historical, spiritual or organic reality, and this nation is considered as a natural order by its members, who have to protect it from a number of dangers, ranging from immigration and miscegenation to 'modern society's values' (Griffin 1991:37). The palingenetic ultra-nationalism defines a political energy 'those mobilizing vision is that of the national community rising phoenix-like after a period of encroaching decadence which all but destroyed it" (Griffin 1991:38). To sum up, the fascist tradition is apprehensive of civilization and aspires to the construction of a utopian community where spiritual values overcome material interests (Ignazi 2003:18).

The term 'radical' originates from the supporters of the French Revolution, the 'left', and is still used by left-wing groups or by progressive liberal groups (Mudde 2007:24). The term 'right-wing radicalism' is often used interchangeably with the term 'right-wing extremism', not without raising subsequent criticism. Piero Ignazi (2003: 28) for instance, considers the term 'extreme right' to be more advantageous than the term 'radical right', because the latter is identified through individuals' personality traits (and not as a set of political values), it describes a ver limited sector due to its use for movements and groups of the counter-revolutionary anti-modern tradition that even adopt violent means, and it is ambiguous because of its different use in the American and German tradition (Mudde 2000:12).

Regarding this last point, in the American tradition the term 'radical right' is commonly used for "a wide variety of groups and small political parties that rekindled a special American tradition of right-wing radicalism" (Sprinzak 1991:10). These parties, based on the old school of nativism, populism, and hostility to central government, have developed a new post-World War II combination of 'ultranationalism and anti-communism, Christian fundamentalism, militaristic orientation, and anti-alien sentiment" (Sprinzak 1991: 10). "The radical right can include movements that are conspiratory but not race-based, extreme right as those committed to white/Aryan supremacy, and far right as including both radical and extreme rightists as well as ultranationalists" (Blee & Creasap 2010 [Durham 2000]).

'Nativism', in particular, is a central term in our study and can be defined as "an ideology, which

\(^{10}\) Nation is "a named community occupying a homeland, and having common myths and a shared history, a common public culture, a single economy and common rights and duties for all members".
It differs from an ethnie that shares the three first characteristics, but does not necessarily occupy the homeland, has one or more elements of shared culture and a measure of solidarity among the elites (Smith 2001: 13).

holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state" (Mudde 2007:19). Nativism is closely related with the idea that non-native people are a threat to the state's homogeneity; therefore it includes a combination of nationalism and xenophobia (Mudde 2007: 22).

'Populism' is an ideology, which postulates that society is divided between "the pure people" and "the corrupted elite". For the populists, politics exists to express the people's general will, which is more important than human rights or constitutional guarantees. It is "a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, the 'pure people' versus the 'corrupt elite' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people (Mudde 2007: 23). Hans-Georg Betz describes radical right parties as populist "in their unscrupulous use and instrumentalization of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment and their appeal to the common man and his allegedly superior common sense (Betz 1994:4). Herbert Kitschelt describes populist antistatism, which differs from the New Radical Right, and can be electoral profitable for political entrepreneurs, as "primarily directed against 'big government' and the 'political class' that dominates a country's politics through the conventional parties, but to a much lesser extent against the libertarian themes of multiculturalism, environmentalism, gender liberation and direct political participation" (Kitschelt & McGann 1997: 21).

In the German tradition the distinctive point between radicalism and extremism is their stance vis-à-vis democracy, and both terms can be used for the right-wing and for the left-wing. The difference between radicalism and extremism, according to the official definition of the German state, is that radicalism is a radical critique on the constitutional order without any anti-democratic meaning, whereas extremism is anti-democratic, anti-liberal and anti-constitutional (Ignazi 2003:28). Of a different connotation are the terms 'neo-Nazism' and 'neo-Fascism'. They are used for formations, whose ideological influence is historical National Socialism or Fascism and whose objective is the restoration of the Third Reich or the Italian Social Republic respectively (Mudde 2000a: 12).

The ideological features used in the bibliography for the definition of the radical right or the extreme right vary considerably. In what follows I will only present a few of the existing definitions, on which I base my understanding of the radical right in Russia. The criteria for the organizations' categorization may vary in quantity, from one, e.g. xenophobia (Fennema 1997) to ten, e.g. nationalism, ethnocentrism, anti-communism, anti-parliamentarism, anti-pluralism, militarism, law and order thinking, a demand for a strong political leader, anti-Americanism, and cultural pessimism (Falter & Schumann 1988).
Seymour M. Lipset and Earl Raab (1970) give a "relativist" definition for extremism and use it to describe someone who is going beyond the limits of the normative procedures which define the democratic political process. Extremism is for them a "self-serving term" (Klandermans & Mayer 2006: 4). What matters are procedures, not issues; it may mean going to the poles of the ideological scale or embracing authoritarianism and totalitarianism.

For Hans-Georg Betz (1994:4) radical right-wing populist parties are radical "in their rejection of the established socio-cultural and socio-political system and their advocacy of individual achievement, a free market, and a drastic reduction of the role of the state without, however, openly questioning the legitimacy of democracy in general". They are right-wing, because they reject individual and social equality, because they oppose the social integration of marginalized groups and because they are xenophobic or even racist and anti-Semitic.

Piero Ignazi combines spatial with ideological definitions. He argues that the "extreme right denotes the issues and organizations that are close to one extreme of the political spectrum", meaning the right of the left-right continuum, and "the extremeness is related to 'anti-system' value sets" (Ignazi 2003:30; 1997). These 'anti-system' value sets, often intertwined with anti-democratic values, are the key feature of the new extreme right, while the old extreme right was characterized by fascism (Ignazi 1997).

Michael Minkenberg (1998:33) defines the radical right as "a political ideology" based on a myth in the form of a populist and romantic ultra-nationalism that tendentiously opposes liberal democracy and its basic values of liberty and freedom, as well as the categories of individualism and universalism". Characteristic of radical right thinking is the emphasis on social homogeneity, and therefore they explicitly support the creation of a homogenous nation with priority over individuals and their civil rights. The national myth is the idea of an individual's belonging to a nation, defined by certain ethnic, religious, linguistic, cultural and political criteria (Beichelt/ Minkenberg 2002:249-250).

Ideologies are conceived as "mass belief systems", which means "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence Minkenberg 1998:32).

Sabrina Ramet (1999: 13) uses the term radical right interchangeably with the terms 'ultraright' and 'extreme right' for twentieth-century incarnations of "organized intolerance": the refusal to allow the right of existence of alternative ideas. The intolerance of 'the Right' gives emphasis to the restoration and imposition of supposedly traditional values that are based on a fictional reconstruction of the past (Ramet 1999:4). This intolerance manifests as a war against society itself and legitimizes violence against designated "outsiders" (Ramet 1999:13). The radical right is also characterized by hostility to popular sovereignty and advocacy of authoritarianism based on populism, the obsession with conspiracies, and the authoritarian equation of the community with the Nation (Ramet 1999: 15-17).
Betz and Johnson (2004: 312) use the term 'radical right parties' for parties that use a radical language to confront their opponents and have a radical political project. Cas Mudde (2007:26) defines the term 'radical' as opposition to fundamental values of liberal democracy and the term 'right' as the belief in a natural order with inequalities.

A broader definition of the 'far right' or the 'extreme right wing' includes less sophisticated exclusionary groups on the basis of ethnic and racial principles, from ultranationalist intellectual circles to skinheads, "those informal or formal (legally established) groups that demand the exclusion of other individuals from public life, civil rights or national territory on 'the basis of ascribed differences between human beings' [Umland 2005:35]" (Valga 2008:562ff.). These differences vary from physical characteristics to membership in an ethnic or religious group (Varga 2008:563).

There are two critiques concerning the people who are involved in the radical right, either voting for radical right parties or participating actively. First of all, that they are considered a homogeneous population. Klandermans and Mayer (2006) challenge this view by underlining the difference between radical right voters and activists. By activists they mean "individuals who are not only members but active participants in a movement" that do not only cast a ballot for radical right parties, but are deeply committed (Klandermans & Mayer 2006: 3; Klandennans 1997). This

suggests that extreme right activists may have different profiles and motivations than other sympathizers.

Second, this non-homogeneous population is not cut-off from its broader environment. There are instances of multiple memberships for example, not only with other radical right organizations, but also with different kind of groups, like football groups. Neither is it clear whether right-wing beliefs are the effect or the result of right-wing activity: if people joined right-wing movements for ideological reasons, or if they adopted right-wing ideology taking part in right-wing activity (see more in Blee & Creasap 2010). Therefore, the radical right should not be studied separately from both other movement organizations and the wider societal context.

Activists studied by Klandermans & Mayer (2006: 7) were not only active in political parties. Their mobilization reached a broader scope that takes the form of a social movement in Sidney Tarrow's terms (1998: 3): "collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, opponents and authorities". Therefore, the study on the participation of radical right organizations shall consider the people involved in the process ofthe radical right party formation and development as movement activists, their organizations as movement organizations,
and their actions as a cycle in a longer trajectory (Klandermans & Mayer 2006: 7). A social movement organization (SMO) is "a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or a counternovement and attempts to implement these goals" (McCarthy & Zald 1977 1218).


**LITERATURE REVIEW BY ORSHOLITS (2017)**

Ignazi proposes three criteria which can be used to distinguish extreme right parties from other right-wing parties: their position on the political spectrum, the party's ideology (and whether it references fascism), and attitudes towards the political system. . . . In his later work, the second and third criteria are merged into a single ideological criterion and extreme right parties are instead defined as holding values and attitudes that are radically opposed to their particular political systems (Ignazi 2006:32). The definition of radical right-wing populism offered by Betz (1994:3) builds on each component which composes the party family's name. In his view radical denotes: [The] rejection of the established socio-cultural and sociopolitical system and their advocacy of individual achievement, a free market, and a drastic reduction of the role of the state without, however, openly questioning the legitimacy of democracy in general. The right-wing aspect refers to three elements. First, these parties oppose equality and efforts to reduce inequality. Second, they refuse to support the integration of marginalized groups. Finally, they make xenophobic (and possibly racist and anti-Semitic) appeals. The populist element derives from the parties’ practice of exploiting a general sense of disenchantment through appeals to common sense and the “common man.” Based on this definition, radical right-wing populist refers to an alliance of pro-capitalist economic positions with xenophobic and anti-universalistic tendencies that channel individuals’ dissatisfaction. Another early proposal for the definition of the “new radical right” party family is that of Kitschelt (1997). He retains two main criteria for inclusion. The first is that other competing parties must “perceive it [the party] to be ‘located on the right’ and not a viable coalition partner.” More precisely, a party is considered to belong to the new radical right when moderate right parties consider it to be too extreme to be included in a government coalition. The second criterion, when the party appeared on the political scene, is related to the view that new radical right parties are fundamentally opposed to the new or libertarian left and thus should have appeared “in the same general time period as their antagonists.” As such, Kitschelt considers right-wing parties founded in the latter half of the 1960s to be candidates for inclusion in the new radical right party family (49).

More recent definitions of the radical right-wing populist party family often do not refer to parties’ economic positions. In fact, newer definitions often explicitly state that these parties mobilize voters almost exclusively along a cultural line of conflict.
Bornschier (2010:35) proposes such a definition and establishes three criteria for the inclusion of political parties in the “extreme right-wing populist party family.” The first is that such parties should be located at the extreme right on the cultural dimension. Bornschier’s cultural dimension – which opposes libertarian-universalistic positions and traditionalist-communitarian positions – is similar to Kitschelt’s. Communitarians would be more likely to defend cultural homogeneity and view immigration as a threat unlike individuals holding universalistic and libertarian values (23).

for Mudde [(2007) there are] three dimensions which characterize the ideology of the radical right. The concept of nativism combines nationalism and xenophobia which are key elements of radical right-wing parties’ ideology (22). The second dimension is authoritarianism. In this case it does not refer to a tendency to support nondemocratic forms of government – though this is not precluded – but rather to “the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely” (23). The final aspect is populism which Mudde considers to be an ideology rather than just a style of politics. These parties believe that society is divided into two opposing groups – “the pure people” and the “corrupt elite” – and that politics should be the expression of the “general will of the people” (ibid.).

for Kitschelt . . . the radical right’s authoritarianism stems from its defence of the capitalist system and its paternalist, family-based method of accumulation. xenophobia, or nativism if we follow Mudde (2007), are central to party ideology (Kitschelt 1997:30–31). . . . The crux of the argument is that the radical right, in principle, is not anti-democratic unlike the extreme right (Kitschelt 1997:43, Mudde 2007:49). Rather, it is opposed to a certain type of democracy: liberal democracy (Mudde 2007:311). In summary, the different definitions of the extreme or radical right agree that such parties hold conservative and anti-liberal views of society. They support (culturally) exclusionist and nativist positions opposing themselves to anti-authoritarian politics and culturally open societies. In addition, radical right parties are not considered to be simply an expression of anti-immigration sentiments or an extension or refashioning of fascist ideals. Where the different definitions diverge is on the importance of taking into account a party’s economic agenda. While Betz and Kitschelt contend that the radical right holds pro-capitalist and neoliberal economic beliefs, later definitions such as those offered by Mudde or Bornschier contend that the economy doesn’t necessarily contribute to the appeal of the radical right.


DEBATES OVER DEFINITIONS
On the debate over the definition of the radical right, see Roger Eatwell, "The Rebirth of the 'Extreme Right' in Western Europe,” Parliamentary Affairs 53 (2000): 410-414; Cas Mudde, "The War of

(David Art, "Memory Politics in Western Europe" (Badia Fiesolana: European University Institute, 2010), p. 2 n.5, http://diana-n.ue.it:8080/bitstream/handle/1814/13248/MWP_2010_01.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)

The scholarship on radical right parties states that the minimal defining feature of such parties is their appeal to a restrictive and exclusionary view of national identity (e.g. Mudde 2007, Rydgren 2007, Eatwell 2000). . . . This analysis (see Table 1-1) of the relationship between exclusionary views of national identity and nationalism on the one hand and radical right vote intention on the other shows that there is no substantive or statistically significant relationship between exclusionary beliefs about national identity or nationalism and radical right vote intention. These results suggest that national attachments do not matter at all in predicting radical right voting. This is puzzling, since scholarship asserts exclusionary beliefs about national identity are the defining feature of radical right parties and lay the foundation upon which such parties appeal to voters.


However these parties are defined, the principle ingredients of right-wing extremism tend to be racism, xenophobia, nationalism, anti-democracy and a belief in a strong state (McGowan 2002, 3). Radical right political parties are identified by Hans Georg-Betz as parties that "reject individual and social equality and political projects that seek to achieve it" and that oppose the "social integration of marginalized groups" and finally, by their appeal to "xenophobia, if not overt racism and anti-Semitism" (Betz 1994, 4). However this definition does not address the economic appeal of these parties. Herbert Kitschelt (1995) identifies radical Right parties as not only being paternalistic, exclusive and xenophobic; he observes that these parties are also often purveyors of free market ideologies. Kitschelt defines radical right parties as those that "stand for strong authoritarian-paternalist procedures and reject participatory debate" (Kitschelt 1995, 20). Further, he notes that these parties advocate the "spontaneous allocations of resources through market institutions but reject redistributive schemes of planned allocation" (ibid).

(Marcella J. Myers, “Important or Impotent? Radical Right Political Parties and Public Policy in Germany and Austria” (Ph.D., Western Michigan University, 2009), p. 8, https://search.proquest.com/openview/cf0763a5d50af484dc1f5e9878ab91ca/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y and http://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1719&context=dissertations)
Hans-Georg Betz has defined radical right-wing parties with some criteria that are valid for all democracies: a fundamental rejection of the democratic rule of the game, of individual liberty, and of the principle of individual equality and equal rights, and their replacement by an authoritarian system are based on race, ethnicity or religion (Betz, Immerfall 1998: 3). C. Mudde has set forth criteria defining the radical right as well as types of right-wing parties. He defines the radical right in terms of four characteristics: nationalism, xenophobia, law and order, and a programme of welfare chauvinism (Mudde 2000: 177). Parties promoting a nationalistic doctrine call for political and cultural unity to produce a monocultural society dominated by the state. They speak out against internal enemies (homosexuals) and external enemies (supranational organisations). The socioeconomic programme is based on the dichotomy “us” and “them“, which defines a group of one’s own people to whom the social benefits are addressed (Mudde 2000: 177).


The traditional way of studying or defining radical right parties or movements was to define them through a single feature, identified as central to the parties' identities. Usually, this feature was an extreme apprehension of the national community, or some sort of variant of this: racism, ultranationalism, xenophobia, anti-immigration policies, and so forth. It was understood that this was the central element to the parties' policies and encapsulated the message which they wanted to transmit toward the voting public; or in another way, the feature with which they attempted to market themselves and set themselves apart from the rest on the political scene. Since this approach did not yield a good understanding of the dynamics of radical right parties and did not explain much, it was soon replaced by what can be termed the "checklist" method. This school, more refined than the first, operated on the correct assumption that the core of a party's beliefs or existence cannot be summarized by a single element, even if it be it central to their discourse.

Working within this checklist method scholars such as Hartmann (6) proceeded to put together lists of elements, linked together in particular logic, which would best express the nature of the radical right. Elements such as nationalism, populism in socio-economic affairs and anti-democracy were identified by Macridis (7) and Falter and Schumann (8). The problem with this approach is that it is fairly vulnerable to criticism from the comparative school. These theories are highly dependent on the set of data and on the objects they study; for example, studies of Eastern and East-Central European radical right wing parties oftentimes cannot fit well into these checklists. There is also the question of what the exact minimum is for features necessary to define (even for heuristic use) a party as belonging to the radical right. If, for example, a party is pro law and order, nationalist, and socially conservative, but not opposed to democracy and immigration, can it be called radical right?

Mudde suggested a new approach, adapting the term "party families" for the radical right and creating the concept of the "extreme right party family". This placement of radical right wing parties within the larger space of "political families" allows for more attention to be given to specific national and spatial contexts within which the respective parties or movements actually exist. Moreover, the
parties themselves do not have to strictly correspond to a number of requirements, or contain the rigorous list of ingredients which would suggest "extremism". Mudde's "extreme right party family" is centered around one ideological core, made up of a set of "consensual" elements: nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and the strong state (9). Mudde also added welfare chauvinism and a belief in law and order as further possible sub-elements (10). The author distinguishes between two subgroups within the "family" of radical right wing parties: the ethnic and the state nationalist Right. They are divided according to their ideological specificities, owing to historical proximity to the pre-1945 period. Mudde's scheme represents a departure from the previous theoretical approaches to the topic of radical right wing parties, as he attempts to analyze them through their ideologies, and contends that while variable and corresponding to national contexts, they share a common ideological core.

However, his blueprint of the core of right-wing extremism does not accurately address the question of continuity, his studies concentrating, as they do, on what he has deemed "the third wave" of the phenomena. His blend of the ideological elements stated above, or at least some combination of a part of them, is rather loose. It does not explain the inner logic with which these elements are combined or what (perceived) socio-political needs the radical right wing seems to address. Both the continuity question and the matter of the inner logic can be dealt with by adapting Mudde's conclusions (the existence of an ideological core, consisting of the combination of the above-mentioned parts) and supplementing them with a concept of fascism borrowed from the intellectual history of interwar political thought. Roger Eatwell's thesis, built on the combination of rising political legitimacy of the extreme right and a growing personal efficacy and declining trust in the system, (11) put forward a meta-historical theorem which could be applied to past and present cases. It is especially this last part, declining trust in the power of the political-economic system to provide for the needs of the people, which is in common with the theory of another British historian, Roger Griffin. Griffin's definition of fascism, as a form of palingenetic populist ultranationalism (12), contains the key to develop a scheme in which to address the issue of continuity and inner logic. The British historian explains the term of palingenesis as a total revolution of state, economics, and society, from the legislative through to the cultural level. He develops this idea further by adding to it the concept of liminoid society (13). In this state, a part of society which supports the extreme right, perceives itself as being on the brink of great change.


In the literature any party to the right-of-center that does not fit into the conservative mainstream is eligible to be called radical right-wing. Four prominent characterizations of the radical right wing have emerged: the fascist legacy, the list of features strategy, the populist description, and the protest party portrayal. Jürg Steiner agrees that the radical right-wing parties are in some ways derived directly from European fascism of the first part of the twentieth century (Steiner 1995, 13). Piero Ignazi also presents this type of “old” radical right-wing party that is connected to the fascist historical legacy (Ignazi 1992). Geoff Eley, a noted German historian and scholar, describes the peculiarities that set fascism apart from other conservative movements, including a central social organization, strong nationalism, and the idea of a “race-community” secured through battling foreign influences (Eley 1990, 52). The list-of-features strategy for defining the radical right-wing parties is best exemplified by the work of Falter and Schumann, which presents ten features: extreme nationalism, ethnocentrism, anticommunism, anti-parliamentarism, anti-pluralism, militarism, law-and-order thinking, a demand for a strong political leader or executive, anti-Americanism, and cultural pessimism (Falter and Schumann 1988, 101). The populist description suggests that the right-wing radical parties utilize status quo conditions of anxiety and frustration with everything from the economy to the government to appeal to the average person (Betz 1994, 4). Finally, radical right-wing parties have been classified as protest parties because they typically stand against many things such as present social values, present socioeconomic conditions, immigrants, and foreigners. Paul Taggart suggests that populist candidates often employ an opposition or anti-everything strategy, opportunistically challenging the legitimacy of their competition in order to construct their own identity (Taggart 1995, 37). Rather than defining themselves explicitly by their own objectives, populists notoriously define themselves by what they stand against. Radical right-wing parties frequently exhibit this characteristic as they attempt to position themselves strategically often by taking up issue space where other parties leave a vacuum (Kitschelt 1995). All four of these ways to characterize the radical right wing fail to provide reasons for their legitimacy and beg questions about the criteria employed. In particular, the list-of-features approach suggests a garbage-can model, where many items listed apply to special cases.


Similar to the attempts of terrorism scholars to confront the absence of an agreed definition of terrorism, two complementing conceptual approaches have evolved to describe the far right. The first approach aims at a minimal definition based on the "lowest common denominator" principle, looking for the maximum number of elements that have characterized all manifestations of far-right political activism. The second approach attempts to achieve an inclusive definition based on the "most similar system design," seeking the greatest number of possible similarities among at least some parts of the research population. In essence, the second approach has reflected an effort to expand the boundaries of the far-right “family” and decrease the extent of gray areas between the mainstream right and the far right.